Cybersecurity & Tech Surveillance & Privacy

The Administration Decision on Encryption Policy

Herb Lin
Monday, October 12, 2015, 4:23 AM

The New York Times reported on October 11, 2015 that

The Obama administration has backed down in its bitter dispute with Silicon Valley over the encryption of data on iPhones and other digital devices, concluding that it is not possible to give American law enforcement and intelligence agencies access to that information without also creating an opening that China, Russia, cybercriminals and terrorists could exploit.

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The New York Times reported on October 11, 2015 that

The Obama administration has backed down in its bitter dispute with Silicon Valley over the encryption of data on iPhones and other digital devices, concluding that it is not possible to give American law enforcement and intelligence agencies access to that information without also creating an opening that China, Russia, cybercriminals and terrorists could exploit.

In the same story, a spokesperson from the National Security Council is quoted as saying

“As the president has said, the United States will work to ensure that malicious actors can be held to account, without weakening our commitment to strong encryption. . . . As part of those efforts, we are actively engaged with private companies to ensure they understand the public safety and national security risks that result from malicious actors’ use of their encrypted products and services. However, the administration is not seeking legislation at this time.”

Assuming these reports to be true, we need to keep the following points in mind:

  1. In the absence of legislation, executive branch policy can stand only until the next administration. Thus, even if the present admin had said that it would *never* seek a legislative or technical back door to encrypted products or services (according to the NY Times, a statement sought by Tim Cook), it would not necessarily have had a binding effect past January 2017.
  2. In the event of a horrific event for which encryption was used in its planning, the political calculus may well change. Indeed, it would be surprising if legislation and even a template for the press release had not already been drafted in support of mandatory exceptional access.
  3. The NY Times reported that the intelligence agencies were less vocal in their concerns about encryption, which it posited reflected their greater capabilities to gather information. If so, it suggests the desirability of increasing the technical capabilities of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to deal with encrypted data and communications when encountered. Note that this recommendation was also a part of the 1996 National Research Council report Cryptography’s Role in Securing the Information Society, but alas, was never implemented.

Despite the Administration’s apparently final decisions on the encryption argument, I’m willing to bet anyone a cup of coffee that we have not seen the end of this discussion between now and January 21, 2017 (though I reserve the right to limit payouts based on my bank account).


Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in and knowledgeable about the use of offensive operations in cyberspace, especially as instruments of national policy. In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

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