House Cyber Legislation Amendments
One of the dangers of blogging about current events is that changing events tend to overtake what you have written. Earlier this week, I wrote about the two House bills currently moving through that chamber.
Amendments have been made to both bills. The Rogers-Ruppersberger amendment can be found here and the Lungren amendment in the nature of a substitute is
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One of the dangers of blogging about current events is that changing events tend to overtake what you have written. Earlier this week, I wrote about the two House bills currently moving through that chamber.
Amendments have been made to both bills. The Rogers-Ruppersberger amendment can be found here and the Lungren amendment in the nature of a substitute is available here. Both amendments make modest changes to the information sharing provisions of the respective bills.
Where, earlier, I had characterized the Rogers-Ruppersberger bill as “silent” on the question of limits on the sharing of cyber threat information for intelligence purposes. The amended bill makes two changes:
- First, the bill now says that "at least one significant purpose of " of sharing cyber threat information must be either a cybersecurity purpose or a national security purpose. Readers will see in this language echoes of the “significant purpose” debate over information sharing that came with the Patriot Act.
- Second, the bill now prohibits the Federal government from affirmatively searching cyber threat information shared with the government for any purpose other than cybersecurity or national security. In other words, it can use the information for prosecution in other unrelated crimes if it stumbles across that information, but it cannot attempt to affirmatively mine the information for other crimes.
- Methods for defeating a cyber operational control;
- Methods for spoofing individuals with access to enable the defeat of an operational control;
- Information exfiltrated from a computer system that describes the cyber attack
- Anomalous patterns of communication indicative of or for the purpose of enabling a cyber attack (but excluding content or routing information); or
- Methods of gaining remote access to a cyber system,
- Provided in all cases that reasonable efforts are made to remove information identifying individuals not associated with the cyber attack.
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group. Mr. Rosenzweig formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. He is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, a Senior Fellow in the Tech, Law & Security program at American University, and a Board Member of the Journal of National Security Law and Policy.