How Ukraine Is Challenging Russia in Africa and the Middle East

In April 2025, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa welcomed Volodymyr Zelenskyy to South Africa for the first official Ukrainian head-of-state visit since diplomatic ties were established 33 years ago. Ramaphosa highlighted Ukraine’s past support during South Africa’s liberation struggle and expressed a commitment to strengthening bilateral relations between both countries.

The visit is part of a larger Ukrainian strategy, one that seeks to take the battle against Russia to a global scale. Over the past three years, the frontlines of the Russo-Ukrainian war have extended far beyond Europe, into Syria, Sudan, and Mali. As Russia deepens its decades-long influence in Africa and the Middle East, Ukraine is working to challenge that dominance diplomatically and, where possible, militarily.

In its messaging to African countries, Ukraine has framed itself as a victim of Russian colonialism, a narrative meant to resonate with postcolonial African states. “Russia is a colonizer who wants to destroy our state,” President Zelenskyy told African media in August 2022. “Many of your ancestors went through this.” And in August 2023, former Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba launched a diplomatic push, touring several African capitals. During a stop in South Africa that November, he called the visit “a new chapter” in bilateral relations.

Yet compared to Russia, Ukraine has a limited diplomatic and economic presence in Africa. Russia has established a vast system of resource extraction; it operates 40 embassies on the continent—almost four times as many as Ukraine before 2022. Additionally, Russia has proved successful in presenting a competing narrative to African countries. As a result, Ukraine has struggled to convert moral alignment into strategic gains. 

Despite its smaller diplomatic footprint, Ukraine has made strides. Since 2022, it has opened eight new embassies in Africa, including in Mauritania, Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, bringing its total count in Africa to 18. In Nouakchott, Ukraine is offering to train Mauritanian soldiers and has delivered food aid to refugees fleeing Russia-backed forces in neighboring Mali. Ukraine’s top envoy to Africa, Maksym Subkh, said, “Ukraine is ready to continue training officers and representatives of the Mauritanian armed forces, to share the technologies and achievements that Ukraine has made.”

Moreover, where it has fallen short diplomatically, Ukraine has made significant gains militarily—striking Russian assets and targeting Russian allies far from the home front. Russia in turn, is attempting to expand its empire into Africa and strengthen its strategic foothold on the continent. 

Competing Influences in Africa

Russian Economic Extraction

Russia’s presence in Africa is ultimately about extraction and control. “In Africa, the Russians pursue several interests. Primarily, it’s about money and financial flows,” said Serhii Kuzan, chair of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center and former adviser to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. Russian mercenaries have been active on the continent, extracting resources since 2018 and fueling instability in exchange for access to gold mines and other natural wealth. Blood gold from Africa is helping to fund Russia’s imperial war in Ukraine. 

“Moscow is focused on plundering the resources of African countries for its own enrichment, including gas, oil, gold, diamonds, and other precious stones and minerals. To achieve this, it supports local juntas and other undemocratic regimes by providing military assistance in exchange for access to their resources,” said Kuzan. 

The Wagner Group has been a key instrument of this strategy. Active in countries like Mali, Sudan, and Libya, the Russian mercenary outfit has served as both a blunt military tool and an economic arm of the Kremlin. Wagner has helped prop up autocratic regimes in return for mining concessions and other lucrative resource deals.

“A vivid example is the activity of the private military company Wagner in Africa, though Moscow relies on more than just them. Many Russian security and intelligence agencies are involved in profiting from Africa, including the GRU,” added Kuzan. A former U.S. official stated that Russia has exploited Sudan’s resources, plundering billions in gold, and supported the coup to retain access.

On June 23, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Malian junta leader Col. Assimi Goita in Moscow, where they signed agreements to strengthen trade and economic ties. While current trade remains limited, Putin highlighted potential cooperation in energy, logistics, mining, and humanitarian sectors, stating that relations with Mali are on a “good upward trend.” Russia is also backing a new gold refinery in Mali, aimed at increasing local control over the country’s gold resources. These gold resources will then be used to help Moscow offset sanctions, providing funds for its war in Ukraine. 

Warring Narratives

Moscow continues to outpace Ukraine not just in its economic presence on the continent, but in its messaging. During his own Africa tour in July 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Ukraine of causing global food shortages through its sea mines—rather than Russia’s Black Sea blockade. Moscow accused the West of imposing a unipolar world order and suggested that Western newspapers are promulgating propaganda about Russia’s effect on the region. The Kremlin has also leveraged historic Soviet-era ties to expand its influence in Africa through arms deals, propaganda, and alliances with authoritarian regimes once backed by the USSR. 

Kuzan noted that changing how Russia is perceived on the continent depends on regime change. “Changing perceptions of Russia on the continent is only possible if there is a change in the authoritarian regimes in Africa, especially in the Sahel region,” he said. “Only then can the information environment and the pressure these governments place on their populations, who suffer from these partnerships with Russia, begin to shift.” 

According to Irina Filatova, professor emeritus at the University of KwaZulu–Natal, “It is next to impossible for Ukraine to challenge Russia’s power on the continent ‘aggressively.’” Moscow’s strength, she explains, lies in three pillars: massive arms sales, a “multi-faceted government-supported propaganda machine,” and support for any military junta willing to host Wagner mercenaries. 

In contrast to Russia’s destabilizing influence, Ukraine has long maintained a different kind of presence in Africa. Ukraine, though a newer actor in this theater, has attempted to differentiate itself through soft power and historical goodwill. As Olexiy Haran, research adviser at the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, noted, “Even during Soviet times, Ukraine was a co-founder of the United Nations and held its own seat in the General Assembly,” with Ukrainian diplomats playing active roles in decolonization and the anti-apartheid struggle. 

At the same time, Kuzan noted, the geopolitical vacuum is growing. “We are currently witnessing a shift in the policies of both countries, France and the U.S., toward the African region. Their support could potentially help counter Russian interests, but for now, France and the U.S. are largely reducing their presence and influence in the region. This, in turn, only strengthens not only Russia but also other countries active in Africa and the Global South more broadly.”

During a coup in Niger in July 2023, many of the coup supporters openly expressed their distaste for France, Niger’s former colonial ruler. Thousands marched through Niger’s capital. Many of these demonstrators waved Russian flags, signifying Russia’s influence in the region. 

The New York Times reported that in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (the “Coup Belt”), the Russian flag “has emerged as a trendy accessory, much like a Che Guevara illustration a generation ago in the West.” That symbolism is taking on physical form elsewhere on the continent: In the Central African Republic (CAR), a bronze statue of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and his deputy Dmitry Utkin was unveiled in December 2024. During a final visit to CAR and Mali before his death in 2023, Prigozhin posed for photos with locals, which Wagner later released with captions hailing him as a “second Nelson Mandela.” The New York Times reported that Sputnik, a Kremlin-backed media outlet, opened an office in Ethiopia in February and announced plans to expand further into South Africa and possibly Tanzania.

In contrast, Ukraine’s media visibility in Africa has been minimal. Filatova points out that historical memory favors Russia. “Despite the fact that many Africans studied and received military training in Ukraine, for them the USSR was Moscow, not Kyiv,” she said. Worse still, Ukraine’s alignment with the West, seen by many in Africa as a neocolonial power, damages its image. “Ukraine’s greatest weakness in their eyes is the fact that it has left the USSR and is now an ally of the West,” she added. “It is not easy to work in Africa due to Russian, Chinese, and sometimes general anti-Western sentiment,” said Haran. 

This challenge is compounded by growing pro-Russian bias in parts of African academia. Some universities, influenced by Soviet-era ties, Russian disinformation, and financial dependencies, have begun echoing Kremlin narratives in research and public discourse.

Taking the Fight Abroad

But diplomacy is only half the story. Ukraine’s defense intelligence agency (HUR) has begun contesting Russian positions across Africa and the Middle East. In South Africa, Ukrainian intelligence agents disrupted multiple weapons transfers to Russia in 2022, including exposing the Lady R, a Russian cargo ship docked at the Simon’s Town naval base to load arms. The U.S. later protested against the South Africa government, based on intelligence passed by Ukraine. In 2023, Kyiv also considered targeting the Russian navy’s training ship, Smolny, in Cape Town but ultimately decided against the operation. 

In Sudan and other regions, Ukrainian operatives have reportedly targeted Wagner mercenaries and pro-Kremlin units. “Our operations are aimed at reducing Russian military potential, anywhere where it’s possible,” said Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence. “Why should Africa be an exception?” 

In July 2024, Tuareg insurgents ambushed Russian Wagner troops and Malian soldiers, killing 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian troops. The BBC reported that Ukrainian special forces had trained the separatists in the use of attack drones and provided intelligence to plan the strike. Andriy Yusov, spokesperson for HUR, commented on the attack by saying that the rebels had received “all the information they needed, which allowed [them] to carry out their operation against the Russian war criminals.” Ukraine did say it would adhere to international law if the rebels transferred prisoners that were captured from the ambush on Wagner forces.

“It appears that the insurgents received advance information and all necessary support to conduct a military operation against the Russian mercenaries,” said Kuzan. “However, there is no confirmed evidence that Ukraine was involved; Ukrainian intelligence has reported as much.” Ukraine’s intelligence reach has been so powerful, that even the CIA has reportedly been caught by surprise.

“It’s worth noting that among the Russian mercenaries killed were many criminals who had fought in Eastern Ukraine, including as far back as 2014,” said Kuzan. According to experts from the UN, Russia’s Wagner forces previously had committed war crimes in Mali. Young women trafficked from Africa are also being forced to work in factories producing weapons used by Russia to strike Ukrainian homes, infrastructure, and civilians, including children. Russia is also forcibly recruiting African migrants and students for its war in Ukraine. Investigations have revealed cases where African nationals were lured to Russia with fake job offers—such as shampoo factory work—only to be coerced into frontline military service or sent to drone factories producing Iranian-designed Shahed drones. 

Facing a wave of desertions fueled by Russia’s promise of high wages—reportedly around $2000 per month—Cameroon tightened border restrictions in March to stop soldiers from leaving for Moscow, where many have been lured by fake job ads and forced into frontline combat. Many were killed or wounded from Russia’s famed infantry suicide tactics, their families left searching for answers online. Some of the Africans fighting for Russia have been nicknamed the “Black Wagners.”

In Sudan, Ukrainian special forces reportedly provided training in first-person-view (FPV) drone tactics to government forces, aiming to help counter Wagner Group operatives active in the country. The Wall Street Journal wrote, “For Ukraine, sending troops to Africa is an audacious new venture—part of a strategy to disrupt Russia’s military and economic operations abroad, make the war more costly for Moscow, and position itself as a bulwark against Russian incursions, including in regions where the West has been reluctant to get directly involved.” 

That said, the strategy hasn’t enjoyed uniform success. Both the Sudanese government—supported by Ukraine—and the Sudanese rebels (Sudanese Rapid Support Forces) have committed war crimes in the conflict, problematizing Ukrainian involvement. The situation grew more tangled when Russia shifted its support from the rebels to the government. 

At a minimum, Kyiv’s strategy seems to revolve around denting Russia’s abilities to extract gold and other resources to cripple that revenue stream for Moscow. The deployment of special forces units, usually consisting of just a few dozen soldiers in places like Sudan and Syria, is relatively low cost. In the trenches of Ukraine, their specialized skills are often underutilized in conventional battles, especially as drones cover the skies hunting for soldiers and heavy armor. In contrast, these units thrive in remote environments, excelling at independent raids and harassing strikes where their training and expertise are indispensable. 

International Backlash and Legality Concerns

Ukrainian activities abroad have drawn criticism. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused Kyiv of opening “a second front in Africa” after failing to defeat Russia at home.

Following the July 2024 attack in Mali, the Jamestown Foundation highlighted that if Ukraine was involved, “it would find little in international law to support its intervention, which could risk international support for Kyiv.” Indeed, it is unlikely that Kyiv would be able to justify its military operations abroad in places like Mali. In response, however, Budanov noted, “War is a risky business. We are in a full-fledged war with Russia…They have units in different parts of the world, and we sometimes try to strike them there.” When it comes to hunting down Russians, Ukrainians appear undeterred by international legal obligations. 

Still, some experts remain skeptical about how much of a role Ukraine played in places like Mali. “It is not clear that Ukraine was actually involved in Mali,” said Antonio Giustozzi, Senior Research Fellow at RUSI. “If there was an involvement, it was likely by providing some funding and perhaps some equipment.” He further added, “This highlights how for Ukraine to support Russia’s enemies in Africa could be problematic: these enemies are typically rebels, often Islamist types. Supporting them in a significant way might damage Ukraine’s image.”

If Ukraine can hunt down Russian war criminals across Africa and kill Russian generals in Moscow, that might suggest Western fears of escalations are overblown. It also sends a message to the Kremlin, showing that Ukraine will keep exposing Russia’s fragility—which is often underestimated globally—and warning African countries to be cautious about placing too much trust in partnerships with Moscow.

The diplomatic fallout of Ukraine’s alleged involvement in Mali has been long-lasting. In April, Mali’s foreign minister, Abdoulaye Diop, met with Lavrov in Moscow and publicly labeled Ukraine a “terrorist state.” Kyiv, in turn, responded: “The true threat to African stability and progress is the Russian Wagner mercenaries, who bring nothing but death, destruction, and plunder wherever they go.” 

Throughout 2025, Russia has continued expanding its African Corps (formerly known as Wagner) in Mali. This is part of an effort to rebrand the notorious mercenary group and distance it from past war crimes. In June, the Associated Press reported that Russia had shipped artillery, armored vehicles, and radio-jamming equipment to Guinea, later smuggled into Mali to reinforce the Africa Corps. These arms transfers violated international sanctions and signaled Russia’s intent to tighten control over former Wagner operations. Shortly after, it was reported that Azawad rebels launched a series of ambushes on Russian and Malian forces, including FPV drone strikes that destroyed a convoy of Russian vehicles. 

Disrupting Russia’s Power in Syria

According to leaked U.S. intelligence, HUR at one point explored plans to coordinate with Kurdish fighters to strike Russian assets in Syria. In September 2024, Ukraine’s Khimik group successfully targeted a Russian base on the outskirts of Aleppo, reportedly used to test strike UAVs. Just weeks later, Ukrainian special forces attacked Russian positions in Syria’s Golan Heights, an area also used by Moscow to monitor Israel’s use of Western arms, in hopes of applying those lessons in Ukraine.

In late 2024, according to the Washington Post, Ukrainian intelligence sent 20 drone operators and about 150 FPV drones to Syrian rebels in Idlib, part of a covert effort to undermine the Assad regime, a long-standing Russian ally. The move reflected Budanov’s 2023 vow: “We will pursue Russians guilty of war crimes in any part of the world.” Alexander Lavrentiev, Russia’s presidential envoy for Syria, claimed that the Kremlin had evidence that HUR operated in Syria and was teaching the rebels how to handle FPV drones. 

Maj. Gen. Ilya Pavlenko, a former deputy head of HUR, noted that the fall of the Assad regime marked a personal blow to Putin, who had heavily invested in propping it up. The well-executed operation to dismantle Moscow’s influence in Syria involved months of planning and contributions from multiple nations, including Ukraine’s HUR.

While it’s unclear if Ukraine’s support played a major role, the collapse of Assad’s regime had significant ramifications for Moscow. Russia had a Soviet-era naval base in Tartus, which it had to withdraw from. The Russians went looking elsewhere, including in Libya and Sudan (Moscow has also considered Eritrea). The U.S. has warned that anyone who helps Russia establish a naval base in Sudan would face “serious consequences.” 

One recent sign of Moscow’s logistical retreat came in April, when the Ursa Major, a Russian military-linked cargo ship reportedly en route to extract equipment from Syria, sank in the Mediterranean. Though Russia claimed the vessel was bound for Vladivostok, Ukrainian intelligence reported it was removing weapons from Tartus following Assad’s fall.

Mohamed Suliman, a Sudanese expert, noted that if Russia were to build a naval base on the Red Sea, it would give Putin a strategic foothold to project power and threaten a key global trade route—potentially allowing Russia to pressure Europe by disrupting the flow of goods through a region that handles 30 percent of the world’s shipping containers.

Iran, too, has claimed Ukrainian involvement on its soil. In June, Tehran announced it had arrested and sentenced to death three Ukrainian nationals allegedly working with Israel’s Mossad to sabotage a Shahed drone factory in Isfahan. The drones made there—including the Shahed-136—have been widely used by Russia against Ukraine.

***

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s fight has gone global. The frontline of the Russia-Ukraine war now extends far beyond the borders of both countries. However, involvement in foreign conflicts remains a risky endeavor, particularly in places like Sudan, where engagement with either side can damage Ukraine’s image. Participation in military operations abroad may also undermine some of Kyiv’s diplomatic efforts in Africa. Still, with a full-scale invasion ongoing, Ukraine is focused on survival—and this means weakening Russia however, and wherever, possible.