Lawfare Daily: A Tumultuous Week in Ukraine-Russia Relations, with Anastasiia Lapatina and Mykhailo Soldatenko

[Intro]

Mykhailo Soldatenko: The fact that they want recognition of Crimea that's, I think that's, that's their genuine goal, even though I think it's, it's, it's not that important as Ukraine being in the sphere of influence.

Benjamin Wittes: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Benjamin Wittes, editor in chief of Lawfare, with Mykhailo Soldatenko, Lawfare fellow and doctoral candidate at the Harvard Law School and Anastasiia Lapatina, Lawfare’s Ukraine Fellow, and the author of the Yours Ukrainian Substack.

Anastasiia Lapatina: That's really the only place where I think the Ukrainian society can accept, okay, no NATO, we'll just build our own army. We'll just build our own capabilities. But everything else truly seems like stuff that, like people would go protest in the streets in mass over it.

Benjamin Wittes: It's been a busy week in Ukrainian/Russian relations, surprise attacks, massing of troops, blowing up of bridges, and peace talks in Istanbul that kind of went nowhere.

[Main Podcast]

So Nastya, get us started here. It's been a hell of a few days in Russian/Ukrainian relations. At the highest level of altitude give us an overview of what's happened.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay, that's a bit complicated because you know, the sheer volume of news over the past week is very impressive, I'd say.

But if I was to boil it down, on Monday, Ukraine and Russia held the second round of direct peace talks in Istanbul. And around that moment, both Ukraine and Russia are sort of pressing on the battlefield in whatever way they can to sort of up the stakes of those negotiations and show that they have the upper hand.

So from the Russian side, this is a very sort of tried and true Russian tactic that its used in other wars, in its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. When there is a negotiation happening, Russia doesn't stop on the battlefield, it ramps up its operations, it turns up the heat. And so that's what we're seeing on the battlefield in Ukraine right now.

There are reports of Russia amassing large numbers of troops around Sumy Oblast, that's in sort of the northeast of Ukraine. There is also some worrying reports about new Russian offensive throughout the summer that Russia is planning to capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast. So there is a lot going on, on the Russian side.

On the Ukrainian side, of course, we can't do as much strictly on the battlefield because Ukraine has manpower issues among many other issues on the battlefield. So we're using our asymmetric technological advantage, which of course was shown very dramatically this week through Operation Spiderweb, which was this sort of astonishing operation that Ukraine did, the Ukraine intelligence service, the SBU did deep inside Russia, targeting Russian strategic bombers, at least four Russian airfields with drones.

And so that's basically what happened. So we've got the negotiations on June 2, and then a lot of sort of kinetic escalation even though I hate that word from both sides around that negotiation date.

Benjamin Wittes: And that escalation has included also third attack on the Crimea Bridge.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right? I forgot about that. Yes.

Benjamin Wittes: Which according to Google Maps, is temporarily closed.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yes.

Benjamin Wittes: I looked it up this morning and Google Maps informs me that if I wanna drive over the bridge right now, I can't. Why is that?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right, I, thank you, I forgot about that. So, Spiderweb, the drone attack against Russian airfield, isn't the only thing that SBU has been up to this week. There were also reports yesterday that there were several explosions near the Crimean Bridge or the Kerch Bridge as it's sort of officially called by the Russians. That's of course the, the bridge that the Russians have built from the Russian mainland to the Crimean Peninsula that they occupied in Donestk, in 2014.

It, it, it's, it's been, it's played a huge role in the Russian war effort because that helps Russia and Russian forces reinforce the peninsula. And basically like they, through this bridge, Russia has turned Crimea into this one huge sort of aircraft carrier with a huge number of forces. So the, the Kerch Bridge has, has always been a legitimate target and a very desired target for the Ukrainian forces and for the Ukrainian people. We, we wanna see that thing destroyed. And so this was the third attack since the full-scale invasion. There were some attacks with long range missiles, but this was supposedly an explosion of stuff that was planted. Like there was, basically the, Ukraine’s forces mined the pillars of the bridge underwater and then that exploded yesterday. So that is also something that SBU did this week.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, so Mykhailo, let's talk about the negotiations in Istanbul. The headlines of which were that they lasted about an hour and that the Russian delegation told the Ukrainian delegation to stop pandering to childless European women with their insistence on getting Ukrainian kids back. For those who are think I'm joking, that's not a joke that's actually happened.

Is that all that happened in these negotiations or is there anything productive or interesting that's going on in Istanbul?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: So it's important to categorize issues that were addressed in one way or another in three buckets. Like humanitarian side, which concerns an exchange of prisoners of war, exchange of bodies, of dead soldiers and everything that's in the first bucket, and there was a success on that front/ And so if there was any value in those talks, the fact that right now, and we can talk it, it may be like thousand people returning home. So that's a big deal, especially on a personal level.

Benjamin Wittes: So, so pause there and let's, let's take the accomplishment seriously. What did the two sides agree to, and how should we see this against the previous round of negotiations which involved a thousand person each prisoner exchange? It seems like there's actually a set of common interests around, around prisoner exchanges and body repatriation, yeah?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah, that that's correct.

Although this time, for the first time, the parties agreed on all for all exchange, but on specific categories, not on numbers. And the categories include young soldiers, from 18 to 25 years old, and then seriously ill and wounded soldiers. And also exchange of bodies, 6,000 for 6,000, according to the Ukrainian side. So that's kind of a breakthrough.

And based on the reporting, it seems like they agreed on this categories, and that would be on a recurring basis. They would exchange lists of people under this categories in order to exchange. But obviously in the Ukrainian proposal, which we’ll talk about a bit later, Ukraine wants to do all for all, and that's something I think that is to be figured out later on and whether it's possible.

Yeah, so that's a humanitarian side and I think it's very important in and of itself, even though based on it, it's, it's, it's just like one small piece and we can talk about other components, other two buckets, which is a ceasefire as a precondition and political conditions.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I think the humanitarian side is, you know, these POWs exchanges, they're pretty easy for Russia to do in a sense that they sort of show goodwill and they give something to Trump, for example, to talk about. And it's, it's, it's a good thing. It's an objectively good thing, of course, for the Ukrainian side.

But for Russia, it's, it's sort of like showing your goodwill without budging on anything else, right? They're not backing down from any strategic things, but they're exchanging prisoners. So it's sort of like, it doesn't cost them anything really, but, but it shows that as though they're willing to negotiate and, and so on and so forth.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah. But it, it's a very interesting contrast to say the Israel/Gaza conflict where, you know, release of prisoners is actually the hardest issue, right?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: And here, it reflects the fact that it's a much more conventional state to state conflict, right? Where both parties, you know, want their own people back and people for people make sense. Whereas, you know, if you're Hamas, people for people doesn't make sense because you're not holding POWs, you're holding hostages.

And it's a, and you, you can do the, these relatively conventional prisoner exchanges as kind of goodwill gestures or PR gestures in this context. Whereas, you know, in, you know, Netanyahu just went back to war over 29 remaining hostages. And so there, I think it's a, it's actually a very interesting dynamic that this stuff is, is doable in this context.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I would though add that there's one thing that's a bit complicated with these exchanges and that's Azov fighters. So the fighters from the Azov Brigade have been sort of notoriously complicated to get back. Only a tiny amount of them have, have been returned from Russia. Supposedly from the reporting that we have, it's because Russia doesn't want to give them back.

And Azov fighters are of course, you know, Ukraine's most, some of Ukraine's most capable fighters. And, and many of them were defending Mariupol and Azovstal and it was this horrific, you know, really dramatic operation. Mariupol was encircled and they survived just horrific things and then sort of had to lay their arms and, and, and, you know, and ended up in Russian captivity.

Because there, there's this union of family members of Azov fighters in foreign captivity, and every time there's an exchange, there is a lot of pushback from that community that no Azov fighters have been included. So it's a, so that's like a, a component.

Benjamin Wittes: And why is it that the Russians are particularly resistant to releasing Azov fighters, is it because of an id, the ideological allegations about the Azov brigade, or is it because they are particularly celebrated in Ukraine and there's a sort of symbolic dimension? What's the, why does the Russians distinguish between as of fighters and other Ukrainian POWs?

Anastasiia Lapatina: The Russian have painted Azov as this, you know, terrorist group and that they say that they are terrorists and you know, Nazis. And they really draw out that, you know, all of those allegations of far right around the, the Azov Brigade to sort of paint them in the worst possible light.

But it's, it's a really kind of stark divide because for, for Ukrainians, of course, the Azov brigade are heroes because what, what they endured in Mariupol is just sort of unspeakable things, right? So the fact that they've withstood all of that just really sort of paints them as heroes here. But then Russia paints them as terrorists and, and to them it's like this ideological component that Russia is drawing out using, as always sort of the, the proof that that Ukraine is full of Nazis and things like that. And I think that component is for Russia to say that we're gonna prosecute them here in Russia and so on and so forth.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: And another speculation that I have is that the Azov Battalion and other similar battalions, they're one of the most capable–

Anastasiia Lapatina: Absolutely.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: And some people absolutely who returned from the Azovstal, they became the head of brigades and, you know, they, they're very capable.

Benjamin Wittes: Just to be clear, for those who, Azovstal is a steelworks plant in Mariupol that was one of, was where this brigade held out for a long period of time and protected a lot of women and children in the course of doing so.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: And, and, and they are highly motivated and there is a chance, good chance, that then when they're returned, they will return to forces. And that's, that's my speculation, but I would not be surprised if that's a real consideration. And the categories that was agreed on, so there is some hope that, you know, there are some Azov fighters who are young, who are between 18 and 25. And so there might be a chance that they would be returned depending on how Russians would cooperate and you know, in terms of list of returns and everything.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, so let's talk about basket number two.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: So basket number two, and Nastya already touched it a bit, so I agree with her that for Russia, it's important to keep the pressure and that the tactic that that used since 2014, basically during the Minsk negotiations that the Minsk ceasefire in 2015 were basically concluded by Ukraine and the concession Ukraine made was because of the battlefield loses. And Russians understand that, that if you keep pressure, there is a higher chance that there will be concessions.

And during the negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul, according to Davyd Arakhamia, who was a lead negotiator of Ukraine, Russians said to them like, guys, we will agree on something right now. We remove tanks from Kyiv, and you would have like another conditions in place.

So for Russians, they wanna keep this corrosive leverage. And that's the second bucket where Ukraine wants, and that was agreed with European partners and was discussed with the Trump administration as well, that there would be unconditional 30 day ceasefire in order for the parties to talk without active hostilities going on to the extent possible. And that's something that Russia rejected. A partial explanation to that is because they're on the offensive and by keeping pressure increases their chances for concession, and if they stop pressure, that that chance would be lower.

So, I need to clarify. Both parties leaked their memorandums. It's just like a bunch of ideas about their positions. So Ukraine asked for this unconditional ceasefire specifically when, when it comes to discussing territorial questions, control and everything.

While Russia, part of the memorandum is about our precondition for a ceasefire, and there are guys, they basically, they say, guys, you have two options. Either you withdraw from four oblasts, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk, even where we don't control the territory, which is preposterous. Right. Then there would be a ceasefire and we can talk, or there is a second option and there is a bunch of conditions with limitations on military assistance, location of Ukrainian forces.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It's 12 points. Yeah, and they're all outrageous. We should go–

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Elections, et cetera. Let's sign an agreement before a ceasefire, without a political condition. So, so about the third bucket that we'll talk about. And so that's their kind of preconditions.

And you know, from the battlefield of dynamic, it, it's probably, you know, for them considering their objectives, it's probably makes sense to do that even though they're risking, they are risking to anger the Trump administration that I agree with.

Benjamin Wittes: I'm confused by this actually. So to summarize your point, the Russian position is, okay, we'll have a ceasefire if either you evacuate your troops from the four oblasts that we claim and don't even control, on your sovereign territory.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: Or you agree to let us grossly interfere in your political system and have, you know, have new elections and, right. Like so one or the other, otherwise, no ceasefire.

It seems to me that that reflects more confidence in their battlefield situation than the current environment actually warrants. So yeah, they're on the offensive. They're also losing an enormous number of people. They just had a third of their long range aircraft taken out, their strategic bombers. They're not able to stop the Ukrainians from doing all kinds of operations, including killing significant commanders, well within Russia.

Part of me says they're deluding themselves about the strength of their position. And part of me says, wait a minute, do they know something about their willingness to incur, willingness and capacity to incur a lot more damage that the rest of the world is just kidding itself and thinks they're, they're running outta gas, but you know, they, they will throw bodies at this problem as long as it takes. How should I, I'm curious, Mykhailo first and then Nastya, how, how should I interpret this in terms of, I mean, obviously I know what they're saying, but what's behind what they're saying?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: So just to clarify that this second bucket about the ceasefire, it's just about what would be the format of our talks? Will it be talking while fighting or just talking and the guns would be silent? So this second bucket is essentially about that.

Benjamin Wittes: But that's precisely my point.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: Because you are not agreeing to anything, you would think that a country that has lost something like between 700,000 and a million people–

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah, yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: –would be, you know, oh, 30 days, we could use that rest too.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah. I think they want to signal, I agree with you. I think they want to signal that they are ready to incur further costs until their goals, as they see them, would be achieved. And I think some people, when they're surprised why, they say Putin is not reasonable here, or he's like crazy, not accepting condition. I think they miss the point, what's the main Russian goal in, in this war is.

And what they, they call it root causes, but it's, it's, it's basically an, it boils down, in my judgment to keeping Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence one way or another. And you can explain it, people can say that's because of the imperial ambitions. Other people may say it's because of the balance of power, but that's like the core.

And till this day, the Trump administration, even though they made some painful concessions, that for Ukraine would be painful, like recognition of Crimea. I haven't seen a sign that they would agree to Ukraine being effectively within the Russian sphere of influence.

And one of these pillars in is the minerals deal. And that's why that's, that's so hard to settle this conflict because that's the goal that they have. They showed it consistently. And by this rejection they show it that territorial control is secondary. What's important for us is sphere of influence, what they call near abroad. And we, and we can, we can unpack it within the third bucket because it'll be like in details we'll see what they want.

Benjamin Wittes: But for now, let's just say they want Ukraine to be Belarus. They're willing to, or at least they're projecting that they're willing to sustain a lot more losses in order to get that.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yes. And Belarus is kind of one of the kind of models. You know, sphere of influence is just like, it will depend whether they have a strong battlefield position. And at this point, why I am hopeful generally that maybe with some sort of a strong Ukrainian position on the battlefield and some reasonable engagement there is a way, somehow to find a way that they would consider that, you know, Ukraine, okay. Ukraine is not in our sphere of influence, but it's not kind of a part of the, you know, Western alliance.

So I think that's where the core issue lies. And, you know, I think NATO is the best security guarantee for Ukraine, but that's something that would make, I think, would make any negotiations impossible.

Benjamin Wittes: Nastya your thoughts on the Russian position in the ceasefire negotiations?

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, I pretty much agree with everything Mykhailo said. People have consistently, for decades underestimated just how much the Russians hate Ukraine. And, and the idea of a democratic sovereign prosperous Ukraine that's independent, that's not within the Russian sphere of influence. I think, and, and to this day, I think people underestimate just how important that is.

And, you know, I, I've said this before in conversations with you, Ben, in my mind, I understand the Russian position as priority number one, challenging the West being at war with the West, essentially. Priority number two, subjugating Ukraine. And priority number three, making money while they do all of those things.

And so I think that's the American problem. That's Trump's problem. Trump thinks that he can offer Putin some deals for business in the Arctic, whatever, and he's going straight to priority number three. And he thinks that's gonna be enough. And people around him think that that's gonna be enough, but it's just not true.

Putin just cares more about Ukraine and it's been a thing for, you know, hundreds of years. But in terms of Putin, like since he came to power in the 2000and, and we're seeing this manifest right now, like they, they've consistently been willing to take, you know, higher risks, much higher risks than the West, and incur much larger losses. And as you've said, they're gonna throw as many bodies at the problem as necessary until they reach their goal, unfortunately.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright Mykhailo, let's talk about basket number three.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah. And so it's basically about the political conditions

Benjamin Wittes: That is the broader political conditions for a peace, a peace deal as opposed to a mere ceasefire.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yes. And that would include, so from their side, they want international recognition of Crimea and all four oblasts where the, that they, they, they don't, don't control. And just to remind to our listeners that they actually, within their domestic law, under their Constitution, they made changes and they count them as their territories for their own.

And, and maybe they wanna do this, you know, I just think this is so preposterous. So there is a chance that this might be, way for them to say later on, look, we changed our Constitution, what a huge concession is that. So I feel like there is a chance that this is–

Anastasiia Lapatina: That's a great point.

Mykhailo Soldatenki: –anchoring in negotiations because this is, this is preposterous.

But the fact that they want recognition of Crimea, that's, I think that's, that's their genuine goal. Even though I think it's, it's, it's not that important as Ukraine being in the sphere of influence.

Benjamin Wittes: So I, I just wanna make sure I understand what you're saying. You, you think they're actually signaling here that they're prepared to negotiate over whether they really care about the evacuation of territory that they don't control, but they're not prepared to negotiate over Crimea?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: You know, I would not consider this leaked memorandum as their red lines. Because when you make a concessions, you don't leak a memorandum to Russian press. That's an informational campaign. That's something like to say, we are so confident in our military position that this is our terms. I would not consider that a red line.

And if I would say what the, like one of the concessions that I would not be surprised that they would make is that they would say, yeah those territories under Ukrainian control and they would remain there.

Benjamin Wittes: So if you, if you take the memo as a maximalist informational position, what is the basis for your sense of where the real red line is?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: It can be only speculation. But the basis is that we need to start, and I think people broadly agree. So people disagree about whether there is like ideological, imperial reasons, or balance of power reasons, but they think people generally agree that there is a goal to keep influence of Ukraine policy and foreign domestic policy and foreign choices within the sphere of influence.

And that's where you kind of see there is, there is, there is a lot of wiggle room there how they can frame it. And, and, and this is just, this is, this is the condition that, you know, you would expect to concede without prejudice in your like, main interest.

And then the more kind of, you know, core demands, which is, so they say Ukraine must be neutral, and this is the repetition of the Istanbul demands. Ukraine is neutral. No alliances, no NATO membership, no military assistance, cap on the Ukrainian forces. Then also no nuclear weapons, which is, by the way, I, I think that would be like for Ukraine, that should be, should be reasonably okay to concede that point.

Also there are like cultural stuff and all this talk about Nazis, about Russian as a second official language. But I like, the core is we don't want Ukraine, strong Ukraine within the western alliance and with a lot of military supplies. And they are, I think that's a nightmare for them to have in the long term strong Ukraine aggravated with a strong armed forces with a constant threat to Russia, but they caused it themselves. And you know, that's the main position.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, so I wanna break this up. Seems to me you have the Russians capable of slowly making. Progress from their point of view along the front line, but at great cost and incapable of preventing Ukraine from inflicting very significant damage to Russian interests and including high value military targets, even in the immediate proximity of the negotiations temporally.

You have from a Ukrainian perspective, yeah you have erosion on, on the lines, but you're getting these spectacular wins, you know, sometimes punctuated in time, but that make a big impression. And you have demands from the Russian side that are completely unacceptable, even as a basis for conversation. It seems to me there's no prospect for these negotiations to move forward in any way at all, except in this basket A of of humanitarian stuff.

Is, do you, do either of you see any room for, we're gonna talk about the Ukrainian memo in a moment, for progress based on any part of this?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: So I think, and that's kind of in my judgment, that Ukraine, it's in the Ukrainian national interest, not only to show to Trump that we are reasonable in negotiations and, and, and as we'll discuss the Ukrainian memorandum, it's very reasonable. There are some concessions there. You see signs of the concessions there.

It's also in the Ukrainian interest to kind of explore to the extent possible, whether there are any hints from another side, whether they can make a concession and that only negotiators in the room with access can feel that, that. From outside, it's hard to tell.

The fact that there is a memorandum leaked in the Russian press, I would not jump into conclusions. So if there is a chance, 20% chance that there is some progress that can be done, I think it's in the interest of Ukraine to explore that. Keeping in mind the core goal, independent, secure, and prosperous Ukraine after the war.

Because the alternatives that we are looking at, potentially, are many years potentially of the war of attrition with uncertain outcomes and with maybe we can take additional territory back, liberate. A risk that Russians may, you know, take something. So I think it's in interest of Ukraine to do exhaust all the possible avenues for finding some sort of things.

So back in 2022 in Istanbul, there were many preposterous Russian demands. But there were like, there were at least some talk and Ukrainians ready, ready to at least concede something, and Russians were ready to concede something. But situation is completely different right now. And some concession may be super sensitive, which is and I don't I'm not in a position to you know, convey the Ukrainian views, but that's just my, you know, feeling that it needs to be explored. And if that's not possible, then what else to do? Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: Nastya, what do you think? Is the whole thing just a useless kabuki dance, or is there, or is there something of value here?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Pretty much the former. I think the only place where Ukraine can make a concession, which I mean it pretty much feels like we've already done that. It's just sort of a taboo to say it, I guess. But like saying no to NATO, at least for some time, you know, like delaying it or promising no NATO accession for a decade or, or some sort of like, our diplomats have written the Budapest memorandum. They'll figure out a way to finesse this language to make it appropriate for the Ukrainian audience and the Russian audience and stuff.

So like that, you know, no NATO, but EU is okay, which is something that the Russians have agreed to before. That I think could happen just because the, you know, Ukrainians are already so sort of angry and annoyed with the NATO leadership anyway. You know, the whole policy of open doors that, you know, us never really joining.

Like we're kind of sort of giving up on it already and we know it's not happening anytime soon. So that's really the only place where I think Ukraine, the Ukrainian society can accept okay, no NATO, we'll just build our own army. We'll just build our own capabilities.

But everything else truly seems like stuff that, like people would go protest in the streets in mass over it. Like I, I cannot imagine Ukrainians accepting Russian as a second language. I'm sorry. That will cause revolution. Like it       will.

Benjamin Wittes: Just to be clear, you a native Russian speaker.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I stopped speaking Russian like six months ago, so I know what I'm talking about. I intimately am aware of the emotional politics of it all.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. But I mean, but, but I mean–

Anastasiia Lapatina: But I'm an native Russian speaker, yes. I grew up, yes.

Benjamin Wittes: People who don't deal with Ukrainians don't understand that this is almost a language, independent thing. People who are not native Ukrainian speakers who refuse to speak Russian even though it's their mother tongue.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yes. And this is like a very common phenomenon. Like tens of thousands of Ukrainians who grew up speaking Russian, quit speaking Russian after the full-scale invasion as an identity sort of reclaiming thing. And it's hugely important to people here, hugely. And I just I don't see it happening at at all. It’s not something we would ever budge on.

Of course, things like voluntarily giving up territory, right? Like evacuating our forces from territory, they don't even control that's like absurd beyond my understanding sort of thing, right? It's just, you know, it's just impossible. I, I just think it's gonna cause such a huge uproar in the Ukrainian society that's already under an unspeakable amount of stress.

From, you know, pretty much every Ukrainian has either lost someone on the front line or knows someone who lost someone on the front line, or has someone injured. You know, tens of thousands of people are missing. Those are all people who have a stake in, in, in what's happening, and those are all people who have, I'm sure, extremely strong opinions about why exactly their husband or their father died and what they died for. Right?

And so I just think that NATO is really the only thing we can budge on. But even there, it would have to be very like diplomatic, finessing. I'm sure Mykhailo has thoughts on that.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: I agree with Nastya and, about those other concessions. And I, and I, and I think, as I already said, I don't think that they are the core of the Russian position.

But anyway about NATO. So I, I kind of generally think that NATO is the best security guarantee. But there, if it's not feasible, other security guarantee should be explored. And some people, and I'm on the fence about it, but some people floated an idea what it's called armed neutrality, which is basically Ukraine is not part of any alliance, but it has strong armed forces and security guarantees, let's say from P five members without veto from Russia, without Russia demands about the caps on the Ukrainian forces and everything.

But if that would be okay for them in terms of Ukraine being its own power and economically integrated with the West, but not tight with NATO. But if that cannot move the needle, that's like then that's, that's, that's very bad.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I agree.

Benjamin Wittes: So let's talk about the Ukrainian position the memo, which also became public. Just to give us a sense of how far apart the parties are. What is the current Ukrainian position?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: So Ukrainian position is non-repetition of aggression, and that means security guarantees with the engagement from international community. So it's very broad. Security guarantees, it's undefined. It's probably strategically done in this way in order to then qualify some different security arrangement as security guarantees.

And we need to understand that here the negotiations is going on not only with Russia but our Western partners as well. Very important to kind of, you know, convince what kind of military and security engagement our Western partners are ready to be involved in. And NATO-like security guarantees for some of them, even outside NATO is kind of problematic. So that's a very, very important component.

But then Ukraine says, no, Ukraine cannot be forced to be neutral. Part of Euro-Atlantic community and EU. Euro-Atlantic community, its close relationship with NATO. NATO membership is a question for the alliance to decide, not for Russia. No caps on the number, deployment of Ukrainian forces and no restrictions of the foreign militaries exercises and presence in Ukraine. Territories occupied since 2014 should not be, must not be recognized by international community, meaning neither Crimea and not those Oblasts, or parts of them.

Benjamin Wittes: But interestingly, that assumes that Russian forces will not withdraw from them. Right. So you could, there's an implicit concession that we're not, Ukraine here isn't demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces. It's merely saying, we will not end the war on the basis of recognition of what is de facto Russian control.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yes. And, and there is a language which I think that makes a Ukrainian memorandum reasonable. That's a huge concession for Ukraine considering the prior positions and prior peace plans. That the contact line is the starting point of negotiations, which is a suggestion that we will, you know have a sort of a discussions based on the current contact line without legal recognition of unlawful Russian occupation.

And then also it requires that territorial issues can be discussed only after a full and unconditional ceasefire. So, Zelensky in his comments, he was kind of backed on the question whether ceasefire is needed for the leadership meeting between Putin, Trump and Zelensky. But here, Ukraine is kind of, you know, an additional requirement.

But territorial questions for sure, like before, before the ceasefire in order to avoid that pressure. Then concession, I think that's, that's also a concession, probably that because in order to look reasonable to Trump administration, some of sanctions may be lifted, but in stages and only gradually with snapback clauses. Meaning we partially remove sanctions, but then if there are violations, they are going back automatically without additional process.

And then frauds and Russian sovereign assets are used for a reconstruction, or if not, they are frozen until reparations are paid. And here about the sovereign assets, in the Russian memorandum, they say that both Ukraine and Russia should revoke their claims for reparations. If Russia claimed that it has a claim for reparation, they withdraw it and Ukraine will withdraw it.

And, and the confirmation why we should not treat their memo leak as like a red line. So that was back in February Reuters reported that they were ready to make an informal or whatever the format that approve the use of their frozen assets, $300 billion for reconstruction in Ukraine on the condition that part of it will be spent in territories that they control.

And so you see that, but they didn't include it in their memorandum. And whether that's true or not, it's unclear, but Reuters told that there were like three sources telling about that. So that's basically the Ukrainian position on political questions.

Benjamin Wittes: To go back to Nastya's point, there is no basis for a real conversation here. I mean, you, you have the Ukrainian position is and, first of all you know, give us back 20,000 children and, you know, start with 318 of them. Here are their names. By the way the contact line is, is the starting point for negotiations. We get some security guarantees type to be determined. And we get to re-arm.

And the Russian position is no security guarantees you don't get any kids back. You have to withdraw from territory, your own territory that we don't control, but we claim. And oh by the way, you never get to re-arm and you have to be part of our sphere of influence. I gotta say, I don't see a basis for a negotiation here.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: The only, the only caveat that I would make in light of the Istanbul talks in particular, I don't think that they say that security guarantees are off the table. They are saying that security guarantees as part of the NATO alliance is off the table.

And that's where, based on prior exchange that we had right now with Nastya, that's, you know, that's here where you have a potential opening. Whether Ukraine is ready to go there, I'm on the fence about that. That's risky, everything, but that's something where you might move the needle.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I also just wanna point out that Ukraine clearly has made some huge concessions here, right?

Like for several years the line was 1991 borders and nothing short of that. Now we can debate another time how realistic that was and whether that was a good approach with the Ukrainian government. But the reality is that that was, that was the official position and that's what the Ukrainian society wanted.

And now we're saying essentially without saying it, but that's what we're basically saying, that we are not gonna get back, right now, all of the territory that Russia currently occupies. And that's okay with us moving forward. We're not gonna recognize it legally, but we're gonna recognize that a fact of reality on the ground. I mean, I think that's a huge concession, right?

And so you are, you are just not saying that same level of concessions from the Russian side. And, you know, I've done an interview for the Lawfare Daily podcast with Mykola Bielieskov, an outstanding Ukrainian expert, military analyst who, you know, has been talking for months now that the main problem here is that Ukraine and Russia just don't have a common sphere of where, you know, there, there are little circles if you draw the diagram overlap at all.

There is nothing to talk about here. Right. And so that's what you're saying, Ben. And I, I think that's true. Which is why, you know it will only change when the Russian reality on the ground becomes more painful and becomes more costly for the Russians. They're, they will only seek peace if, if they think they're losing.

Benjamin Wittes: Which is presumably what the SBU operations are about.

And I'm curious, they're a great deal of fun to talk about because they're spectacular and they've got the sort of, you know, James Bond equality to them. But here's my question, and in, can't remember if it's ‘43 or ‘44, the SS runs a completely spectacular commando operation in Italy in which they rescue Mussolini, who has been captured and deposed by the king. And it was run by a commando named Otto Skorzeny. And they bring him to Berlin.

You know, it's a one of these game changing commando raids that doesn't, in fact change the game. And it was a huge deal, and now it's kind of a footnote, right? Mussolini gets deposed, he gets rescued by Hitler. They put him in charge of a little fake state for a several months or a year and a half or something. And then he gets strung up by the partisans and shot with his girlfriend.

And my question is, when Ukraine does these operations, they're super spectacular, they're really exciting. But are they meaningful in the sense of changing the balance of power between the sides? Or are they kind of like rescuing Musso-, not morally, of course because you know, that wasn't the, those weren't the good guys.

But you know, but like, all right, you're cool, show you rescued Mussolini. But you still have these, you know, allied forces coming north across, up the Italian peninsula. And you know, Normandy either happened already or is going to happen. And I, I guess the question is, if the front is eroding, how much does stuff like that matter at the end of the day?

And acknowledging that neither of you are military specialists, I'm curious about your, I mean, it affects the negotiations if the Russians are going in there thinking, oh my God, they just destroyed a third of our long range bombers. That's a different thing than if the Russians are going in there saying okay, you have your little fun with the bases, but at the end of the day, this is decided on a front that we're making progress on. Curious for either of your thoughts on it,

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Or they may also think that's an additional reason why we need to keep going till the end, in order not to have a robust, aggravated country that will cause problems for us down the road. So, and that's, that's, I just, it's very hard to tell what they think. I'm not a military expert so in terms of how that influences the battlefield dynamics and everything, it's hard for me to tell.

But that can work both ways, you know? So when you put pressure, it can be both, lik oh, we don't wanna have that so we wanna to concede something. But it also can mean, whoa, they can do that. That's definitely a threat to us and we need to fight filthy.

Benjamin Wittes: What do you think? Is this Ukraine making itself feel good as the front erodes? Or is this Russia kidding itself? It can't even protect its air bases, progress on the front is is an illusion.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It's a great question. I think that if Ukraine was able to repeat this kind of stuff sort of continuously and, and keep these things happening regularly instead of it being like a one-off once a year we do something crazy. You know, and we think it's gonna change the game, but it doesn't. If, if we were able to inflict this kind of pain regularly, I do think that it could change the calculation.

But at the same time, I think, and you know, I wanna hear Ben, your thoughts about this as well. I think the way the Trump administration has changed the calculation here matters a lot for Putin's calculus. I think Trump showing up and pretty much, and I'm of course, you know, dramatizing and oversimplifying. Trump showing up and saying, you know, Ukraine doesn't really matter and we don't actually care about the European continent and what has, and what happens here, in my judgment, that really emboldened Putin.

That's a huge blinking green sign, come and do whatever you want. Right. When, when you see the American government dismantling teams that are fighting the Kremlin, you know, like the, the, this report about the, the, the, the team that was fighting the Russia's disinformation in the U.S. I just read the report that apparently the wife of the person of the, of the Trump staffer who dismantled that is Russian.

And so some people are now worried about, you know, what that was and who was involved in making that happen. And that's just one example of a whole array of things that the Trump administration has done to basically serve Russia's interest as the United States of America. So I think that's playing a huge role in Russia's calculus here.

It's not just that, you know, it's winning on the battlefield. It's that the overall sort of strategic dynamics are totally like going well for them. And again, you can correct me if I'm wrong because you understand these sort of.

Benjamin Wittes: No, I think it's exact. I think it's exactly right. I think one of the consequences of the Trump administration's posture is that Russia chronically has hope of gaining favor in the American position. Not withstanding Mykhailo’s correct point that for all the pro-Russian vibes that there's actually not much in the, the American position that should give Russia confidence that we're willing to let, let Ukraine become part of the Russian sphere of influence.

And actually that's a great note on which to wrap up. Mykhailo, give us a sense of why, why the minerals deal is important to that atmospheric?

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yes. So there was, right after the deal was signed, there were reports in American media in the Washington Post that Russians were nervous that that might prevent potential positive concessions for them in the negotiations, specifically connected to the security cooperation between the West and Ukraine.

And so the minerals deal itself, it does not contain security components at all, meaningful ones. But it provides commercial incentives for the United States to continue supplying military assistance. And so it's just, just to make the long story short, the, there would be a fund that's already created reportedly under Delaware law that would gather parties contribution and invest in projects in Ukraine.

Important to understand it's not only about minerals. It's oil, gas, infrastructure, pipelines or terminals, railways, all kinds of infrastructure that that would be investments including potentially the U.S. investments. And then after 10 years, the returns on those investments would be distributed between the parties and the U.S. military contributions and military assistance would have a priority rights to revenue.

So before the fund pays to the U.S. based on those so-called Class A shares or units, it cannot distribute revenue for other shares, including ones held by Ukraine. And the question is, and it's unclear from the disclosed agreement, whether military assistance also includes sales. And there is a risk if that includes sales in the long term for the United States, that might be a big share.

So in short the more assistance the United States provides, the more returns in the future from the fund it will have. The less returns Ukraine will have. And that should work as a commercial incentive for the United States. And so when President Trump, that all depends on the security environment in Ukraine, whether those projects will be successful, everything but President Trump's goal of getting return, it's not unrealistic if those projects will go well.

Benjamin Wittes: I wanna say as an American, as patriot, I hate every aspect of this deal. And I think as soon as we have an honorable administration in office, the United States should offer Ukraine to abrogate the deal at will and renegotiate something equitable and reasonable. In the meantime, however, it does seem to be evidence that the Trump White House does not want Ukraine to fall under Russian domination, and so I suppose it has a role to play in the short term.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Yeah, and they call it skin in the game.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I also wanna say my last 2 cents before we wrap up. Right as we were talking news came out that Trump just had a call with Putin and he basically, the only valuable part of that rant that he posted is that Putin assured him that he will have to respond very strongly to the Spiderweb airfields attack. And then there was stuff about Iran and, and things like that, but.

Benjamin Wittes: Well we are going to leave it there on that cliffhanger suspense note. Nastya, Mykhailo, thank you both for joining us today.

Mykhailo Soldatenko: Thank you, Ben.

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