Oral Argument Summary: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (Tariffs)

Can a president declare an economic emergency and, with the stroke of a pen, reshape U.S. tariff policy on a global scale? The Supreme Court confronted that possibility on Nov. 5. when it heard oral argument in Trump v. V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, two consolidated cases with sweeping implications for presidential trade powers and the statutory limits Congress has placed on emergency economic authority. The litigation stems from President Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose worldwide “reciprocal” tariffs and separate “contraband-drug” tariffs. At stake is whether IEEPA authorizes tariff measures at all, and if so, whether that delegation violates constitutional principles of nondelegation.

IEEPA 

The IEEPA authorizes the president to take certain actions “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” The procedures for declaring a national emergency and accessing IEEPA powers are outlined in the National Emergencies Act (NEA). The president must submit an annual declaration to sustain IEEPA actions beyond one year. Congress can terminate a national emergency through a joint resolution. 

The authority provided to the president by IEEPA, found in 50 U.S.C. § 1702, includes the power to, “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise…regulate…importation or exportation….” The words “tariff,” “tax,” or “duty,” however, do not appear explicitly in the text of the statute.

Presidents have most frequently used IEEPA to impose sanctions based on national security concerns. No previous president has invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs. That said, IEEPA and its predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA), contain identical language authorizing the president to “regulate… importation.” And the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (since replaced by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) did uphold President Richard Nixon’s use of TWEA to temporarily impose a global 10 percent duty in United States v. Yoshida International (1975).

President Jimmy Carter (and later President Ronald Reagan), in one of the most notable uses of the statute, invoked IEEPA to sanction Iran during the hostage crisis. In the 1981 case Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981), the Supreme Court upheld the use of IEEPA to block “the removal or transfer of all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran which were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” including the suspension or termination of claims by American citizens against the Iranian government pending in American courts.

Procedural History

Beginning in February, President Trump issued “trafficking” tariffs targeting imports from Canada, Mexico, and China, by tying them to a declared national emergency over fentanyl and drug trafficking. He then followed with “reciprocal” tariffs on most imports from nearly all trading partners, claiming that persistent trade deficits pose an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and the economy.

In Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, importers and several states sued in the Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that IEEPA authorizes sanctions and embargoes, but not tariffs. The same jurisdictional issue later surfaced in Learning Resources before the D.C. district court. 

On the reciprocal tariffs, the CIT held that although IEEPA’s authority to “regulate . . . importation” can support some import measures, Congress specifically routed balance-of-payments surcharges through Trade Act § 122 (capped at 15 percent for 150 days), which the president could not bypass via IEEPA. On the contraband-drug tariffs, the court concluded they did not “deal with” the declared emergency within IEEPA’s meaning because they operated as leverage rather than a direct response. The CIT granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the tariff orders, entered a universal permanent injunction, and directed a return to pre-emergency rates within ten days. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the CIT’s order pending appeal.

The Federal Circuit, sitting initially en banc, affirmed the CIT’s decision in part and vacated in part. In a per curiam decision, the court held the challenged tariffs were unauthorized but on narrower grounds, emphasizing that when Congress grants tariff authority it typically does so explicitly and that IEEPA’s “regulate . . . importation” does not speak in terms of “tariffs,” “duties,” or “taxes.” Without deciding whether IEEPA can ever authorize tariffs, the court held it does not authorize tariffs of the magnitude imposed here and invoked the major questions doctrine, which requires clear congressional authorization for actions of vast economic or political significance, to reject an interpretation that would allow “unlimited” tariffs.

Judge Tiffany Cunningham wrote separately to conclude that IEEPA authorizes no tariffs at all and that any contrary reading raises nondelegation problems. Judge Richard G. Taranto dissented, reasoning that “regulate importation” encompasses tariffs and reflects a broad emergency delegation in foreign affairs. On remedy, the court affirmed declaratory relief, vacated the universal injunction in light of Trump v. CASA, Inc., and remanded for the CIT to reassess any injunctive relief. The Federal Circuit stayed its mandate pending Supreme Court proceedings, thereby maintaining its earlier stay and keeping the tariffs in force.

In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, a separate challenge proceeded in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The challengers contested the president’s tariff authority under IEEPA. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to Learning Resources on May 29, finding a likelihood of success (IEEPA does not authorize unilateral global tariffing) and irreparable harm (an existential threat to the business), but stayed its order for 14 days and then stayed it pending appeal to the D.C. Circuit. As the appeal was being coordinated with the Federal Circuit’s timeline, the CIT issued its merits decision in V.O.S., and on June 10, the Federal Circuit stayed the CIT’s nationwide injunction pending appeal.

On Sept. 9, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and expedited argument. The Court agreed to decide whether IEEPA authorizes the president to impose tariffs and, if so, whether that delegation violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Arguments of the Parties

The Government

The government’s defense of IEEPA tariffs makes three points: 1) the tariffs are supported by the text; 2) the nondelegation doctrine is not violated; and 3) the district court lacked jurisdiction.

First, the government asserts that IEEPA authorizes the challenged tariffs. The plain text of IEEPA unambiguously grants the president authority to impose tariffs. The regulation of commerce to encompass tariffs has been understood since the Founding, and the context of the language also supports the interpretation of a broad grant of authority. Congress has used the phrase “regulate importation” to authorize executive action regarding the flow of goods into the United States, including the imposition of tariffs, quotas, and embargoes. Tariffs were once the government’s primary source of revenue, and the power to regulate imports naturally encompassed setting or adjusting duties as a tool of foreign and economic policy. Over time, Congress delegated limited tariff authority to the president in trade statutes, and the 1941 amendment to the TWEA expressly extended presidential authority to regulate “importation or exportation” during national emergencies. When Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977, it borrowed that same language from TWEA. The government also cites Yoshida, arguing that Nixon imposed tariffs that the Federal Circuit’s predecessor upheld under the TWEA provision authorizing the president to “regulate importation.”

The major questions doctrine also does not support reading IEEPA to prohibit some tariffs but not others. The court has also never applied the major questions doctrine in national security or foreign policy contexts, and it does not provide any basis to artificially narrow IEEPA’s text.

According to the government, other arguments for denying the tariffs could not stand under IEEPA. The government maintains that Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 and IEEPA are separate. Thus, the use of one by the president does not compel him to comply with the terms of the other. In addition, the government’s brief argues that the trafficking tariffs “dealt with” the national emergencies contrary to CIT’s holding and that the president’s emergency and threat determinations should be upheld. 

Second, IEEPA does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. The government argues that IEEPA’s purported tariff authority is not an unconstitutional delegation of congressional taxation authority. The non-delegation doctrine plays an even more limited role in light of the president’s constitutional responsibilities and independent Article II national security and foreign policy powers. Even if the domestic version of the non-delegation doctrine is applied, IEEPA is still sound as Congress has delineated both general policy and the boundaries of the delegated authority.

The government argues that the CIT had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over these consolidated suits. The CIT has “exclusive jurisdiction” over “any civil action commenced against” the government “that rises out of any law of the united states providing for tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation or merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue” or for “administration and enforcement with respect to” such matters. As a result, the Learning Resources district court did not have jurisdiction. 

The Challengers: 1) Private Respondents in VOS Selections; 2) State Respondents in VOS Selections; and 3) Petitioners in Learning Resources

The challengers urge the Supreme Court to reject the Trump administration’s use of IEEPA to impose tariffs on two points: 1) IEEPA does not authorize tariffs; 2) The district court has jurisdiction.

First, according to the challengers, IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. The plain meaning of “regulate... importation” in the statutory language does not include a tariffing power for the president. Congress has never authorized a tariff or tax through the word “regulate,” and the ordinary meaning of “tariff” and “regulate” are distinct. The challengers point out that this court has also required Congress to speak clearly when delegating “the uniquely dangerous taxing power.” As a result, the government’s argument that Congress delegated taxing power through just the word “regulate” is inconsistent. The challengers point to the example that Nixon’s 1971 surcharge prompted Congress to enact Section 122, confirming IEEPA’s lack of tariff authority, given its lack of explicit tariffing authorization.

The statutory context also weighs against the power to tariff. The challengers argue that the government’s reading renders the key phrase unconstitutional in part, as the Constitution expressly prohibits taxation of exports in Article. I, Section 9, Clause. 5, which is also supported by the surrounding textual context. The tariff authority is also at odds with IEEPA’s foreign property limitations, given that IEEPA is limited in its application to “property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,” and there is no reason to believe Congress intended IEEPA to include tax on wholly American property.

History also confirms that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs: IEEPA has never been used to impose tariffs. In addition, the challengers raise that Congress enacted IEEPA to limit emergency authority and thus never suggested that it was delegating authority through IEEPA to impose taxes, tariffs, and generate revenue. TWEA’s wartime powers also did not include tariffing. 

The major questions and non-delegation doctrines also support the argument that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. On the major questions doctrine, the challengers argue that the lack of historical precedent for tariffing authority cuts against the breadth of authority claimed by the government. On the nondelegation doctrine, a grant of authority would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power if Congress were to grant the president the authority to unilaterally impose tariffs that remake the national economy without any restrictions.

Second, the challengers argue that this action arises under federal law. Therefore, the district had jurisdiction to hear it unless it falls within the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction. If IEEPA is a law providing for tariffs, all civil actions against the government arising out of IEEPA, involving tariffs or not, would have to be adjudicated in the CIT. However, the challengers point out that the government has failed to cite any IEEPA case in CIT from 1977 until now.

Amicus Briefs

A very large number of amicus briefs have been submitted, with significantly more in support of the challengers compared to those of the government. Two of the amicus briefs were mentioned in the oral argument, including "Brief amici curiae of Professors of U.S. Foreign Relations Law," by Paul Stephan and Andrew Kent (also the subject of a related Lawfare article by Stephan), and "Brief in support of neither party," by Aditya Bamzai. Stephan and Kent’s brief argued that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs on the importation of goods to the United States. They point out that IEEPA represents a “limited grant of authority tied to the foreign commerce powers of Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, and thus in contrast with the TWEA, which does authorize war powers consistent with Article I, Section 8, Clauses 10-13, of the Constitution and the international law of war. In Bamzai’s brief, he argues that Congress enacted TWEA against the backdrop of a time when the use of a “tax” or “fee” was an appropriate method to regulate trade with the enemy under the classic laws of war. He thus argues that “that language [of IEEPA] is best read to have the same meaning that it had when used in the TWEA before the passage of the IEEPA.”

Among other amicus briefs submitted, several briefs concentrated on the text of IEEPA, the major questions doctrine, and economic concerns. For example, the brief of the economists focuses on the “reciprocal’ tariffs,” pointing out that trade deficits have existed “consistently over the past fifty years in the United States” and not “unusual and extraordinary” but rather “ordinary and commonplace.” In turn, these deficits are “not a ‘threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy or the economy of the United States,” and tariffs “do not meaningfully reduce trade deficits.” In the brief of a bipartisan group of 207 members of Congress, they argue that the president’s imposition of tariffs under IEEPA is unlawful: Congress enacted IEEPA to “provide the President with the power to impose sanctions, export controls, and similar measures,” and “neither the word ‘duties’ nor the word ‘tariffs’ appear anywhere in IEEPA.” On the opposite side, Jill Homan of America First Policy Institute argues in her brief that IEEPA grants the president broad powers to regulate foreign commerce during a declared emergency. Under the commonly used canon of constriction noscitur a sociis, “the Court should look to the neighboring words in the statute to help determine the meaning of ‘regulate importation,’” and since the neighboring words in IEEPA include “broad, sweeping powers,” the Court should apply a broad interpretation to the meaning of “regulate importation.” In the State of California and Governor Gavin Newsom’s brief, it argues that the text, the context, and the history do not indicate that Congress intended to give the president the power to impose tariffs. They also argue that “tariffs are a potent economic weapon” and can have “as much ‘economic and political significance’ as weapons of war when deployed against foreign nations,” thus implicating the major questions doctrine. 

Oral Argument

On Nov. 5, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments. Lasting nearly three hours, the justices asked skeptical questions about the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs on imports broadly from almost all U.S. trading partners. D. John Sauer, the U.S. solicitor general, argued for the government.  Neal Katyal argued against the tariffs on behalf of private companies, and Benjamin Gutman, Oregon’s solicitor general, represented a group of states challenging the tariffs.

Textual Arguments

Several justices directed their attention to the text of IEEPA. Focusing on the phrase “regulate… importation” in the statute, Sauer argued “regulate” was a “capacious” verb, and when read among the other verbs in the sentence, suggests legislative intent to confer broad power to the president. Justice Amy Coney Barrett challenged this characterization, noting that words such as “nullify” and “void” have “definite meanings,” which “pack a punch” but are not necessarily broad in range of meaning. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson expressed a similar view, questioning why the Court should read the word “regulate” broadly when Congress supplied a granular list of other actions: “investigate, block... direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit.” Justice Elena Kagan added that Congress declined to include several terms that were present in the statute preceding IEEPA—“confiscate,” “vest,” “hold,” “use,” “administer,” “liquidate,” “sell”—and pointed out that IEEPA doesn’t contain any terms referring to raising revenue.

Sauer relied heavily on the 1976 Supreme Court case Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. to support the proposition that the text of IEEPA does not need the “magic words” of “tariff” or “duty” to authorize monetary exactions for trade purposes. There, the Court held that the term “adjust imports” in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) was not limited to quotas but included fees and duties (monetary exactions), and thus the statute authorized President Ford's system of license fees on imported oil to protect national security. Justice Sonia Sotomayor challenged the context of this analogy, stating that Algonquin dealt with a “very different statute” because it was specifically “in the duties section” and “was paired with questions about decreasing tariffs and increasing tariffs.” Sauer defended against this criticism by pointing out that “adjust” is a narrower term than “regulate” and is itself a type of regulation. Therefore, if the power to adjust imports includes the imposition of monetary exactions (that is, a licensing fee), then so must the power to regulate imports. Justice Brett Kavanaugh seemed sympathetic to this argument and pressed Katyal on the implication of Algonquin.

Katyal argued that the operative phrase in Algonquin was located in a significantly different statutory context than the one in IEEPA. TEA “was expressly a trade statute”; IEEPA is not. Katyal emphasized that the Algonquin court recognized the limits Congress attached to its delegation of power, including the requirement for cabinet secretaries to make certain findings, specific statutory factors the president must consider, public hearings, and limited remedies. “All of that is in the statute,” Katyal said. “All of that is in the Algonquin opinion. None of it is in IEEPA. That's the problem.” Justice Jackson stressed that Algonquin was largely decided on legislative history, asking Sauer if he agreed that it “was not a textualist opinion.” She noted the Algonquin court searched for, and found, “much to suggest that the President's authority extends to the imposition of monetary exactions—evidence that is absent in IEEPA.”

A central point of the government’s argument was that Yoshida confirmed that TWEA's “regulate… importation” language includes the authority to impose tariffs, and that Congress codified this understanding when it subsequently used that same language in IEEPA. Sauer argued that because a court of exclusive jurisdiction had “interpreted that very phrase very visibly, very prominently, to include the power to tariff,” and Congress re-enacted the language, this was “powerful evidence of congressional acquiescence” to the tariff power in IEEPA. Justice Kavanaugh, supporting this argument, highlighted that Nixon announced the tariffs very publicly. “It was not some kind of little piece of paper,” he said. Katyal, in turn, largely dismissed Yoshida, arguing there was “no evidence that Congress thought it was ratifying Yoshida,” and that the ruling itself advised that future surcharges should use the limited authority of the subsequently enacted 1974 Trade Act. Justice Samuel Alito noted Yoshida held that TWEA “did not authorize the President to ‘fix rates of duty at will without regard to statutory rates prescribed by Congress,’” suggesting the power was limited, undercutting the government's claim of unlimited authority. Justice Barrett highlighted that TWEA’s authority was rooted in wartime powers, potentially making its interpretation inapplicable to the peacetime context of IEEPA. 

Major Questions Doctrine and Non-Delegation Principle

Several justices revisited the “major questions” doctrine issue. Chief Justice John Roberts noted that authorizing one person to “impose tariffs on any product from any country in any amount for any length of time” plainly qualifies as a “major” question, especially because tariffs function as “imposition[s] of taxes on Americans,” a power the Constitution assigns to Congress.

Justice Neil Gorsuch pressed Sauer, asking, “what would prohibit Congress from just abdicating all responsibility to regulate foreign commerce—or, for that matter, declare war—to the president?” He warned that upholding such authority would create “a one-way ratchet toward the gradual but continual accretion of power in the executive branch and away from the people’s elected representatives.” Sauer pushed back against the notion that Congress would never be able to retrieve its delegated powers, pointing to the 2023 termination of the COVID-19 emergency. He asserted that it demonstrated that “the political oversight that's baked into the statute's meaning will hold” when a “political consensus against a declared emergency" coalesces. Sauer conceded that Congress would have to pass a statutory amendment—subject to veto—to reclaim the tariff power delegated by IEEPA, but this “would be true of any case this Court definitively interprets the statute.” Justice Barrett shared Gorsuch’s concern, saying, “If Congress ever wanted to get the tariffing power back, it would have to have a veto-proof majority... definitively interpreting a statute that grants presidential power makes it particularly hard to get the President to not want to veto something.”

Katyal argued that the very breadth of the claimed authority triggers the major questions rule. “IEEPA is a sanctions statute. It’s not a tax statute where Congress gave away the store,” he said. He asserted that Congress has delegated tariff powers  “explicitly, always with real limits,” while IEEPA’s use of “regulate,” has never included taxation.  Katyal warned, “We will never get this power back if the government wins this case.”

Gutman tied the issue to Congress’s exclusive control over taxation. When Justice Kavanaugh asked why IEEPA could authorize a total embargo but not a modest “1 percent tariff,” Gutman explained that the difference lies in the structure and effect of the action. Embargoes stop transactions outright, consistent with IEEPA’s history of freezing or blocking trade, whereas tariffs “cede[] control over whether the transaction occurs” to private actors and “add[] revenue to the Treasury,” a hallmark of Congress’s Article I taxing power. “It’s just as unnatural to read a phrase like ‘regulate importation’ to discuss [tariffs] when the statute has nothing to do with tariffs and doesn’t otherwise mention tariffs at all,” Gutman concluded.

The government urged the Court to view the tariffs as foreign affairs regulation, beyond the major-questions doctrine. The challengers countered that no president in peacetime has ever imposed taxes unilaterally, and only Congress can authorize it clearly. 

The justices repeatedly circled back to the non-delegation issue: who decides when Americans pay what is, in substance, a tax. Several justices echoed Chief Justice Roberts’s concern that taxing “has always been the core power of Congress.” Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the Constitution requires both houses and the president to agree before citizens are taxed. 

Justice Alito suggested Congress deliberately excluded tariffs because they raise revenue, remarking, “that’s our business, right?” Gutman answered, “Yes . . . every other time that Congress has authorized the President [to impose tariffs].” 

Justice Gorsuch later tied that concern directly to the founding debates, recalling the Navigation Acts that helped ignite the Revolution. “The power to reach into the pockets of the American people is just different, and it’s been different since the founding,” he said. “Even Parliament couldn’t do that, that had to be done locally through our elected representatives.”

After several rounds of questioning, Justice Alito joked that Katyal “probably never thought he’d find himself reviving the non-delegation doctrine,” drawing laughter before the argument quickly turned back to statutory text. Katyal responded lightly that his position did not depend on non-delegation because “this isn’t just delegation running riot . . . that’s a legislative abrogation.”

If the Court interprets IEEPA to allow sweeping, revenue-raising tariffs—according to Katyal—it risks erasing the constitutional line the framers drew between Congress and the president. 

The Justices Probe What Comes Next and How Far is Too Far 

In discussions of what might happen after the case, the justices had multiple exchanges with Katyal. Justice Barrett asked Katyal whether the reimbursement process for the plaintiffs would be “a mess.” Katyal clarified that the government had stipulated that the five plaintiffs would receive refunds, and for everyone else, there is another body of trade law that governs the administrative process, to which Justice Barrett subsequently reiterated her skepticism, responding “so, a mess.” Likewise, in the exchanges with Justice Alito, the justice asked about the alternatives to IEEPA, prompting him to hypothesize about the question “what if the President tomorrow invokes Section 338 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] as basis of the tariffs,” pointing to the possibility of President Trump invoking the statute six months or a year from now. To this, Katyal pointed to the fact that Sections 252 [of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962] and 301 [of the Trade Act of 1974] were largely understood to have superseded Section 338. He also acknowledged, however, that the government could try and seek to use the other statutes whether it is “section 122 or 338” but that is a separate argument to be brought and was not embraced in this case.

The other justices also expressed skepticism about both parties’ positions through hypotheticals about other “dire emergencies” and the scope of power at issue. In her final clarifying question, Justice Sotomayor framed the challengers’ position as questioning whether the statute allows the president to “use taxing power to effect his personal choices,” citing examples such as threats to impose a 10 percent tax on Canada for an ad it ran on tariffs during the World Series and a 40 percent tax on Brazil because of its supreme court’s decision to permit prosecution of one of its former presidents. Justice Alito probed Gutman on whether his stance would change if it were “an undisputed emergency, and a really dire emergency.” Similarly, Justice Jackson posed a scenario in which the limitations, as argued by the challengers, would force the president to “respond to an emergency in a way that is more extreme.” Justice Thomas questioned whether, in a situation where a foreign trading partner was holding a U.S. citizen hostage, the president could use tariffs for leverage, to which Gutman rejected the hypothetical for the reason that tariffs were revenue-generating.

Looking Ahead

As Scott Anderson, Kathleen Claussen, and Peter Harrell noted on Lawfare Live, whether IEEPA authorizes tariff measures and whether that delegation violates constitutional principles of nondelegation remains uncertain. While the Court typically issues its decisions by June and July, this case is proceeding on an expedited schedule at the parties’ request. Given the accelerated briefing and the Court’s recognition of the case’s national and economic significance, it is likely to issue its ruling sooner than usual. At stake in the short term is whether Trump can continue to rely on IEEPA to carry out his administration's tariffs—and in the long term, are potential significant implications for executive power. Perhaps a humorous line from Justice Kavanaugh summarizes the issue at hand most succinctly: Justice Kavanaugh asked Gutman why, if Congress had given the president sweeping powers, they had “cut the hole out of the donut.” To this, Gutman replied that “it’s a different kind of pastry.” To what form this pastry ultimately takes will be something to keep watch for.