Courts & Litigation Cybersecurity & Tech

The D.C. Circuit Curbed Pro-executive Panels Before. Is Anthropic’s Case Next?

Samuel Morse
Friday, November 20, 2026, 10:00 AM
In three major cases since 2018, the D.C. Circuit has reversed rulings that sided with the executive. That record suggests the full court will likely rehear Anthropic’s challenge to its Pentagon blacklisting.
(Anthropic, https://tinyurl.com/27ke56s5, CC BY 2.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en).

In a 2-1 panel decision in the case filed by Anthropic against the Department of Defense and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Pentagon’s immediate blacklisting of Anthropic on urgent, national security grounds was a lawful exercise of the secretary of defense’s authority under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (FASCSA). On Oct. 13, Anthropic petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a panel rehearing or, alternatively, a rehearing en banc. The U.S. government filed a motion opposing both panel and en banc rehearing on Nov. 18.

Panel rehearing, reserved for situations where the panel overlooked or misapprehended a particular fact or point of law, is unlikely. There are less stringent rules for when en banc rehearing may be granted. Granting a petition for rehearing en banc requires a majority vote of the 11 active judges on the D.C. Circuit. This article examines the history and why it suggests that there is a good chance that the D.C. Circuit grants the petition and vacates the earlier panel decision. This, in turn, will likely set up a showdown at the Supreme Court.

En Banc D.C. Circuit Activities Since 2018

In three recent cases that implicate questions of executive power, the en banc D.C. Circuit repeatedly reversed 2-1 panel decisions that favored executive power over what could be perceived as checks on that power. Anthropic argues that the 2-1 panel decision here should be reversed for similar reasons, because it “upheld an extraordinary assertion of executive power.”

In PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018), the en banc D.C. Circuit upheld the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) director’s removal protection after a panel struck it down on a 2-1 vote. The panel was made up of then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, Judge A. Raymond Randolph, and Judge Karen Henderson. Judge Henderson dissented from the portion of the panel opinion that invalidated the CFPB’s actions because the removal provisions were unconstitutional. In Henderson’s view, the panel’s decision of the constitutional issue was unnecessary, because there was a sufficient basis to invalidate the CFPBs action on statutory grounds. The en banc court took a less expansive view of executive power than Kavanaugh, Randolph, and Henderson, who in dissenting opinions from the en banc decision, would have found that the for-cause removal limitations were unconstitutional.

In Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020), a 2-1 panel held that the House committee did not have standing to enforce its subpoena. That panel was made up of Judges Henderson, Judith Rogers, and Thomas Griffith. Judges Griffith and Henderson, over the dissent of Judge Rogers, held that the House committee did not have standing to enforce its subpoena of Don McGahn because McGahn was a member of the executive branch. The panel held that Article III did not permit the federal courts to resolve an “interbranch information dispute,” but the en banc court held that finding the committee had standing did not disturb the separation of powers between the courts and the political branches of the federal government. Judge Rogers’ panel dissent gained the support of the majority of the en banc D.C. Circuit and became the majority opinion in the case.

And in In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2020), the en banc D.C. Circuit vacated the mandamus that President Trump’s former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn had won from a 2-1 panel consisting of Judges Neomi Rao, Henderson, and Robert Wilkins. The panel held that Flynn had established a right to have a writ of mandamus issued directing the district court to dismiss the government’s charges against him. Judge Rao, for the panel, explained that the district court’s failure to dismiss the charges infringed upon “the Executive Branch’s exclusive prosecutorial power.” The en banc D.C. Circuit noted that this case also implicated the separation of powers, but concluded that it could not issue mandamus to compel the district court to dismiss the charges. The conservative panel that granted the mandamus petition was more willing to invoke the exceptional mandamus authority to give full and unquestioned effect to the executive’s prosecutorial authority to dismiss pending criminal charges. Judges Rao and Henderson filed dissents from the en banc decision, which largely reflected their views in the panel decision.

In these three decisions, the panels and the en banc D.C. Circuit came out on opposite sides on questions involving the breadth of executive power, and the proper checks and balances on that power from the federal courts and Congress. The en banc D.C. Circuit repeatedly favored those checks and reigned in the executive branch.

Why This Matters Here

The panel decision in the Anthropic case was 2-1, with two Trump-appointed judges in the majority (Rao and Gregory Katsas) and a George H.W. Bush appointee dissenting (Henderson). The holding is exceptionally deferential to the executive branch’s invocation of national security justifications.

Given historical precedent, the en banc D.C. Circuit is likely to take a less expansive view of the Pentagon’s authority to blacklist Anthropic than the panel. The fact that Henderson, a reliably conservative voice on the D.C. Circuit, dissented could expand the likely majority of the en banc D.C. Circuit. One commentator has noted that Henderson has “gone along with many conservative and even Trumpian arguments over the years” but “has on a handful of occasions in recent years proven immovable on certain points.”

Of the 11 active D.C. Circuit judges, seven were appointed by Democratic presidents, and four by Republicans. Given Henderson’s dissent from the panel opinion in this case, observers can surmise that she will vote with the judges on the D.C. Circuit who are more solicitous of views embracing the needs for checks on executive power, rather than a unitary-executive approach to judicial decision-making.

On balance, the D.C. Circuit’s recent practice in these sorts of cases makes en banc rehearing more likely than not, and reversal likely if rehearing is granted. The Anthropic case does not involve the proper bounds of executive power per se, because the case is nominally about the secretary of defense’s statutory authority. But the national security risk determination underlying that statutory authority relies in large part on an executive branch agency head’s discretion to make national security determinations that are subject to extreme deference from the courts. An en banc victory for Anthropic may be followed by a certiorari petition from the government. And if the government seeks certiorari here, there is a good chance it would be granted, since the government’s grant rate is higher than that of any other litigant before the Supreme Court.

Anthropic has framed this case as a misuse of executive power. In the first lines of its petition, Anthropic explains that “[a] divided panel upheld an extraordinary assertion of executive power: the Secretary’s blacklisting of an American company as a national-security threat based on a public disagreement over AI-safety commitments.” Anthropic’s lead argument in favor of en banc rehearing is the exceptional importance of the questions presented by this case, and suggests that questions of this magnitude, including questions about “military uses of an almost unimaginably powerful new technology,” deserve consideration by the full Court. The petition also focuses on the fact that the panel decision will govern future invocations of FASCSA authority and highlights how the panel decision changes the entire dynamic of government contracting. Under the panel decision, Anthropic argues that “procurement will no longer be an arm’s-length negotiation. Instead, every contractor now bargains under the ultimatum Judge Henderson described: “Agree to the Secretary’s demands or risk being designated a national security threat.”

Where the Supreme Court would come out on this is uncertain. Earlier this year in Learning Resources v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229 (2026), which concerned the president’s authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Supreme Court rejected the asserted national security justifications underlying the president’s IEEPA authority. But this would be the Supreme Court’s first foray into a case about artificial intelligence (AI) models and military application, and where any of the nine justices fall on that is pure speculation.

Setting aside the AI context, the Supreme Court is no stranger to executive branch reliance on national security justifications. To differing extents, the views of the justices break into three different camps: There are the justices who almost reflexively defer to the president and other executive branch officials on these claims; there are the justices who are generally skeptical of national security justifications and will not treat the executive’s national security rationales as dispositive; and a third group of justices are generally deferential yet believe that the judiciary should not wholly abdicate its role in favor of executive judgment.

If the en banc D.C. Circuit vacates the panel opinion and enters a new judgment in favor of Anthropic, the government would need at least four justices on the Supreme Court to grant a petition for certiorari. Whether there are four votes depends on what the en banc D.C. Circuit does. If the en banc D.C. Circuit opinion gets to a result that a majority of the Supreme Court agrees with, there may be no need for the Court to hear the case. And given the fact that the president, in July of this year, stated that he no longer believed Anthropic was a national security threat, it is not clear there would be the political will to push this fight further.


Samuel Morse is a third-year student at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. He graduated from The George Washington University with a degree in political science in 2015, and upon graduating law school in May, will be clerking on the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.

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