The Truth About Honey Traps
Seduction in spycraft is less exotic than it’s made out to be, allowing agents to build rapport with potential assets.
Spying is the world’s second oldest profession, and every bit as honorable as the first.
This oft-repeated quip points to a notion held in the popular imagination—and buttressed by fictional works—that spying, sex, and seduction are frequently leveraged by the world’s intelligence agencies. The idea received new succor with allegations published in last week’s New York Times that an extramarital paramour of Jensen Huang, the CEO of Nvidia—a technology company inextricably intertwined with the artificial intelligence (AI) sector—passed intelligence about the relationship and the company to the Chinese intelligence services.
The notion that spies and their assets leverage sexual relationships to bolster their intelligence gathering efforts is not necessarily wrong, but it is widely misunderstood. While Huang’s affair poses a range of questions pertaining to the national security of the United States and its possible technical edge over its adversaries, it also provides an opportunity to dispel certain myths about so-called honey traps. The debate surrounding the allegations tends to rely on stereotypes that lack merit. The U.S. must dispel these misconceptions if it hopes to contain the damage caused by any secrets Huang may have relayed over pillow talk.
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The woman with whom Jensen Huang was allegedly sleeping, Huang Le, is a Chinese national. She appears to have extensive connections in the Shanghai-based world of high finance and is an executive at a Singaporean company with business interests and relationships with major Chinese corporations, the Chinese defense industrial base, and the Chinese government. Her possible husband (the state of their marriage is not entirely clear) has had interactions with People’s Republic of China (PRC) regulators and administrative authorities. While there are still questions about the exact nature of the relationship, it appears she and Huang were having an affair; given her connections, there is widespread speculation that she acted as a “honey trap.”
This term, which describes how sexual seduction can be used to obtain intelligence about a foreign adversary, first appeared in a novel (albeit one that receives high marks in verisimilitude from members of the intelligence community). John Le Carré, who himself was briefly involved in intelligence, coined the expression in his novel “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.” Actual intelligence officers eventually adopted i as a term of art, like much of Le Carré’s invented jargon. But the concept has been around since long before Le Carré invented George Smiley; it probably began when early societies first realized they had interests inimical to their neighbors. Even scripture documents the ploy in Judges 16:5.
Many educated people—probably as a consequence of fictional media—believe that the primary reason for springing a honey trap is to generate material for blackmail: provide someone with photographs of himself having extramarital sex, or exhibiting some sort of taboo kink, the thinking goes, and that person will willingly give up state secrets in order to safeguard personal ones. And that methodology was used at times during the Cold War by the various Soviet services and East Germany’s Stasi. (Perhaps all is fair in love and proletarian revolution.) As sexual mores liberalized, though, threatening to publicize a person’s proclivities or extracurricular partners no longer landed with as much heft as it might have in years past; the KGB’s blackmailing and subsequent recruitment of, for example, John Vassell could not likely have occurred once Great Britain legalized homosexuality.
There’s another reason, too, that most intelligence agencies eschew blackmail as an effective and long-term tool for intelligence operations. The primary job of those agencies is to identify individuals who have access to secrets, create pretextual or artificial—although organic-seeming—reasons for meeting them, establish a relationship with them, and then identify their exploitable vulnerabilities in order to obtain the originally identified secrets. When done right, this can result in a long-lasting relationship that benefits both parties. To draw on another Cold War example, MI6’s best asset in the Soviet Union, Oleg Gordievsky—who would famously help avert nuclear disaster during the 1983 Able Archer exercise—formed a warm bond with his recruiter, who would refer to the development of the relationship as a “long, complicated dance.” Such was the dynamic between them that Gordievsky turned down opportunities to defect and spent nearly a decade as a recruitment-in-place; he fled his home country for good only when an impatient CIA executive tasked an analyst named Aldrich Ames to figure out the identity of the British service’s prize source. (Ames, of course, volunteered for the Soviets himself shortly before completing his task.)
A long-running asset like Gordievsky (or, from the Soviet perspective, someone like Ames), able to report on his agency year after year, would be an indispensable source for any intelligence service. But it’s difficult to conceive of any situation in which a relationship that involves the threat of blackmail could develop the necessary bonds of affection and loyalty that provide the foundation for a long-running operation. The potential of a personal secret’s exposure may generate enough panic, at first, to result in a one-time dump of information—which might be useful absent other options. But as time passes, most people grow inured to the threat; through the power of imagination and rumination, many individuals, without realizing it, inoculate themselves over months or years to the possibility that aspects of their private lives may become public. The power of a threat diminishes every time it is repeated, and one should never count on it as an evergreen motivation for an asset.
Why do honey traps work, then? If leverage created by bribery diminishes over time, one might imagine that the novelty of a new companion, which may momentarily lower one’s inhibitions, eventually expires too. However, it’s not the act of sex itself that is relied upon in this sort of operation, but the emotional attachment—real or seeming—that forms after repeated liaisons that lends honey traps their potency. In this respect, this sort of operation is not a deviation from the normal recruitment processes, but simply a technique of rapport building. The real question, then, is not why honey traps are successful, but why they are not used more frequently. The answer has less to do with moralistic concerns and more to do with quotidian logistical difficulties.
Arranging a pretextual “meet cute” is difficult but not impossible; guaranteeing that the agent or officer of an intelligence agency can spark romantic chemistry with the target adds another layer of complexity. The target must have a lifestyle that allows him or her to continue “accidentally” meeting with the would-be seducer in public situations where their meeting together would not arouse suspicions. The lifestyle must also allow, if the other preconditions are met, for the target’s ability to steal away to private settings if casual flirting turns to sexual attraction. And ideally, the bond between the two individuals should be strong enough that it will not dissipate after the first encounter. The return on investment of a one night stand is considerably less than that of an ongoing and emotionally involved long-term affair.
In other words, a lot has to go right for a preplanned honey trap to work. But there is an alternate way savvy intelligence services may reap similar benefits without necessitating the earlier legwork. And that is to find an extant partner of the target and recruit him or her while the affection is already in motion.
It is entirely possible, if not outright probable, that the relationship between Huang Le and Jensen Huang belongs in this category. It may have occurred without state action, but the Chinese intelligence services discovered it through the government’s regular contacts with the woman and recruited her once she was already in situ.
At this point, there are more open questions in this particular matter than there are verifiable facts. That may never change. This article speaks in generalities and broad principles, and anyone who has worked in intelligence knows that anomalies to such understandings can occur with alarming frequency. But all humans have vulnerabilities and needs (indeed, many of those who pretend to deny them, like the Silicon Valley oligarchs Jensen Huang would count as peers, actually present acute cases) of the very type that intelligence agencies seek to exploit. To ignore that sex, romance, and emotional validation can play a role in resolving basic human desires, or to characterize the exploitation of such desires with puritanical opprobrium, is to be purposefully obtuse. And that is something no citizenry that cares about its own national security can afford to do.
