Lawfare Daily: How Ukraine Is Winning the Drone War

[Intro]

Anastasiia Lapatina: Hi, my name is Anastasiia Lapatina. I’m a Kyiv-based Ukraine Fellow at Lawfare, and you probably know me as the voice behind Lawfare’s Ukraine coverage. I always tell everyone that I have a dream job, and one of the main reasons why I say that is that we at Lawfare never strive to be the first. We strive to be the best, which means that we don’t rush through news coverage.

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Jimmy Rushton: Well, you’re talking about something that’s so cheap and capable of being deployed in such large numbers. Even if you do shoot down, you know, 90% of these drones the 10% that gets through are gonna cause significant damage.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It’s the Lawfare Podcast. I’m Anastasiia Lapatina, Ukraine Fellow at Lawfare, with Jimmy Rushton, a Kyiv-based journalist and security analyst.

Jimmy Rushton: I think the longer this campaign goes on, the more difficult and the more strained Russian logistics will become, and that will cause problems again u- at the tactical level because trucks can’t move without fuel, tanks can’t move y- without fuel, soldiers can’t fight without bullets, and drone teams can’t fight without drones.

So it’s gonna cause them significant problems, I think.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Jimmy and I talked about how Ukraine seems to be gaining an upper hand in its drone war against Russia, and about Russia’s latest missile strike on Kyiv.

[Main Podcast]

We brought you on to talk about your recent piece at the Kyiv Independent, where you’ve analyzed the Ukrainian drone war against Russia. And in that piece, you basically argue that Ukraine has recently gained the upper hand in its drone operations. And you go through, you know, the tactical level, the middle strike operations, and the deep strike operations. You also talk about the interceptors and Russian Shahed attacks against Ukraine.

So I wanna go through all of that, but perhaps in more depth than the article would allow for, and I wanna start with the tactical. So we know that drones these days account for more than 80% of all of the casualties on the battlefield, which is, you know, a striking figure to think about. You’ve investigated that Ukraine is surging ahead in several aspects of the tactical drone level usage.

So can you just sort of explain what it is that the Ukrainians are doing that maybe they haven’t done before and why is it working?

Jimmy Rushton: Sure. So essentially, the drone war is comparative. Obviously, you have two sides, and both sides attempt to achieve dominance in this arena. Unmanned systems are the most important weapon or category of weapon system in this war, and as you said correctly, they account for over 80% of all casualties killed and wounded on the front.

At the tactical level, and when we talk about the tactical level, we’ll talk about day-to-day offensive and defensive operations, Ukraine increasingly uses drones to win these operations whether they are you know, offensive or defensive engagements. They use FPV drones, dropper drones, and large bomber drones to inflict casualties on the Russians and to defend their positions or to, you know, support offensive operations.

Obviously, infantry is still vital to these operations, but drones play an incredibly important supporting role in these types of engagements.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I understand that the situation with Starlink which is the cutoff of Starlink for the Russians that happened on February 1st, has been something of a game changer here, where it really wrecked Russian communications.

Have they been able to adapt to that at all?

Jimmy Rushton: They’ve tried. So Starlink is an incredibly effective form of communication. It’s very difficult to jam. It’s incredibly fast. You know, b- because of the nature of the system, essentially it requires a line of sight to the sky, but it doesn’t need, you know, wires.

It’s relatively cheap. A Starlink Mini is about $300 dollars. And it provides very fast speeds, so it enables real time streaming of high-definition video. So you can have a drone team on the front flying recon drones and that footage can be beamed back to a command center to enable commanders to have, you know, real time situational awareness of what’s happening on the battlefield.

And if you go into a Ukrainian command center, you’ll see, like, banks of monitors that relay footage in real time of these drones which monitor the front lines continuously. So the Ukrainians have this, the Russians don’t. And the Russians have been trying to adapt. They’ve been using these Wi-Fi bridges by this company, Ubiquiti.

Though it supplies large numbers of these Wi-Fi bridges to the Amer- to the Russians. But it’s not as good. They are far more vulnerable. They have to be placed at, you know, high levels. Some poor Russian combat engineer has to call up, you know, telecommunications masts and install them, and they’re very vulnerable to drone strikes.

And they’re using old-fashioned battlefield telephones, which use, you know, a wired connection between positions. But, you know, this is nowhere near as effective or as, you know, high speed and resilient to interference, so resilient to jamming, resilient to, you know, just the everyday kind of degradations of a battlefield shelling, et cetera that you would get.

It... the Russians really don’t have any answer to Starlink. It’s head and shoulders above anything that they have access to.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I wanna now kind of skip the middle strike component because I wanna come back to that and focus most of our discussion on that. I think it’s the most interesting part of the discussion.

And I wanna go for now to deep strikes, which I’ve covered for Lawfare a little bit before, and it’s kind of a very flashy in the media kind of subject. Ukraine has been hitting Russian oil infrastructure, industrial targets very deep into Russian territory you know, in these kind of very stunning operations.

Ukraine has been doing that for many months, right? Over a year now at least. Is there anything special happening recently that’s sort of raising the cost for the Russians?

Jimmy Rushton: I mean, the first Ukrainian long-range drone strikes into Russian territory were conducted in 2022 using off-the-shelf Chinese drones that they purchased from Alibaba.

But what you’re seeing is this maturation of multiple Ukrainian indigenous drone programs that have created a co- whole range of deep strike drones, and they’re all manufacturing their own models. So you have Fire Point, you have the Beaver drone, you have the Liutyi drone a bunch of others, and they’ve all essentially, you know, started mass producing these things.

They’re relatively cheap. The Fire Point FP-1 is about $55,000 dollars. The Liutyi and the Beaver are slightly more expensive, but you know, they’re very effective and we’ve gotten to the point where Ukraine is now firing or launching hundreds of drones into Russia every night. And this has come at the same time as Russia’s own long range drone program, which uses Shaheds, which is an Iranian supplied drone which the Russians now mass produce in Alabuga in Tatarstan.

They call it the Geran. Russia still fires huge numbers of drones at Ukraine about 6,500 a month. But the Ukrainians have become far more capable and adept at knocking these out the sky. So it’s interesting you’ve seen this Ukrainian long range strike campaign really become very effective, very capable of inflicting severe damage on the Russian economy and Russian, you know, military industrial sites at the same time as the Russian deep strike drone campaign has become less effective because of Ukrainian adaption particularly the FPV interceptor program.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I wanted to ask actually about the interceptors.

So Ukraine n-now has and for a while, you know, Ukraine has had kind of staggering, very successful and very high rates of interception of these drones, right? The Shaheds or the Russian variant, the Geran. And the Ukrainian interceptor drones are more and more successful, and there are many of them being produced in Ukraine.

Is it similar or the same in Russia? Is there a kind of a mass production of interceptor drones? How are the Russians approaching that technology?

Jimmy Rushton: No, there isn’t. So Russia has interceptor drones like Ukraine does, but they haven’t invested in the program probably because Ukraine essentially...

Because Russia had a head start in the one-way attack munitions, the Shaheds, it was, the impetus was in, on Ukraine to create a countermeasure to that. So that’s why they put a lot of time and effort into developing these FPV interceptors. Also very important to target Russian tactical and operational level reconnaissance drones.

So these super cams, Zalas which were flying over Ukrainian positions and observing everything that was happening on the ground. And the initial phase of the interceptor drones were to target these Russian reconnaissance drones. They weren’t originally designed to target Shaheds.

That came later, ‘cause Shaheds fly a lot faster than these Russian reconnaissance drones. So e-essentially, al-although they, the Russians do have the access to this technology, it’s not as extensive. Also, Russia is just a bigger country, so it’s more difficult for Russia to defend itself against drones than is for the Ukrainians.

You know, you—In regards to the interceptor program, it really kind of, it really does change the game in regards to economics, simply because your average interceptor drone costs about $2,300 dollars to $3,000 dollars, which is very cheap for any form of air defense munition. Significantly cheaper than a, than an incoming Russian drone.

Roughly each Shahed is about $35,000 dollars. That’s for the very cheapest. They can range up to about $120,000 dollars, but the cheapest model is about 3,500—$35,000 dollars, sorry. So it kind of really neatly changes the cost per engagement compared to what it used to be, which was having to use surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery, which was, you know, significantly less effective than either a surface-to-air missile or a FPV interceptor.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah, I mean, w- in regards to Russia’s mass drone attacks against Kyiv, both of us live in Kyiv, a- and we’ve talked many times about how really the drone threat is barely perceived as a threat at all.

I mean, both of us civilians, you know, kind of having to make calculations when to take shelter, et cetera. And, you know, correct me if I’m wrong, but neither of us take the drone threat really seriously because the interception rates are so high. So yeah. I wanna now talk about the middle strike campaign, the Ukrainian middle strike campaign, which I think is the most interesting part of it.

And when we talk about middle strike, we’re talking about the distances, you know, between 25 and 200 kilometers away from the front line, roughly. And r- Ukraine has been developing more and more technologies capable of targeting, you know, various Russian sites at that distance, and it’s been ramping up that campaign and doing it very effectively, and it’s causing a lot of you know, wreaking a lot of havoc and causing a lot of chaos on the Russian side.

Can you talk a little bit about the targets that Ukraine is choosing at this range, and why they’re so critical?

Jimmy Rushton: Sure. So essentially, as you said you’re talking about targets at the operational depth between about 20, 25 kilometers to 200 kilometers from the front. So i-i- in that area, you’re talking about air defense systems, you’re talking about logistics operations, so that’s both the trucks that carry the logistics from supply depots to the front, and also the supply depots itself, so fuel dumps, ammunition depots command centers, anything really that supports operations at the tactical level.

So when you strike these targets at the operational level, you make tactical level operations significantly more difficult because if a soldier has no ammunition, if artillery has no shells, or increasingly if a drone unit has no drones, they can’t really do that much. So it’s about you know, creating problems at the tactical level.

And also, when you talk about strikes on air defense systems, it’s increasingly the case that it improves the ability of Ukraine to carry out operations you know, at the strategic level using deep strike because you’re removing air defense systems that, that would have potentially shot down these drones that are going further and further.

So yeah, no, it’s very significant, and you’re seeing a lot of strikes along the M14 highway, which is along the coast of Azov—the Sea of Azov, sorry.

Anastasiia Lapatina: That’s the highway that connects Russian territory, so sort of Rostov-on-Don region, Rostov Oblast, near occupied Donbas, and runs along the Sea of Azov towards Crimea, and it’s this, you know, very valuable to Russia land bridge that connects occupied Crimea to mainland Russia.

And you know, there is this patch of occupied Ukrainian territory there with several highways, you know, M14, M18. The Russians use different names for them. It’s a little confusing, but the key point is that there are several very critical roads there. And as far as I understand, very recently, Ukrainian forces have begun systematically targeting those areas for the first time and it’s caused so many problems that parts of that highway have even been closed to, you know, civilian traffic, right?

Jimmy Rushton: Yeah, so the Russians call it the R280 which is the road, as you said from Rostov-on-Don down to Crimea, and they run a lot of their logistics along that road. So Ukraine has been using a variety of different systems to hit things on that road, but primarily the Hornet, a loitering munition which was developed by Eric Schmidt’s Perennial Autonomy.

It’s very cheap. It’s about $5,000, but it’s very effective. Azov have been using them with Starlinks strapped on the top, and that has increased the range of about 200 kilometers. So, you know, they’re effective, they’re cheap, and it causes problems for Russia because you’re talking about a system that can be deployed en masse, that is again cheap, that can be produced at in, in large quantities.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Like, is there anything that the Russians can do to counter it, or are they doing anything now that’s, you know, that’s helping at all?

Jimmy Rushton: You know, there, there are potentially ways that you could counter them. You could devote more forces to anti-drone operations. But the problem is when you’re talking about something that’s so cheap and capable of being deployed in such large numbers, even if you do shoot down, you know, 90% of these drones the 10% that gets through are gonna cause significant damage.

And again it’s a, it’s... a lot of war is about economics. If you’ve got a munition which costs $5,000 dollars, which can take out a truck that costs $80,000 dollars or whatever, that’s a significant you know, exchange rate, right? That’s a significant... You don’t need that many drones to get through to tip the balance in your favor.

And Russian logistics have always been pretty poor. They aren’t the U.S. military as much as they would like to think that they are and they’ve never had very good logistics, and this is increasingly straining logistics. You’re already seeing queues for fuel in Melitopol. You’re also seeing queues for fuel in Crimea.

So I think the longer this campaign goes on, the more difficult and the more strained ru- Russian logistics will become. And that will cause problems again, you, at the tactical level, because trucks can’t move without fuel, tanks can’t move without fuel, soldiers can’t fight without bullets, and drone teams can’t fight without drones.

So it’s gonna cause them significant problems, I think.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah, it really seems like the middle strike campaign has the potential to create significant change and just have significant impact in the short to medium term in a way that the deep strike campaign can’t. Not, you know, not to say that the deep strikes aren’t important, they are very important, but it’s I think the math there is very different, and you’re really looking at, like, kind of annual or longer term impacts of, you know, chipping away at the Russian oil infrastructure.

Whereas here, as you’ve said if trucks don’t have fuel that’s a very immediate kind of impact on the battlefield. And you c- we can see already that Ukraine is really leaning into this. So the Ukrainian defense minister, the newly appointed defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, just yesterday actually announced what he called a logistical lockdown.

Very flashy in a very kind of typical Ukrainian government communications fashion. And basically, this logistical lockdown program is the government allocating an extra 5 billion hryvnias, which is around $110 million dollars, a little more than that, to procuring more drone technology specifically for those middle strikes.

And Fedorov said that, quoting, “We’re seizing the initiative using technology and the cold math of the war to paralyze operations,” end quote. So the Ukrainian government seems to be really prioritizing this. Yeah, it’s very interesting. I wanted to ask also about the recent Russian strike on Kyiv—Both of us live in Kyiv, but I wasn’t actually in the city during the strike.

I was in the suburbs with family, so I, you know, I didn’t hear or experience the immediate impact. But Jimmy, you live like 200 meters, 300 meters away from where there was what looked like a direct cruise missile hit. Do you want to just talk a little bit about this recent last weekend’s attack and sort of what happened there?

Jimmy Rushton: Sure. What I mean, as you correctly stated, it was a cruise missile, KH-101 apparently, which hit a office of the DSNS, which is a, it’s the Ukrainian Ambulance and Rescue Service, essentially, and the Chernobyl Museum, which was just behind it. And yeah, it was very loud and it blew out quite a few windows on my street.

Not in my building, thankfully, but it damaged a significant, you know, part of our neighborhood, which is, you know, obviously it’s very different when you, as a journalist, you visit lots of destroyed areas of Kyiv and other cities, but it’s obviously different when it’s your area of Kyiv that’s been hit.

Thankfully, you know, obviously it did a lot of damage to the building that it struck, but it seems like most of the other buildings will be relatively quickly repaired because That’s what the Ukrainians do. There was a business center that got hit by a Shahed drone about two nu- two, three months ago.

They also hit the synagogue, the local synagogue at that time or very close to the synagogue.

Anastasiia Lapatina: This is in your neighborhood of Kyiv.

Jimmy Rushton: This is in- Yeah ... my neighborhood, yeah. And, you know, that’s been completely repaired now. It looks like nothing had happened. So I think you’ll see, you know, as happens, life goes on, they’ll repair the buildings.

Thankfully nobody was killed in this attack.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Nobody was killed in your neighborhood, but-

Jimmy Rushton: In my neighborhood, yeah ...

Anastasiia Lapatina: I think two people were killed.

Jimmy Rushton: In the, in, in the wider attack, yeah, but in this-

Anastasiia Lapatina: In general, in the wider attack on Kyiv, two people got killed, yeah.

Jimmy Rushton: In this cruise missile strike, nobody was killed.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah. Yeah.

Jimmy Rushton: So it’s, you know, it’s a terrible thing, but I think one nice thing you saw, so there was this one cafe that was had just opened the day before, and, you know, the owner was understandably very upset that his cafe had been hit or been damaged by the shock wave. So he posted on Facebook and The Kyiv Independent wrote a story about it, and then lots of Ukrainians came up to queue to buy coffee from him, which is very sweet.

So it’s, you do see kind of the community coming together during times like this, and you see kind of people looking after each other. But yeah it’s, you know, it’s not pleasant when large explosive devices land close to your apartment.

Anastasiia Lapatina: No, it’s not. S- speaking of large explosive devices the Russians also used the Oreshnik miss- missile which is their intermediate-range ballistic missile that’s nuclear capable and, you know, i- is supposed to make everyone shudder in fear.

They’ve also used two of them, I think, in the latest attack. This was only the third time that they’ve used this ag- used it against Ukraine, if I’m correct. There was one hit on Dnipro, and then there was one hit on Lviv some time ago, and then this was the third. And the Russians have really, you know, as they do with all of their new technology and new weapons, they try to sell it as this, like, invincible missile that’s ultra-powerful, impossible to shoot down.

Of course, nuclear capable, so that’s, you know, scary, or supposed to be scary. And every time they use it against Ukraine what happens is that there is really very minimal damage. I mean, there is damage, but by the standards of all other Ukra- Russian attacks in Ukraine, like, the damage is quite minimal.

And you actually have gone to the site of where this latest Oreshnik missile hit. Can you just talk a bit more about, about what you saw there and sort of what this part of the attack was and why the Russians did it?

Jimmy Rushton: Sure. Well, I mean, so almost every long-range munition Russia fires at Ukraine is nuclear capable.

So you could s- stick a nuclear warhead on every cruise missile and ballistic missile that Russia fires at Ukraine. You know, that doesn’t really say that much. The interesting thing about a Oreshnik is it was specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons. So for example, an Iskander can carry a conventional warhead, a cluster munition warhead or nuclear warhead, and it’s effective at delivering any of those.

A Oreshnik is not effective at doing anything other than delivering a nuclear weapon because it’s—Essentially, it’s not particularly accurate because when you design a weapon system to deliver a nuclear weapon, you don’t need to be precisely accurate as you do when you’re delivering a conventional weapon.

Also, the munitions are relatively small. They arrive at significant speed, but they’re not that big. This is because Oreshnik uses MIRVs, which is multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, which is designed to overwhelm missile defense and deliver multiple nuclear warheads onto a target.

Again, great if you’re using nuclear weapons, but it’s not designed to deliver a conventional payload. It’s essentially completely useless at delivering a conventional payload. And when I went to the site, and it was where in the very, very small area that it hit was quite destructive, but not as destructive as a conventional ballistic missile or e- it was around about the sort of level of destruction that I would say I’ve seen from Shaheds, Shahed drones, possibly less actually.

The thing about a Shahed is that it has a high explosive warhead, and it can deliver shrapnel. There was no shrapnel damage at these locations. Essentially what you saw is that these very, these submunitions arrived very fast. They punched through the roof of these garages and created, you know, they, these garages were burnt out a- and destroyed, but the neighboring garages were not.

They were basically completely untouched. So, you know, it’s a very expensive way of delivering a—

Anastasiia Lapatina: A message.

Jimmy Rushton: Yeah.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Except it seems like nobody actually cares about the message, right?

Jimmy Rushton: No, I think y- the initial strike was definitely far more shocking and intimidating, but at this point-

Anastasiia Lapatina: You mean the first time they’ve used it?

Jimmy Rushton: The first time they used it in Dnipro, but even then, you know, Russian military bloggers were complaining about the lack of impact because it really is not ... it hits the roofs of some industrial military industrial units in, in Dnipro but it didn’t do much damage, and again, significantly less damage than a conventional ballistic missile or a conventional cruise missile.

So again, coming back to economics, ‘cause a lot of war is about economics, right? You’re spending 50 to 100 million, right? Nobody knows the true cost, but it’s between 50 to 100 million on this thing to cause relatively little damage and to, you know, create a lot of noise and a lot of spectacle and a lot of light.

I actually saw the Oreshnik land from my balcony ‘cause I’m, you know, I’m one of these crazy people that, that- Yes ... being a journalist and being a kind of security analyst I look at what’s happening. I don’t go to shelters or-

Anastasiia Lapatina: Which is, like, the exact opposite of what you’re advised to do—

Jimmy Rushton: But at the same time-

Anastasiia Lapatina: You should move away from the windows, but anyway.

Jimmy Rushton: Oh, no, I was on the other side of the window, so yeah. But the, I think again, for, so the point of being a journalist, at least from my perspective, is, you know, you wanna witness these things, you wanna tell people what’s happening. And I saw the Iranshinik- You also wanna

Anastasiia Lapatina: stay alive. But anyway, we’re-

Jimmy Rushton: Sure.

But,

Anastasiia Lapatina: I’m not gonna lecture you on what to do with your

Jimmy Rushton: security ... but, you know. But so, so I saw the Oreshnik landing, and it was very underwhelming, to be honest. Again, significantly less intimidating than a conventional weapon, a conventional ballistic missile, a conventional cruise missile. So it’s an expensive way of attempting to send a message, which is increasingly not being listened to—

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah, every time the Russians are preparing to send an Oreshnik missile, intelligence services get a wind of that because the preparations for the launch are quite distinct from other launches.

And e- every time, like in the three times that the Oreshnik has been sent at Ukraine, the U.S. Embassy posts this special security alert, and that’s kind of when everybody knows that, okay, they’re going to send an Oreshnik. And it’s interesting that the U- the U.S. Embassy doesn’t, I mean, correct me if I’m wrong, Jimmy, but I haven’t seen any similar warnings about any other type of attack.

It’s only this Oruh- Oreshnik stuff that they sort of publish these for, but it’s s- such a contrast because they’re actually quite underwhelming objectively. Like, I’m pretty sure they haven’t actually killed anyone in the three times that they’ve been used. So yeah, I mean, it’s definitely part of Russia’s broader sort of campaign of intimidation and how they’re signaling their displeasure with s- with certain events, with certain Ukrainian attacks.

I mean, just recently, a few days ago, they’ve started this new wave of threats basically announcing this new campaign of targeted strikes against Kyiv, and they’ve publicly called on all foreign diplomats to leave Kyiv, and it we’re witnessing this now sort of a few days after that, that, like, nobody seems to care.

Like, I haven’t heard of any... I mean, I think there may have been a few embassies that have evacuated part of their staff, but not any of, like, the key, like British Embassy, American Embassy, all of the European teams. Like, nobody is responding to it, which, you know, just speaks to how overused this fear-mongering tactic is, right?

Jimmy Rushton: Yeah, so as far as I’m aware, no embassies have closed or have left Kyiv as a response to this Russian threat. So yeah, I, you know, Russia makes these bellicose threats all the time, and I think that the problem with making a lot of threats is that if you don’t follow up on them, people stop paying attention, and that’s what you’re seeing.

You’re seeing this kind of r- Russia is so bellicose and so threatening and so, that they come out with all these ridiculous statements all the time. It gets to the point where, you know, they just become background noise. And, you know, if I was the Russians, I think you, part of it is, it’s a little bit worrying for them because when they do actually want to issue a genuine threat, everyone’s gonna ignore them.

And that’s why it’s good to not be so bellicose. I mean, if you look at most governments don’t speak like this. So if, for example, the British government came up tomorrow and said, “You know, we’re gonna bomb a country,” you’d probably- ... take that quite seriously ‘cause the British government never says that.

But with the Russians, they say- I mean, they’re also not at war, but yes. We’re also not at war, right? But, you know, it’s like i- if Russia talks about invading the Baltic countries all the time, it talks about Finland, it talks about, you know, it was t- Armenia the other day because Armenia’s left the CTSO, and it’s just like, it’s just constant stream of threats from Russia towards everyone, and people just tune it out because it’s just constant, and the threats, yeah, they’re so bellicose, and they’re so outlandish and just ridiculous that it doesn’t have the impact that Russia, that Moscow wants it to have at this point.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Well, on that note, Jimmy, thank you so much for coming on. Hopefully we’ll talk to you again soon.

Jimmy Rushton: Thank you very much.

[Outro]

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