Cutting Off Hamas’s European Fundraising Spigot
Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
Editor’s Note: Hamas is greatly weakened, and to restore its strength it will need money. The group relies heavily on donations from around the world, and cutting this off would keep it weak. Michael Jacobson and Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argue that Europe holds many of the keys to stopping Hamas financing. While some European countries are aggressive in their efforts, many are lax and must step up their efforts.
Daniel Byman
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The authors, both graduates of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, dedicate this article in memory of Prof. Richard H. Shultz, director of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School, who recently passed away after 42 years of teaching at the Fletcher School. Prof. Shultz leaves behind thousands of students impacted by his teaching and mentorship, including the authors.
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As its actions make clear, Hamas is keen to maintain control and power in Gaza over the long term. But the group will need to rebuild its military and security capabilities to do so—a costly proposition. Drying out Hamas’s funds would help buttress the ceasefire in Gaza, allow time for alternative Palestinian leaders to emerge, and keep a dangerous group on the back foot. Unfortunately, Hamas’s overseas financial support networks remain largely intact. Cracking down on those networks—particularly those in Europe—will be essential as the international community seeks to stabilize and rebuild Gaza.
While Hamas has raised funds around the world for decades, its overseas financial solicitations increased after its assault on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. On Oct. 10, Hamas leader Khaled Mishal called for supporters to give “aid, money, and all that you have” in what he called an act of “financial jihad.” Hamas fundraisers responded with alacrity.
Within days of the Oct. 7 attack, Hamas launched several new fundraising campaigns, primarily under the guise of alleviating the genuine humanitarian suffering in Gaza. Europe has been a particularly active hotbed of Hamas’s post-Oct. 7 fundraising—hardly a surprise given the group’s long-standing ties and operations there.
In a September 2024 report, the Israeli government said that Hamas has established a “network of activists and organizations” in Western Europe over the past 20 years. The U.S. government made similar assertions a month later, claiming that Hamas was receiving approximately $10 million a month in donations through sham charities including in Europe—a sizeable sum rivaling what Iran was providing the group at its peak funding levels in the lead-up to the Oct. 7 attack.
Actions by other governments over the past several years back the Israeli and American assertions. For example, in March 2024, the United Kingdom joined the United States in designating the group Gaza Now and its Europe-based founder, Mustafa Ayash, as alleged “key financial facilitators” for Hamas. Gaza Now, created soon after Mishal’s Oct. 10, 2023, call to action, solicited donations through U.S.- and Europe-based financial institutions as well as cryptocurrency accounts, providing guidance on how to donate in dollars, euros, or cryptocurrency. Ayash was later charged by the Austrian government and will likely soon be extradited from the Netherlands to face prosecution for alleged terrorist financing crimes.
The 2024 designation was not the first joint U.S.-U.K. action targeting Hamas’s financial network. The United States and the United Kingdom also jointly sanctioned Hamas financiers in November and December 2023 actions. Australia joined both countries in targeting additional alleged Hamas financial networks and facilitators of Hamas virtual currency transfers in January 2024.
On the positive side of the ledger, the United Kingdom is not the only European government taking action to address the Hamas threat in its country. In May 2024, German authorities issued an arrest warrant for Majed al-Zeer, a senior Hamas official, who was accused of coordinating Hamas’s activities across Europe, including its fundraising. Prior to his move to Germany, he spent years in London, where he was also allegedly heavily involved in Hamas activities. The Netherlands, in addition to extraditing Ayash to Austria, is also prosecuting another major alleged Hamas financier, Amin Abu Rashid, and his daughter on charges of sending millions of dollars to Hamas.
The U.S. Treasury has sanctioned numerous other Hamas-linked entities in Europe over the past several years, calling them “sham charities.” This included the Italy-based “Charity Association of Solidarity with the Palestinian People” and its founder, which the U.S. charges helped “bankroll Hamas’s military wing,” sending at least $4 million to the terrorist group over a 10-year period. It also designated Adel Doughman, whom it accused of being “in charge of Hamas activity in Austria” and of working with Hamas-affiliated fundraising organizations outside Europe, such as the Lebanon-based al-Quds International Institution and the Gulf-based Union of Good.
Many governments around the world have the tools and the legal authorities to stop Hamas from continuing to operate and raise funds in their countries. Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization not only in the United States but in Europe as well. The European Union has designated the group, with some governments also putting in place national-level bans or sanctions. In fact, the European Union strengthened its sanctions regime against Hamas (and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in 2024, expanding the scope of sanctionable activities tied to the terror group. In particular, these new authorities made it easier for the European Union to target those financing and supporting Hamas, moving beyond the traditional European focus on sanctioning those directly involved in violence.
Some European governments, such as Germany and the Netherlands, have taken these responsibilities seriously and acted against Hamas funding networks within their borders. Many others have not. For example, Hamas has been active for years in Belgium and Italy, but the governments there have taken little action. In 2024, in response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Belgian justice minister confirmed that Hamas was continuing to operate in the country through shell companies, but more than a year later, the government has yet to crack down on these networks. And there are no indications Italy has taken steps to cut off Hamas’s fundraising to follow up on the U.S. designations of Italy-based Hamas entities and individuals over the past year.
Other governments, such as the United Kingdom and France, have taken some limited action, but much more still needs to be done. For example, while the United Kingdom joined the United States in designating Hamas leaders outside the country, London has yet to sanction or take action against Interpal, a U.K. entity that was designated by the United States for its Hamas ties more than 20 years ago and continues to operate. In 2024, France froze the assets of a France-based nongovernmental organization, Humani’terre, after Israeli authorities seized material featuring the group’s logo in Hamas tunnels in Gaza. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Humani’terre is an alias for Comite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, another charity designated by the United States 20 years ago for funding Hamas. The fact that such organizations were able to continue funding Hamas for two decades after being sanctioned by the United States underscores how far European countries have to go to uproot the Hamas financing networks established in Europe over many years.
The change needs to start at the EU level, taking advantage of authorities recently passed but used in a very limited fashion to target the financing of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The European Union has only sanctioned a handful of entities and individuals so far using the new proscription authorities it approved in January 2024, and only one—a Spanish company owned by a Sudanese Hamas financier—in Europe. In January 2025, the European Council renewed these authorities for another year, but it will have to be renewed again before Jan. 20, 2026, to remain on the books. The authorities should be renewed, but this time around it should be employed to go after Hamas financiers in Europe. Far more needs to be done to make a dent in Hamas’s extensive European financial networks.
Hamas’s financial hub in Turkey poses a particularly serious challenge—hardly a surprise given President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s well-known sympathies and ideological alignment with the group. In December 2023, less than two months after the Oct. 7 attacks, Erdogan made his position on Hamas clear, emphasizing that “No matter what anybody says, I cannot accept Hamas is a terror group.” The following year, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hamid Abdullah Hussein al-Ahmar, a Yemeni national based in Turkey who allegedly helped oversee Hamas’s once-secret $500 million overseas investment portfolio. The following month, the Treasury Department sanctioned multiple Turkey-based Hamas members for their alleged involvement in financial facilitation. Erdogan’s government has taken no visible actions against these sanctioned entities, despite the U.S. sanctions. To the contrary, Erdogan has publicly insisted that Hamas is not a terrorist organization, Oct. 7 notwithstanding.
Governments—in Europe and beyond—that hope for peace and stability in Gaza should be working vigorously to identify and disrupt Hamas’s financial and support networks in their territories. The recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is a rare opportunity to move the region toward a more stable, peaceful future. Weakening Hamas’s networks around the world can help ensure that Hamas cannot rearm itself and plunge the region back into chaos.
