Lawfare Daily: NATO’s Eastern Flank: The View from Lithuania

[Intro]

Gabrielius Landsbergis: It’s not easy. I'm still kind of believing that we are caught in the perfect storm of aggressive Russia, and U.S. is reconfiguring its role in the world. And unfortunately, we are at the front line. If Europe or the West would be challenged, it's very likely that we would face it first.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Katsiaryna Shmatsina, Eurasia fellow at the Lawfare Institute with Gabrielius Landsbergis, former minister of foreign affairs of Lithuania, and Vytis Jurkonis, Associate Professor at University of Vilnius.

Vytis Jurkonis: Really, Kremlin doesn't understand anything else but power. And that needs to be our response. We cannot, we don't have the luxury to actually think that we'll talk to him, we’ll open his eyes and he will understand. No, he wouldn't.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Today we are talking about Lithuania’s security perspective as a NATO member bordering Russia and Belarus.

[Main episode]

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Today we are turning our attention to NATO's eastern flank, to Lithuania, a country with deep historic memory of Russian Soviet occupation, resistance, and now a frontline democracy watching Russia's war in Ukraine from close proximity.

And I would like to set the stage from big picture and ask a question: How would you describe the current atmosphere in Lithuania? Has the perception of security changed since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine?

And I would like to start with Vytis, since you have the firsthand experience working with Ukrainian refugees and civil society.

Vytis Jurkonis: Thank you for having me here. Indeed, the situation is tense in the region.

I mean, it's obvious because of the war. It's obvious because of all sorts of provocations which are happening like airspace being violated, cyberattacks, instrumentalized migration and whatnot.

Obviously, it's also led by disinformation, discreditation, and all sorts of other information warfare, kind of to also infuse psychological effects to the Lithuanian society. Also, to spread the divide-and-rule, sometimes hatred against migrants or, I don't know, like some liberal groups, if you will.

I mean, the pattern of what Kremlin and Lukashenko’s regime is doing is somewhat similar, though it might vary depending on situation. If we talk about the mood of the society, my understanding and my feeling is that the peak of stress and big big concern was just before the full-scale invasion, because there was a lot of uncertainty.

What is going to happen? How is this going to look like? And I think the resilience and the ability to defend themselves was the inspiration for Lithuanians, that Ukraine managed to defend itself. Even being not at the best odds, so to say.

So, and we have noticed an immediate, huge huge solidarity with the Ukrainians, like hosting the refugees coming from Ukraine, assisting the society, the military, state institutions.

Lithuanian society has been incredibly generous, donating money to all sorts of like civic initiatives. I think the best-known initiative is Blue/Yellow, which provides also military equipment to military units.

So, it has been an inspiration. It managed to calm down some, because when you are able to respond, when you are able to act, I think it diminishes your stress somewhat.

So we do have ups and downs, waves of attack in this psychological warfare. So obviously I think part of the society is generally concerned. When Gabrielius Landsbergis is our foreign, minister of foreign affairs, like in the previous government, was trying to address issues that we need to be prepared very fast, there were like parts of the society, which were saying like, you are dragging us into the conflict.

Which was a totally misread thing that was like an alert to the Europeans and to Lithuanians in general that it's serious. But the source of the aggression, the source of war, all sorts of provocations were, are, and I’m afraid will be coming from Moscow and Minsk.

And I think that Gabrielius was certainly right to say that we need to show that we are prepared, as your Atlantic Community but also as the society. Because it also has a preventive effect, where the enemy might count a couple of times, whether, and do the cost-benefit analysis, were it worth it?

On the other hand, we see that in the Baltic Sea region. There's Sweden, Finland, which joined the NATO Alliance. And I think from that standpoint, it's also showing that other countries are stepping up. Those who used to be neutral. And they understand all the threats coming from the east.

So I think that the, there are like some pluses, some minuses in terms of the dynamics, but the general attitude that Lithuanians are ready to respond back. They understand the gravity of the situation, but there's no panic whatsoever.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Gabrielius, I am honored that you found time to join the conversation and I'm looking forward to drawing from your expertise in diplomatic service and in, in the government.

So since Russia’s endeavors in Ukraine, did you see any policy shifts in Lithuania, like in the policy circle or some actions taken by the Ministry of Defense?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Well, clearly there have been changes. Just to name a few, so we are, we started somewhere at 2% of spending on defense at the beginning of the war. And we're now––well, at least officially, the government claims that we are roughly around 5%.

So that's one example of how things are changing. I believe that, again, coming from what Vitys said, that indeed the stress has subsided and the population is, a lot more calmer than it has been at the beginning of the war.

But it also reflects in the way that the government makes decisions. So, during the first days of war, you could feel that you could push almost any decision through the parliament. The government would debate almost constantly, in order to make sure that we are prepared as much as we can be.

Now everything is much more back to normal. So the debates on the parliament are more difficult. The discussion is much more polarized. That means that there are people who would say, well, maybe you know, we shouldn't be doing this. Maybe we should be doing something completely different.

And that is, for me at least, it is a bit concerning. Because even though Ukrainians have been able to save us from the war in a way, but as I say, we're not out of the night yet. There are still not––we shouldn't be prepared to see the light of the dawn very soon.

And that means that we still need to be preparing, we still need to be doing as much as we can, taking in Ukrainian lessons, building up anti-drone defenses and, so many other things. Because nobody––not in the military, in political sphere or anywhere––could be saying that, or should be saying that, well, tomorrow will be safer.

Unfortunately, most of the people say something different. That, well, Putin, most likely he's going to escalate. We've seen that happening, like the drones in Poland, the jets in Estonia, the drones that stopped the airports in Nordic countries. These things continue and they're going to continue. And we have to answer the question whether we are getting prepared for these sort of eventualities.

And it's, I mentioned one thing as a, being prepared from the military perspective. So, being able to shoot down. There's also another element, are we able to make Putin pay for it. Are we prepared to issue costs in some way for these drone operations or not?

And are we able to make decisions where it matters? So these questions, unfortunately, are not yet answered. Hopefully we have enough time.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: I wanted to encourage our audience to check out Gabrielius Landsbergis’s personal website. And as far as I remember, like last time I checked you had this like logo, which says, I'm Gabrielius Landsbergis, and I refuse to deescalate.

And I also know that you wrote memoirs or like reflecting on––

Gabrielius Landsbergis: still working on it.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Okay. Yeah. Looking forward to reading those.

I had a meeting on the Hill the other day, and the question I was asked whether Russia is launching drone attacks on NATO to convey a message such as, ‘do not send weapons to Ukraine, you might need them yourself.’

And I wanted to redirect this question to both of you. Do you believe Russia might attempt to extend its aggression to the Baltic states, moving beyond Ukraine?

Vytis Jurkonis: Well, that's a question which has two sides of the coin. One, which is if they are trying to intimidate us, the question is not only on the one, which is like sending that signal. But on the other, on the receiver’s end, how are we responding?

And Gabrielius alluded to that, right? It is just, so what are we doing? Any response, a symmetrical––I remember my former boss, David Kramer, was working on a book. I don't know, maybe he has written it.

What does it mean, like when someone in Washington says that this is not acceptable, right? It is just what kind of practical consequences do that entail, right? So it's important to respond so that the signal is received by the one who's sending us that signal.

The other thing is, I believe Kremlin, its modus operandi is always testing the boundaries, how far they might push.

It's just like saying, oh, that was an accident. Oh, we didn't notice. Oh, like, it's not us. And all that jazz. I mean, we've seen that many times. With the green men, it's not us. With MH17, it's not us. With all sorts of “it's not us,” right.

And we need to be very clear, you know, especially when we know who did that so that we say that and that then there's a response. Otherwise, if we choose to kind of, ‘let's not escalate,’ by not saying the truth, I think that this is certainly has opposite effect, which is encouraging Kremlin to actually be more aggressive and push the boundaries even further.

Gabrielius Landsbergis: I will just, you know, add a couple of things.

So one is that, Putin is feeling the bite of the war. Probably for the first time in three years, he's actually having to pay the price for the war because of what? Of Ukrainian long-range attacks.

That means that regular Russian in Moscow, St. Petersburg, or, somewhere further from the center understands that, okay, there is a chance that Ukrainians can, can inflict harm on us. And they are. And it feels.

So for him, now, without the full-scale or much larger mobilization in Russia, for him it's very difficult to change the situation in Ukraine.

The only hope is that Ukrainians will just get tired first. That is his hope. So how do you change balance, then, of the war? So then, you kind of, you––you figure out new axis of attack. And this is where, you know, western Europe or ‘West’ as such comes into play.

And this is why, in my assumption, we are seeing these escalations with drones and whatnot. Meaning––and your question was very right, that probably his attempt could be to put enough pressure so that the debate, the national debate, would start in the capitals of Western Europe that maybe we are assisting Ukraine too much, because you see, we might ourselves find ourselves at war. And therefore we cannot do much and that, and we need to defend ourselves.

That could be his attempt. You know, I'm not sure whether that––we, it still remains to be seen that whether he's successful or not, especially with escalation.

But we have to keep that in mind, and honestly, my advice would be to prepare for that and send a preemptive signal that, look, this is not going to work. We are going to support Ukraine, and we're not getting, we're, we won't be afraid of your escalation.

Now the second thing is, again, in many cases when we see Russian escalation, people will say, well, I mean, should we be taking down his jets? And Mark Rutte, the secretary general of NATO said, well, if they don't pose any threat, then, you know, we will not be taking them down.

Kind of––I agree with Vitys ,that basically this invites further escalation. For Putin this is a sign of weakness, and basically, okay guys, you cannot do anything, that means that I can continue. And he will continue.

But there are ways how can we answer. And they are symmetric. There, there are ways from, for example––we have all sorts of cyber capabilities that could turn off the lights in the airport that houses the jets. And, one day is just unable to take off because, it's just not working.

There have been some interesting pager operations in Middle East. And if suddenly, Russian generals or whoever would have to start checking their mobile devices to be sure that they suddenly, they wouldn't be exploding in some way.

There, there are ways how to send a message without, without shooting a rocket at Russian city. And I think that way, West could manage escalation quite well.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: If we talk about Lithuania or Russia's interest towards Lithuania and sort of having Kaliningrad as a neighbor, or, I came across certain investigative journalist reports about Russian sabotage training attacks and on Klaipėda Port, potentially, or whatever Russians are up to in, again, like on the Kaliningrad side or in Belarus for that matter.

And I realized that drone attacks aimed at Poland is something that hits headlines. Right now it's in the news, but what kind of attacks or hybrid attacks or operations Lithuanians are experiencing as we speak?

Vytis Jurkonis: I think, well, there were headlines when the cables were torn in the Baltic Sea, right?

And that was affecting the entire like Baltic Sea region, which in fact encourage more closer regional cooperation on like security region, so I would say––on security issues. So I'd say, we managed to get out of the situation even more coordinated and resilient, though we shouldn't fall, like, fall asleep.

We should continue. 'Cause I remember like one of the advisors of Gabrielius previously was always mentioning this. Take the Nordic Baltic countries alone in terms of their budgets. Take it into the perspective and compare that with the budget of Russia. And then you see that sometimes maybe you don't even need some of the other EU countries, that like we are capable to actually respond.

Especially since Finland and Sweden joined. But there were all sorts of provocations before. I mean, it's not that it started as of February 2022. Let me remind you, the grown soldier story. Like it is what, 2007, 2008 perhaps, right?

So when some youth groups were beating, like, smashing windows in the streets of Tallinn, cyberattacks were happening. I wonder if that kind of event unfolded now, whether it would not be perceived as the Article Five, right?

Again, in 2005 or something like that, we––when we were already a member state of NATO, a military jet just fell down in the territory of Lithuania. I can go on and on. I mean, let's even remember the interference into the domestic affairs, that Lithuania was the first country to impeach its president because of the ties and influences related to Kremlin.

So, so I mean the spectrum of all the provocations is very wide. Now, obviously, the cyberattacks, all the propaganda, all of that. Which is in, basically, in the manual of Kremlin trying to affect––previously we were also blackmailed because of our energy, because of our economic ties.

And I think that Lithuania was among the very first who decided that we might face short-term costs which are going to be higher. We’re going to spend more now just to make sure that we are not becoming victims of that kind of blackmail.

And now, like, we are not the, in this energy circle of BRELL, as of this year. Which was a huge, huge effort. As some politicians were saying, that was the our last, like, battle regarding our independence. Obviously given the circumstances now and the war in Ukraine, most probably not the last battle, but it was certainly a very very important one.

Because when we joined the EU, one of the requirements was to basically shut down our nuclear power plant and from 100% self-sufficient country on energy resources, we became 100% dependent country.

So it was a long way, and Lithuania had to adapt a lot of like measures to be much more resilient, much more independent. And this fight continues.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Gabrielius I wanted to talk with you about the Alliance politics and are there any changes to the NATO policies in the light of second Trump administration?

And have you observed any change to Lithuania-U.S. relations? Any shifting priorities, or what's your perception of the U.S. commitment to European security more broadly?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Well, that's an important question. I think that to, to evaluate even the last 10, well, somewhat 10 months after the inauguration, we––if we try to evaluate the, even the last 10 months, we are seeing certain shifts in the attitude even within the new administration.

The biggest underlying problem, the way that I see, is that we've ended, I believe that we ended at time of strategic clarity when it comes to U.S. commitment, and we've entered a stage which we could call––or entering a stage that we would, could potentially call the ambiguity.

I think that the most important phrase that has been said in that regard was when Secretary of Defense or War, Mr. Hegseth, mentioned that Europe can no longer depend on U.S. for its security. It was never explicitly explained as to what it really means.

I mean, apart from the clear and understandable request for Europe to take a greater role in defending itself, in paying more for its defenses, that's all understandable.

But my worry is that this message can be read in certain ways also in Moscow. That, you know, when Europe yesterday announced that well, European Commission announced that Europe would be ready to defend itself by 2030. So in combination, Putin is reading, okay, so this is my timeline. Then Americans are changing their position. Europeans are not yet ready, so I have to figure out things by 2030.

So this is what makes me a bit uneasy while watching the whole situation. Now, when I say that things are still, even with this administration, things are changing and not yet certain. You know, for example, the way that attitude towards Ukraine has shifted.

At first it was, Russia first, Ukraine second. Now looks like it has flipped, at least for the time being. We're waiting for a meeting between President Trump and President Zelenskyy in, upcoming days. Again, we will see how that works out. So, I mean, so that kind of, in general, there's a, this changing environment.

But in general, I'm a bit worried that it might give some wrong ideas to put that the U.S. is no longer as interested or as committed to U.S. defense that it has been in the past. Secondly, from practical perspective, there have been changes. So one of them is what is called the Baltic Security Initiative.

There was a special line in the Pentagon's budget which has foreseen several hundred million dollars––so not a huge amount, but still quite, quite significant for three Baltic countries––that could be spent on procuring defense equipment in United States. And as per last decisions made by the Pentagon planners, this has been canceled.

It still has not yet gone through all the procedures in the House, but again, most likely that this is––it's very likely that it's not going to come back. And last point of this is, you know, that everyone in Europe is waiting for what is called the U.S. force posture review. That will define how many and which of U.S. troops will remain in Europe and in what proportions.

Again, we are watching that very closely. Some experts are alluding to the possibility that the Baltic states might see a diminishing in U.S. numbers, U.S. troop numbers in our territory. Which, again, I think is, would be a worrying signal. Even though in some cases the numbers might look like they are symbolic, but then again, while Putin is looking for a trigger, symbolic gestures might convince him that it's––they're enough for him to make a move.

So it's not easy. I'm still kind of believing that we are caught in the perfect storm of aggressive Russia, and U.S. is reconfiguring its role in the world. And unfortunately, we are at the front line. If Europe or the West would be challenged, it's very likely that we would face it first.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: I wanted to talk about the debate about the prospect of peace deals, peace talk on Ukraine-Russia War. And maybe more broadly, because I think Lithuania has this unique experience and vantage point––like, you have the right to speak from your past, record of relations with Russia––how a deal could look like?

And more importantly, do you think Russia would stop if it gets some territories, some concessions? I came across some academics or some western analysts who would argue that it was Ukraine's fault or western fault that Russia felt triggered and threatened, and hence had to adopt a more like an aggressive foreign policy.

So again, not to put words in your mouth, but I wonder what's your perspective on that? And I'll make sure we discuss the Lithuanian historical experience of dealing with Russia.

Vytis Jurkonis: Well, it's, complicated question if we are trying to like, bring parallels from the past. So, you know, there are a lot of a lot of instances and examples to compare.

I think that if we talk about the, any negotiations, the fundamental question is trust. This is what we need to answer. Do we trust the other side? There are books written I mean, I'm lecturing Arts of Negotiation, so, so I can talk on and on regarding that. But you know, bargaining with the devil: do we argue?

So one theory says, one school says that we cannot and we should not, because it's only encouraging bad behavior. The other would argue that we should, because especially when the costs are very high. I mean, whatever the case is, at some point you might be negotiating with the other side which is evil, which has evil intent.

But then you approach these negotiations extremely ready. One of the former FBI negotiators, Chris Voss has written the book “Never Split the Difference,” right? And he was a negotiator negotiating with the terrorists. So, it was his daily life, basically, to negotiate.

So it is possible, and it's sometimes very much needed. But you need to be damn prepared and have the institutional memory. And I think that, at the moment, it would be better to bring some comparisons with what is happening in the region.

We do have some sort of negotiations. I don't know if we can even call it negotiations, but some sort of process regarding the release of political prisoners in Belarus, the neighboring country, the ally number one of Russia. Well, from the cost-benefit analysis, Washington and generally your Atlantic community might have a lot a lot of leverage. And not so much in terms of costs, strictly speaking. And I think Belarus could have been a low-hanging fruit, where Donald Trump's administration might have entered this with the like full power, sending a very clear signal that there are no jokes, sending signal to Putin that we are going to be too, super hard.

So now the question is, what kind of signals is Vladimir Putin receiving from these negotiations, from this process? Because in his eyes, obviously Lukashenko is certainly not a very strong leader, or a country which has plenty of resources. And we, if we come to these kind of like negotiations as soft, that is going to be the signal that Vladimir Putin is going to be reading.

So I think that the current sanctions regime, it needs to be strengthened. We need to like deepen, broaden, make sure that whoever who collaborates with the companies or with the individuals who are under sanctions, there are criminal cases. We need to be supporting Ukraine and increase our support.

That is going to be a proper signal, and that is going to provide us with the negotiation space. Otherwise, we are going to be entering this from the soft position. That's how Vladimir Putin would be reading it.

Yeah, at the moment Vladimir Putin is dragging foot, obviously. He is not interested, as far as I can tell, in any peace deal. He's––because he keeps bombarding civic objects, and he wants to make sure that Ukraine is hurt as hard as it gets. And he might be still dragging foot. Because we are hearing about the possible peace deal for what, almost a year, right? And casualties in Ukraine are like––we hear about it daily. I don't exclude the possibility that we might, at some point, start negotiations, but we need to come much better prepared to it than we are at the moment.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Gabrielius, I wanted to address the same question to you. And also was wondering if you could share some insights from your diplomatic career dealing with the Russian delegations, or any impressions or insights you had at that time?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Well, I mean, there have been quite, quite minimal interactions throughout my time.

I think that I've encountered Russian delegation probably just once, during the OSC meeting in December 2021. So a couple of months before, before the war, where minister Lavrov declared the goals, the strategic and geopolitical goals, of Russia.

They started very ominous. And I think that they are, in most of the case, have not changed. Basically the underlying goal is the withdrawal of NATO, up until 1997 borders. So that means that no NATO in Lithuania, no NATO in Poland. And, you know, it has to retreat, leaving the territories in gray zone, or basically just leaving the territories, the countries, up to Russia to take. That could be their thinking.

Additionally, to what you asked before, I think that it's an important question to tackle this, the question whether Russia's interests have been affected or hurt somehow, and it was provoked. I think that we need to address this. And I, I call this weaponized victimization, where you use a term––you present yourself as a victim, a perpetual victim.

And Russians have been exceptionally good at that, all the way from the Second World War. Even when Stalin held in his fist, big chunk of Europe, he still was presenting himself that, well, according to per capita people lost, he would need to go all the way to Portugal in order to compensate how much Russians lost, how many people did they lose, and how much did they sacrifice for the, you know, for the victory against Nazism.

And it's, it’s a continuous trend. An empire that was the first to begin the war, that was first to begin the Second World War with its attack against Poland, after the agreement with Nazi Germany, suddenly they become the biggest, biggest victim.

And we all tend to forget that––or at least not that it's impolite to, to remind them that basically you are the culprit. The reason why countries want to join NATO is because Russia has been aggressive.

That Russia has been aggressive against Chechnya. That forced many countries in the eastern flank to fast-forward their accession to NATO. After 2008, that was, has been, even pushed for. 2014, again, you see NATO forces being ushered eastwards. And then, so, so the story goes. But then again, we've always presented with this argument that somebody is a victim and that, you know, that somebody is Russia.

Unfortunately, in many cases, I'm hearing the very similar arguments being made by China, you know, the hundred years of humiliation. Everybody harmed the big countries, and now the only thing that they can do is fight back and kill innocent people in order to amend the harms that have been done.

I think it requires a very strong pushback, this weaponized victimization. And, yeah, I don't buy it at all. I think that the blame is clearly on, in Russia's court. And I think that it will––they, for all our sake, I believe that they will, they will lose the argument and the war.

Now, about the question that we just answered, do we trust Putin? There's also additional, another part in this: whether Putin trusts us. And I believe that, well, trying to imagine a person, who is spending his days in bunker, not trusting almost anybody in his circles, now, for him to believe that any sort of, for example, ceasefire agreement that he would sign with Ukrainians, with the support of, I don't know, some, western countries––that this would somehow hold?

I, I would never imagine him believing that. And probably this is the reason why he refused a ceasefire when it was proposed by President Trump and demanded by and agreed with by Ukrainians.

And he said, well, the only thing that I would agree is the piece that solves the, the core issues of our dispute with Ukraine. Right? So, you know, the establishment of Kyiv, Rurik Empire, and all the other things. So basically he wants to go all the way, basically by denying Ukraine it's right to exist. Even though the ceasefire looked like a deal that he could take, right?

You take the ceasefire, you reconstitute your army, and then you figure out some things from there. But he, since he doesn't trust the ceasefire––he wouldn't trust the ceasefire––that means that it's not in his interest to have it. Because, he cannot remove the troops. He needs million troops just to hold the front.

And he knows that as long as his fire is there, he will be stuck in those trenches. And just watching every day for Ukrainian drones. So that means that he's, you know, he doesn't see a way out unless he is able to take over to take over Kyiv. That is my calculation.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Vitys, I see you have a comment reaction to that.

Vytis Jurkonis: Yeah. I started to like, with trust––and Gabrielius, just like also followed up on this. There might be some sort of misinterpretation, I think. And sometimes we hear this argument as if, you know, blaming Putin is simply mental. I don't want to give him any excuses, or say that this entire situation is because he misperceives the reality––I mean, facts are clear, in terms of the responsibility.

The Budapest memorandum, right? Who signed that? All parties, Russia being one of them, signed Budapest memorandum basically ensuring that Ukraine borders are secure if it gives away the nuclear weapons, right? So, and U.S. was part of that deal.

And it's not that we are talking about the Second World War. We are talking, like––it happened not that far. Vladimir Putin was back then alive, and he clearly remembers that. So, then, Minsk Dialogue. Which is very recent, and Vladimir Putin was active already, and we can look, like, going para by para at, how many points which were as agreed, were violated.

So in a way we are ending up that clearly Kremlin doesn't understand anything else but power. And that needs to be our response. Like we cannot, we don't have the luxury to actually think that we'll talk to him, we'll open his eyes and he will understand. No, he wouldn't. On, for multiple reasons.

And therefore, basically at the moment, the only answer is help Ukraine and prepare for the worst-case scenario to defend yourself.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: So when I bring up some historical parallels or when I talk about the NATO expansion and European Union enlargement, I do not suggest to get lost in some historical details. But I would love to hear your perspective and your, I believe that, like your witnesses of Lithuania's path towards NATO membership and EU membership.

And if you could just share, again, like any observations, any policy discussions or activist efforts for that matter, in the nineties or late eighties? What brought Lithuania––because Lithuanian sovereignty, it was not a given. It was taken and there was a fight behind it. And as far as I know, there was also quite a fight for Lithuania joining European Union.

So what was the rationale behind it for Lithuanian side, and how did it look like?

Vytis Jurkonis: Well, first of all, I think that there's the historical memory. Like, our grandparents do remember, like not only what was happening during the Soviet occupation, but what was happening in between the First and Second World War, and especially during the very start of the Soviet occupation,

Kremlin is presenting as if in 1945, our part of Europe was liberated. In fact, for us, it was the second occupation. Nazis ended, the Soviets started.

And we had massive deportations. Basically every third family, if I'm not mistaken, faced these repressions. We had an armed resistance, very strong one. At all odds basically––because unlike Chechnya, we don't have mountains––and even despite all odds, the armed resilience was taking place from 1945 basically for almost 10 years, which was almost a miracle.

And initially, like, the Forest Brothers were relying on the support from the West, saying well, clearly they would not allow this occupation, clearly they understand. But due to the geopolitical circumstances, even if the Americans didn't recognize legally the, like, the occupation, de facto, we were occupied, and it took us generations like to recover.

There was a movement, the underground movement, like all sorts of varieties, like starting with the Catholic Church Chronicles, like some printed underground press like music, rock, jazz, basketball. Those who haven't watched, there's a wonderful movie, “The Other Dream Team,” where like Lithuanian basketball club was competing with the military basketball club from Moscow, CSKA. And it embodied some sort of struggle.

So there were all sorts of inspirations which eventually became a movement, a political movement, called Sąjūdis, where one of the leaders was Gabrielius’s grandfather, Professor Landsbergis.

It was not easy. But I think Gabrielius also remembers that––I don't know if you were part of that Baltic chain where 2 million people from Lithuania to like Estonia, from Vilnius to Riga and Tallinn, 2 million people were holding hands to commemorate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and that demand that this historical mistake would be fixed.

So I was a kiddo back then. What was––I mean, less than 10 years old. And that was a huge huge inspiration, showing the incredible unity to fight back in peaceful protest.

And it was like brick by brick dismantling the Soviet Union. So I think that there's, in our historic memory, there's a strong focus on resilience, on fighting even at odds. And a genuine understanding that freedom is not for free, that you need to fight it, and sometimes it means sacrifices.

And honestly, in 1991, a number of Lithuanians were killed because they were standing, like, defending the TV tower. Meanwhile, the Soviet army was going on it with tanks, shooting into the peaceful protestors.

So there's always a price, but we are grateful and thankful for those who sacrificed that. And it's sort of an inspiration, but also a responsibility for our generation to keep going.

Gabrielius Landsbergis: I will maybe just add a couple of points. So one is, so 1989 and 1990s, for the West, was definitely not about the Baltic independence. It was, these were the years of German reunification. And most of the effort or diplomatic effort by the Western leaders––United States and Germany and France and United Kingdom––has been devoted to reunify Germany.

Part of the thinking was, as far as we know now from the documents kind of that the leaders were thinking about what to do with Eastern Germany once it's reunited with the West, and maybe what to do with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. This is where the Western reach has ended.

Now, from the Lithuanian perspective, the understanding was that if we don't make a step, if we, kind of––because the door has opened, right? The empire is falling. If we don't make a step, we might be left behind all the changes that are happening in the West. And interestingly enough, that our interest, that Lithuanian interest was to squeeze through the opening that has been made available, while the leaders of the West had actually had the different interests.

And therefore, now, paradoxically, we do remember, I think it's quite important to remember, the letters of French and German leaders then to Lithuanian leadership, asking them to stop their work on Lithuanian independence. Because they were worried that, well, maybe it's in the best interest of everyone to save Russian Empire from falling.

Warsaw Pact, kind of, that was a dumb thing. You know, the Germany, okay, that is reunited. But what happens if Russian Empire falls? They did not have an answer.

And therefore, you know, Lithuania declared its independence in 1990. The first country out of the occupied Soviet Republic. So basically we were the part of the empire, not Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary. So we were the first ones. Not even the Baltic countries followed us.

But we started the discussion that, basically, this is it. We want to be free, we are free people. We elected the parliament that is democratic and recognized, and we declared our independence.

And now it's up to the West to make their move. And it took almost one and a half years for us to wait for the recognition, which came after the failed pooch in Moscow, where basically Soviet Empire was dissolved officially then. And then, you know, others declare their independence and so on and so forth. So then, kind of, the whole situation changed.

But if you count the years, Lithuania has been independent the longest. And I'm rather proud about it.

Katsiaryna Shmatsina: Well, that is a great place to leave it on an uplifting note. Gabrielius, Vitys, thank you so much for this great conversation.

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Thank you for the questions.

Vytis Jurkonis: Thank you.

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