Lawfare Daily: Political Change in Madagascar and Kenya

[Intro]

Holly Berkley Fletcher: The high court affirmed his power for now, but said elections should take place in 60 days, according to the constitution. He said that they will take place within two years. So, it's obvious this is not at all constitutional or democratic by any means, even though the protesters have welcomed this intervention.

Daniel Byman: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Daniel Byman, foreign policy editor of Lawfare, and I'm here with Holly Berkeley Fletcher, a former senior CIA Africa analyst.

Holly Berkley Fletcher: That's going to be a real test, because I think if it's a free and fair election, he definitely could lose. He's definitely vulnerable and while Kenya's had transitions of power, they've never had an incumbent leave office after losing.

Daniel Byman: Today we're talking about the coup in Madagascar and the death of a giant in Kenyan politics.

[Main episode]

Let's start with Madagascar, and the last week seems to have been quite significant. On 14 October we had the military take power. And that was after a pretty dramatic set of events before that. Now talk us through simply what happened and where we are today.

Holly Berkley Fletcher: Yeah, well, it's dramatic and it's not, for Madagascar. This is actually their fourth coup since independence and there's been many other attempted coups. And the president who was just ousted himself came to power in a coup in 2009.

There's been fragile democratic progress since then. But this situation really developed very rapidly. The last coup took place over months before the president––the then-president––was actually ousted.

This has happened in weeks. It started September 25th with the beginning of youth-led online organized protests that we've seen in a number of countries of late, protesting the economic situation, very high unemployment, very high poverty, and then most immediately water and power cuts, devastating water and power cuts up to 12 hours a day. Power cuts, which obviously makes productivity really difficult and further harms the economy.

So the protest continued for a couple of weeks and the security services were cracking down. A couple dozen protesters were killed in that period.

And then on October 8th, President Rajoelina well tried to quell the situation by sacking his entire cabinet, and saying that he would resign in a year if he hadn't addressed the water and power situation, and promising never to run for president again.

That did not do anything to diffuse the situation. And so a few days after that, an elite military unit––not a combat unit, but a, this sort of central nerve, this nerve center of the Malagasy military took over. They mutinied and they took over, and met very little resistance from the rest of the military and quickly consolidated their power.

The president fled the country. He tried to dissolve parliament from exile, to force elections, but that didn't work. And the military declared, the head of that unit declared himself in power and the high court acquiesced. So that's where things stand. The high court affirmed his power for now, but said elections should take place in 60 days according to the Constitution.

He said that they will take place within two years. So, it's obvious this is not at all constitutional or democratic by any means, even though the protestors have welcomed this intervention.

Daniel Byman: So, you mentioned there have been four coups. What's going on in Madagascar that makes it so coup-prone?

Holly Berkley Fletcher: Well, like many, you know, developing economies and democracies––or the absence of democracy––you know, they've never had strong institutions. They've never had a stable constitutional order. The Constitution has been amended and rewritten and altered many times and has not been a guiding force in the country.

Again, very weak institutions. And so what usually happens in these cases, and we've seen this certainly all over Africa, is that the military becomes the strongest institution. They have the weaponry, but they also have, over time, they build up bureaucratic expertise as well. And so in certain cases, you could legitimately say the military is the most competent institution in a government.

That was certainly the case in Sudan with the overthrow of Bashir. So, you know, that's a common pattern that you see all over the world, particularly in Africa and particularly of late. There's been a number of coups, particularly in West Africa. And once you have a coup-prone government, you tend to have many many coups.

They tend to feed off of each other once the precedent has been set.

Daniel Byman: Holly, what led, I guess, former President Rojoelina to lose the support of the military, the very people who had put him in power?

I mean, I get why ordinary people might be protesting because they haven't had electricity and prices are high, but why did the people who put him in power turn against him?

Holly Berkley Fletcher: Yeah. Well, it's a rather different situation than in 2009, where, you know, the president then, Ravalomanana, you know, the country was really politically divided. Rojoelina was the mayor of Antananarivo at the time and really led––he was a, very young, he was like 35.

He was actually too young to be president. That was a sticking point at the time. He was a former DJ. Big businessman in the capital. And he led a popular movement against the president who had a pretty solid base of support, particularly with the business elite. He was actually a strong U.S. ally. And so that conflict split the military, and split the country politically and became protracted.

This is a very different situation. Rojoelina has now been in power, I mean, really, he's been in power since 2009. There was a, there was a president in the middle there who was his, really his, ran as his proxy. They had a falling out eventually, but he originally was the president as Rojoelina’s proxy.

So he's really been in power since 2009. And you know, he has not delivered on many promises. He's, again, the youth are––you know, he's no longer young and exciting. The youth are disenchanted, to say the least. He's seen as very corrupt. And he's had plenty of opportunity. He also, he was just reelected less than two years ago in a very flawed contest that the opposition largely boycotted.

So he's grown more authoritarian as well. Turnout was very low in that election, showing widespread disillusionment. His political support is evaporated. He, his supporters in Parliament pretty much dissolved when all of this started. And the military, the CAPSAT unit faced no real opposition from other parts of the––brief opposition from one other unit, and then that dissipated as well.

So it's a very different situation politically that the military's intervened in.

Daniel Byman: So, when we think about military coups, sometimes it's done in defiance of the people, with the military shooting on crowds.

In other cases, the people are delighted the military has replaced an unpopular leader and that what the military is doing is not only restoring good government, but eventually going to bring about a more democratic system.

How should we categorize this one? Is there any kind of longer-term hope that this one might be something that is actually in the interest of the people of Madagascar.

Holly Berkley Fletcher: I mean, time will always tell.

Of course, we saw the Bashir regime in Sudan collapse under popular protests that the military––at first there was, they cracked down, but then eventually they supported that. Although the tensions between civilians and military never did dissipate completely in Sudan, but still, you could argue that one was a military coup on the backs of a popular protest.

Another one that I can recall was in Zimbabwe when the military really ousted Mugabe. They sort of sat, they did a sit-in until he resigned. They kind of did it the gentlemanly way. But they forced him to resign, and then they immediately handed over power to a civilian. And people were thrilled.

There were, the military was out on the streets with the people as well. But of course, that didn't work out for the people of Zimbabwe either because the regime basically was perpetuated in the next administration.

So, time will tell with this one. Last time this happened, the AU and the regional body SADC got very involved in negotiating an end to the crisis and successfully ushered Madagascar to genuinely Democratic elections in 2013.

So, you know, we could see a situation like that again. I think the difference here now is there's really a civilian power vacuum that there wasn't in 2009 and then leading up to 2013, because the military supported a movement led by the mayor of Ant––the then-mayor of Antananarivo, now President Rojoelina.

So there was sort of a ready-made civilian that they handed over power, and then he was the one that was involved in negotiations. Now, I really haven't seen any evidence that there is a civilian leader in place. The rivalry between Rojoelina and former President Ravalomanana has continued this whole time, like since 2009.

And that has been the major political divide in the country. But I've not really seen, I've been looking to see any response from Ravalomanana, and I haven't really seen anything. So, I'm not sure he's much of a force anymore. It's not clear to me who is waiting in the wings. Certainly, this youth movement, as many of these are, is very grassroots, leaderless, organic, internet-driven. And so that's sometimes difficult to graft on a political head.

Similarly, Sudan, that was a grassroots movement that never really acquired a strong civilian political leader. And that became a problem, a big problem in Sudan. And undermined, and ultimately helped to undermine that transition.

So we'll have to see what happens here, but I do expect the AU and SADC to once again try to negotiate a settlement and a transition. SADC has already suspended Madagascar again. The AU is probably going to do that as well, according to their rules.

But I think the international situation is quite different this time, and they, these regional bodies don't have the leverage and the clout that they once did. And neither do the French, neither does the U.S. The international situation is very different and it could be that this military government is able to resist pressure and remain in power. But it just, it's an open question as to now.

Daniel Byman: Do the external bodies––whether African or European or international––do they have any leverage? Is there anything they can do other than, kind of, you know, wag their finger?

Holly Berkley Fletcher: Well, last time, again, these suspensions, Madagascar seemed to really, you know, this made them sit up that, that they were suspended from these bodies. The U.S. also arrested aid.

Madagascar, by the way––this is an interesting fact that seems so far removed from the current situation, but Madagascar was the first country to get a Millennium Challenge account. If you remember back to what, the Millennium Challenge, you know, these countries that showed promise and sort of met certain requirements. Because Mark Ravalomanana was a reformer and he was a U.S. ally, and so his government was able to secure an MCA and an AGOA agreement, which is, that's about to expire.

But now, you know, I will say the, Madagascar's economy is in very bad shape now, which might propel them to cooperate. But on the other hand, there's different actors that are ready to continue assisting and supporting them, including the UAE. And, of course, China's a big trading partner.

France is a big trading partner, but France’s influence in Africa has dimmed significantly, has really been run out of West Africa and has not done anything to stem the tide of coups in West Africa.

The protestors were very anti-French. They saw Rojoelina as a French puppet. So I think France’s influence is greatly diminished.

And then we'll see with the U.S. The Trump administration hasn't said anything as of now that I've seen. They have threatened Madagascar with high tariffs, very high tariffs. That could be a, a stick, I suppose.

And then the Russians are kind of in the mix too. They've been playing both sides of the political divide in Madagascar for a while. Madagascar has a lot of minerals that various nations have wanted to get in on. And also, Russia has wanted to, has been scouting for naval logistics base locations in the region. So, that's another point of possible leverage for Russia.

Daniel Byman: I want to switch over to Kenya. But before I do, I want to try to take a stab at looking forward in Madagascar.

If you're making, you know, reasonable predictions, what's a good scenario and what's a bad scenario, say, two or three years down the road? And if you're betting, which one would you bet on?

Holly Berkley Fletcher: I mean, ideally, of course, that there will be a transition to another election and civilian rule. But I think with these youth protests, and we can sort of transition into Kenya 'cause it's a similar dynamic that we're seeing there, I think in these developing democracies with these youth protests, there's really a sort of leap that, that countries need to make. That are potentially fraught, but if they can make them, I think it, it opens the door into a new era of governance that's more responsive and accountable to the people.

But you know, in many countries, including Kenya and Madagascar, the politics have been dominated by these elites. And they may have good elections and they may have, you know, competitive and even, you know, credible elections. But at the end of the day, the elites are kind of a, they have the same interests that are not really the interests of the people or the national interest.

And these youth protests have been, you know, a real wake-up call in that, you know, the normal personalist politics that is, in some countries like Kenya, that's very ethnically driven are, you know, not holding water with the next generation. And they're seeing more of an alliance on generational terms across different ethnicities on economic, on the issue of economic opportunity in particular.

And, you know, the political elite are––it's a wake-up call for them. And it's a, and it's a huge adjustment for them. And if they're willing to, if some, you know, enterprising politicians can sort of speak to that, and champion that, and sort of develop a vision for the country that speaks to these needs, there's a real opportunity there to, to again, ascend to the next stage of democratic development.

Obviously, Kenya's way way farther down that road than Madagascar. But unfortunately, the risk is that the elite will further entrench and go in an authoritarian direction in order to preserve their power against this new generational challenge.

Daniel Byman: Okay, well let's switch over to Kenya. So, a day after the coup in Madagascar, we had another dramatic development, which is the towering opposition figure Raila Odinga died.

Tell us about him. Tell us about his accomplishments, his legacy, and what we should be looking at or thinking about when we think about his passing.

Holly Berkley Fletcher: Yeah, well this hit me kind of hard, personally. You know, I grew up in Kenya and then I met, you know, I followed Kenya as an analyst for many years and even met Raila Odinga.

And so he's been a presence in my own life. And my whole life, really, I remember him as an opposition leader during the fraught years, the Moi years when I was growing up. He was, at that point, he was detained for several years and tortured. And he was imprisoned for four years. And then he came out of prison, and after a brief exile came back and really led, was the, one of the key opposition leaders that put together what would be opposition politics for the next several decades in Kenya at a lot of costs to himself and his followers.

The nineties were very brutal and bloody as Moi tried to hang on to power in the new era of multi-party democracy. And then Odinga, you know, formed, was a, the architect of a grand coalition in 2002 that defeated the ruling party.

He did that through sort of making a deal with Kibaki, who was elected in 2002, on the premise that they would push through a new constitution that checked, better checked executive power.

And then when Kibaki didn't deliver on that promise, Odinga fell out with him. Anyway, he proceeded to run for president, like, for the next few––the last four elections he'd run for president.

But most people believe he really won the 2007 election against Kibaki, and that election was just blatantly rigged at the national level. They altered the tally and Kibaki was sworn in in the middle of the night, which sparked huge electoral violence.

And once again, Raila Odinga––everyone called him Raila, so if I call him Raila, then forgive me. Raila Odinga––Odinga, you know, was the, you know, then the, helped negotiate the peace. He was made prime minister in a newly created position, transitional position. And then he was the one that really got the new constitution ultimately passed and promulgated in 2010.

And that has been an important document for Kenya. Its original constitution was really written to preserve a powerful presidency and then multi-partyism was sort of grafted on top of that.

The new constitution is a truly liberal democratic document, and it has devolved power around the country. Not without hiccups, there's some downsides to devolution, but it brings more checks to executive power. And it brings government closer to the people.

Probably the biggest change of the constitution is a much more independent judiciary, which has repeatedly checked the president in the past several years. So, Odinga is the architect of opposition politics in Kenya, and really I would consider him if not the father, a father of the new constitution.

And on balance––he's not a perfect person, he certainly enriched himself along the way with access to, his own access to power, and he certainly played ethnic politics like the rest of them––but on balance, I consider him a shepherd of Kenyan democracy and certainly a towering figure.

He's arguably had more influence than certainly any of Kenya's recent presidents. Your colleague at Georgetown Ken Opalo divided Kenyan history into three eras: the Kenyatta era, the Moi era, and the Odinga era. And I think that's probably about, about right. I will say that in later years he, his sort of political game of playing elite power politics to get reform concessions transitioned into what appeared to be, to a lot of people, more of a just self-preservation tactic.

And it kind of became this well-worn, cynical shtick in many people's eyes with fewer results. And he's made deals with, you know, Kenyatta and Ruto that did not really pay off in terms of actual progress for the Kenyan people. And he also was caught flatfooted by these youth protests.

And so his death in combination with these youth protests, I think is really, it is really a new era for Kenya. And we'll have to see what happens. But I do believe he, on the, on balance, deserves a lot of respect and honor. The nation is in mourning across, you know, ethnic lines, and I think that speaks to his enormous legacy for Kenya.

Daniel Byman: So, let me kind of talk, not just legacy, but future. And so as we look at, you know, really the passing of a giant, what are some of the institutional challenges that remain for Kenya? And are there chances things might continue to improve, or is this a case where losing, you know, this major figure actually could set things back substantially?

Holly Berkley Fletcher: No, there's a huge opportunity here. I mean, to go back to my earlier point about these, sort of, new generation of politics and how the elite, political elite need to adjust. And if Raila were, had remained––Raila needed to adjust. Like I said, Raila was part of this political elite and was increasingly out of step with the needs of the times.

But when he was alive, he really kept a stranglehold on his party and on opposition politics, and there wasn't much room for newer voices to emerge. There was, in the last few years, more tension between him and his party and movement than in previous times.

The last sort of deal he made with Ruto, there was a lot of pushback from his own party for that. But now that he's gone, there's clearly a huge––it's a void, but it's also an empty stage for someone else to come up on. And if that person can be a new kind of politician that, again, is looking not to just their own power and preservation, or their own ethnic community’s positioning, but can capture some sort of vision for the country and the public good, and that speaks to the aspirations and disillusionment of the new generation, then I think there's a tremendous opportunity.

I think the danger is that, again, Ruto––and there's already been signs in response to these protests––that Ruto’s government will go in a more authoritarian direction in an effort to control this movement and to control his hold on power.

Ruto is enormously unpopular. So unpopular. I was just there over the summer and didn't meet a single fan, of any tribe, that was a fan of Ruto’s.

But he will run again in 2027. And that's going to be a real test, because I think if it's a free and fair election, he definitely could lose. He is definitely vulnerable. And while Kenya's had transitions of power, they've never had an incumbent leave office after losing.

So that would be a big deal. And a big test.

Daniel Byman: That seems like a nice way of thinking about the future. Both the real risks, but also, as you say, the potential that you may have a new generation that really moves things forward. Holly Berkeley Fletcher, thank you so much for educating us today.

Holly Berkley Fletcher: Thanks.

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