Lawfare Daily: President Trump’s Peace Plan for Gaza

[Intro]

Scott R. Anderson: It is the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Senior Editor Scott R. Anderson here with Joel Braunold, managing director for the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace.

Joel Braunold: We've seen a lot of things that were, that have been inverse, changed around, moved around, but functionally it is a deal that, as President Trump said, everyone will be a little bit disappointed with, but at least ends, and moves us all into another chapter.

Scott R. Anderson: In a live recording on October 1st, we discussed President Trump's new peace plan for Gaza and the implications it could have for the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

[Main episode]

Hello everyone. I am Lawfare Senior Editor Scott R. Anderson. Really excited to have with us Joel Braunold, who is the managing director at the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, frequent guests on the podcast.

We have for folks who've been following the last few years, been doing a number of quarterly-ish long updates on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Gaza War, everything that intersects with that, which is a huge array of regional issues.

And in the last 48 hours or so we've seen, I think, what we both agree is one of the most significant updates we've seen in a long time in the context of the Gaza conflict––in a lot of ways, the much broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace process as well. And that is the Trump Peace plan.

This 20-item plan the White House has come out with and seemed to have gotten a lot of buy-in from a number of regional actors including most notably Bibi Netanyahu and the State of Israel, or at least Bibi Netanyahu so far. We'll see if the rest of the Israelis go along with it.

Joel, really excited to have you here.

Joel Braunold: It's a pleasure to be with you, Scott.

Scott R. Anderson: So, Joel, the last one of these long conversations that you and I recorded was a little over a month ago, maybe almost two months ago after the highly dramatic strike that Israel took on Hamas leadership in the state of Qatar.

A really, really dramatic move that seemed to signal a willingness on Israel's part, combined with some remarks they made around the same time, to really put itself out on a limb in terms of advancing what it perceived as its security prerogatives and its national security interests––regional consequences, diplomatic consequences to some extent be damned.

Yet here we are, six weeks or so later, a little less even, I think. And we are at a point where we have what could be a diplomatic breakthrough. At least, it's a pretty dramatic set of terms aimed at specifically winding up the Gaza conflict. But that has ramifications for huge parts of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the trajectory we've seen in that that conflict moving in the last few months.

Talk to us about how we got here, what has happened over the last four to six weeks that lead to, again, what really looks in a lot of ways, like a bit of a diplomatic breakthrough?

Joel Braunold: Scott, cheers. I think I can count 11 major things that happened over the past under-30 days that have led us to this point. And the whiplash and rollercoaster that's happened is remarkable in the true sense of the word.

So let's go back. August 27th, it's reported that there is a meeting at the White House, where Jared Kushner and Tony Blair were there. It was interesting because the first formal time that Jared seemingly has joined the White House policy meeting. Of course, very interesting that Tony Blair was there and if you remember also Ron Dermer arrived overnight missing his meeting with Cindy McCain back in Israel, the head of the World Food Program, because it was urgent that he was there.

And it comes out, it was reported that Mr. Blair was putting together a day after plan for Gaza. And it seems like at the time it was reported that Mr. Trump, President Trump was supporting Mr. Blair's plan, and he was told to go around the region and get support for his plan.

Okay. While Mr. Blair apparently is going around and doing that on September 9th, the Israelis strike Hamas leadership in Doha and sort of scramble the whole region. And that's when we reported our Lawfare podcast, if you remember. And in between, especially after the Qatar strike, simultaneously, you've got the ramp-up of the French and Saudi initiatives around recognizing a Palestinian state.

And the Israelis are very clearly signaling during that time after the Qatar strike, and in response to these recognitions that they're gonna annex the West Bank

How much of the West Bank was the question, but it was pretty much formulaic that at least the Jordan Valley was being annexed. Which they said was consensus. And Dermer, apparently, were saying to Europeans that the Democrats don't even oppose this.

Whether that's true or not is a separate question. But you know, ‘this is consensus, and in any future political agreement with the region, you of course would not say the Palestinians would maintain control over the Jordan Valley. So like, we're just formalizing this.’

And by the way, that was just the floor, not the ceiling. Smotrich was talking about annexing 83% of the West Bank. And so there was a real question about what would be the responses to these recognition moves.

And Bibi made that, that statement that spoke about on the Lawfare Podcast where he said that Israel will live as a super-Sparta, as a autarkic state, which is self-dependent, you know, shredding the free market economy. And he is like, that's just the direction we're going to live in, okay.

September 21st, U.K., Canada, Australia all recognized the states of Palestine, much to the chagrin of Israel, who is once again, very much signaling that there will be significant and deep responses to these countries and to the Palestinians because of this. September 22^nd, Erev Rosh Hashanah, you have the UNGA Two-State Solution Conference led by the Saudis and the French.

And more countries recognize. It's clear that this is the theme of UNGA, right? Every year, UNGA has really a theme. This was really about Palestinian recognition. That seemed to be the theme. September 23^rd, the Arab leaders all sit down with President Trump to have a meeting. Interestingly, the pictures coming out, at the top of the table is President Erdogan of Turkey sitting next to President Trump on a Arab stroke, Islamic leaders.

So unlike other previous attempts, where attempts would be made to just get Sunni Arabs on board, president Trump very smartly was also dealing with ideological compatriots in terms of Muslim Brotherhood, compatriots of Hamas in terms of Islamist-led countries such as Turkey, of course Qatar. Not Iran.

But Turkey being at the head of the table was kind of very important. And coming out that, it leaks that Trump said to the leaders that there would be no annexation.

Not only does it leak, Trump then says it in the Oval Office and puts out on his own public, you know, on his own White House social media, you know, responds 47, clearly says it's not. So Bibi's landing after Rosh Hashanah in the United Nations to a response from President Trump saying, there is no way I am letting him annex.

And apparently, you know, he had said, look, I'm going to go to D.C., I've got this meeting with Trump, and we're going to decide on annexation, and that's what's going to happen. And even before he's given a speech at the UN, President Trump's come out and said, ‘you are not allowed to annex.’

The next day, on the 25th, on the Thursday, President Trump hosted President Erdogan in the White House for a very long, substantial meetings that seemingly, you know, apparently went very well.

It discussed a whole manner of things. Turkey and Israel, of course, are at, sort of, loggerheads. And Turkey walks away with potential very significant weapon sales, a civil nuclear agreement, lots of other things, and clearly the Gaza situation was discussed.

And it starts that night. Kushner and Witkoff go and discuss with the Israelis these 21 points that apparently President Trump presented to the Arab states in his meeting about his plan to end the war that seemingly was getting their buy-in as well.

Bibi gives his speech to the United Nations on the 26th of September, where he basically says two important things, if you listen in between the rhetoric. He said that Hamas can have an amnesty, which was one very important thing. And also, once again, prioritize hostage release over anything else, which was sort of another important thing.

And he said like, you know, the entire state of Israel––I didn't speak for myself, but the entire state of Israel is behind me vis-a-vis not allowing for a Palestinian state. And he attacked a PA saying they're lying to you, whatever else. But sort of, but he's silent on the Trump aspect of the plan. He doesn't speak about it.

Over the weekend, the 21 points are published. They're leaked in ToI and other places. Then on Monday so early this week Trump has a meeting with Bibi. Clearly they had been negotiating and they're are edits, it seems, from this published version to the version that President Trump puts out.

And they released the 20 points and Netanyahu says he agrees though, very much clearly says there are things in here that he really does not agree with. Trump says, I understand you don't agree with it, but did not say that they're not in there. And then also the Bibi is forced to apologize to the state of Qatar for really killing one of their citizens in the strike on Doha.

And then today it is released that the president has signed an executive order, basically giving Qatar a defense pact with the United States, not through a Senate treaty, but through his own executive order which paved the way for lots of different interesting things. So that's just the context.

So we went––and I know that was very long, but we went from a position where Israel is talking about how much of the West Bank it's gonna annex. And like how there will never ever, ever, ever, ever, ever be a Palestinian state and foreclosing the political horizon, like formally foreclosing the political horizon. Not just at de facto, but de saying it's over.

And every one of you who recognizes we're going to make it harder for them and harder for them to now a plan that Netanyahu accepts that has, you know, points in there that launches a diplomatic process with the Palestinians, states that it's the legitimate recognition of the people of Palestine to have a, a state of their own, and inverts many other things. And I know we'll get into the plan as we go on the podcast.

And the last thing I'll say is that, you know, the entire perspective of, of the prime minister, some of his key cabinet members, around trying to get a normalization agreement with Saudi and defense pacts for themselves with America ends this morning with Qatar, the state that Israel literally bombed, getting a defense pact with the United States.

Right? So it's a very interesting sort of spin around the carousel in terms of what's going on. And now we all wait to see if Hamas can live with the deal. And, you know, what amendments and other things might be put in.

But the last thing I'll say is where this deal lies before we go through it. The Israelis have accepted it. And despite the Israelis screaming that we will accept no edits, it's not really their decision whether they accept edits or not. President Trump said, you know, to Hamas, you've got three or four days. And through leaks in the media it seems, he's like, look, if you wanna have edits on, on the sidelines, okay.

And even in one of the leaks they said, you know, timetables for disarmament or exile, those are pretty major things. Or withdrawal of Israel, we can talk about those. But the major aspects a lot––I think in President Trump's head, the major aspects is all hostages are released within 72 hours. The war stops.

And that the general structure––the exile, disarmament, handover to an international force with Palestinian components––that's the locked part. The 20-point document is not a formal treaty, it's not written like a formal treaty. It's not like you are editing every comma and word, but it's, it's a bridging proposal between a day-after plan and an end-of-the-war plan. And I'll pause there.

Scott R. Anderson: So I want to get into the 20 points we have landed on, at least for now, until we might see minor revisions around certain aspects.

As we mentioned from the negotiation with Hamas, the last major party that hasn't yet signed on to this to date. Before we do that, let's talk a little about what we know about some of the people involved, because one of the names is a little bit of a blast from the past.

Tony Blair––of course a figure who actually has been very active in the region for a very long time, particularly since leaving public office in the UK––obviously played a––I think the last biggest high-profile role he played was kind of the quartet role that kind of revives an element of the peace process during the end of the fir––second Bush administration, but still has been active.

Talk to us about his role and the role that we see the other bay actors playing here. We have the Saudis and the French. We see have the Gulf States more general in addition to Saudi Arabia. You have Turkey. Where did this plan come from, and who's been inputting into it, and how did it end up in President Trump's hands?

Joel Braunold: So, everything I'm about to say is conjecture because like, unless you're in the room, you don’t know, right. We’re sort of, as all analysts are, trying to piece something together and, you know, fairmindedly without judgment, just sort of looking at what seems.

The first reported interaction between President Trump and former Prime Minister Blair comes in this August 27th meeting. It seems like Tony, through his institute, has been planning, so like many other people, have been trying to do a day-after plan. It would appear though the fact that he's, you know, there with Jared that, and Tony has, you know––former Prime Minister Blair has very good, as you said, relations in the region.

He himself is a former principal, so has access to world leaders unlike any other think tank. Right? He can sit there with the Crown Prince or the Emir of Qatar or, you know, the president of the UAE or the, you know, Ron Dermer or Prime Minister Netanyahu, who he maintains good relations and there were pictures of him with President Abbas and Jordan sort of a month prior.

He's clearly been cooking up a plan quietly, trying to work out what it could look like in terms of a day-after. And clearly he was working, at least in some ways, with Jared Kushner from outside of government. And, you know, I think this also is a reflection of the lack of capacity of the particular White House team.

You know, Steve Witkoff doesn't have a very large team. You know, the joke is, you know, Secretary of State Rubio is doing 19 different jobs, right? And there isn't a large team under Steve Witkoff. So, you know, as he, as Witkoff has been focused on ending the war, someone needed to do the work of, what does a day-after plan look like?

Witkoff took the Biden plan in January that got the first ceasefire, but since that was abandoned after the Israel refused to move to stage two, as they said was their right. And there was no obligation to move to phase two. Someone needed to come up with a plan. And it seems like at that White House meeting, President Trump said, all right, this Blair plan seems pretty good.

Not this BCG, whatever, great presentation, but this plan seems pretty good. And we know from when it leaked again to the Times of Israel that this plan, you know, was basically an org chart of what a day after could look like with UN-mandated peacekeeping forces, sort of modeled after the trusteeship of Kosovo with the chairman of the board, a Palestinian component, trying to sort of look at what really existed between them.

It seems like for Mr. Blair, the important thing was to get the Israelis on board, to get the Saudis on board, and then to some extent the PA and Egypt. But if he had the support of the Americans, people knew it was serious. So that was sort of the Blair piece of that.

Secondly, you've got the French Saudi initiative that's been floating around for, for sort of nine, 10 months, which is ‘look, we’––and I think I said this on the previous podcast, that plan was a push against maximalists. Saying, ‘we wanna recognize the state of Palestine in order to show Hamas there is no pathway forward with, without a state of Israel and to show the Israelis there is no pathway forward without a state of Palestine.’

And, you know, the Israelis rejected that, saying this would be a reward for October 7th. The, you know, Europeans and the, and the Saudis and really the, everyone who supported them, which was pretty much everyone except for America and Israel, were basically like, look, we all think that two states is the only sustainable way for this region and to stop this conflict spilling out into our own backyards and countries.

And, you know, there are a series of reforms that the PA have to undertake. And there's huge annex of those reforms––like genuinely, extremely large––that they have committed to undertake. President Abbas condemned October 7^th. And the whole region, including Islamist-led governments like Turkey, agree that Hamas needs to disarm and leave as part of disagree––

They can't be part of a governing thing, and it works because there is a Palestinian entity that will eventually come in. So there's a whole format that––in terms of, that can work on––so you've got them trying to push a multilateral track of doing that through the United Nations and recognitions, which is really what Abbas wanted. Because he had no, and still has no faith in bilateral negotiations, if he didn't already lock in the fact that a Palestinian state needs to happen.

Okay. So you have that whole track going on there. And then, you know, especially, you know, the Turks play a very important role, a being a NATO ally, being someone who facilitated the release of Edan Alexander, the last American hostage, you know, and therefore showed that they had some ability to sort of motivate Hamas.

And really it's Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar that play the really important roles on, on speaking to Hamas. Of course, Iran is there and the aim is that you empower these three actors to disempower Iran who also of course have their links in Hamas. And so all of them sort of are all pushing different tracks.

I think that the challenge was, and always was, even when we saw the Blair plan in public it––that's great, but how is that linked to an end of the war? Like, even if you get the parties to agree, the war could continue for three more years, five more years, 10 more, you know, the Syrian Civil War had a UN Security Council resolution that was agreed to, but it didn't stop the fighting.

So, you know, what was the linkage between the plan and the end of the war? And I think what we saw over the past week or so is this Kushner, Witkoff, whatever it is, bridge between how you end the war and how you get into Tony's plan.

And that has got the support with then some of the elements of what the French and the Saudis have done to some extent, right? It’s not––was it all stage managed? No. But was it, look, I'll take some from here, some from here, some from here, throw it all together and push it out? I think so.

And, you know, for all the critiques that people have of the Trump administration and we've spoken about this a lot you know, I admire the boldness. There isn't a lot of interagency––just try and get it done, you know, sort of on a very much, you know, his style of negotiations, of a lot of pressure, deadlines make deals. I mean, there's something to be said for that.

Again, the proof will be in the pudding if Hamas signs on, but like, bridging what is a very difficult, very large gap. And as we get into the plan, we'll talk about some of the most remarkable things that are in there that have got agreed to.

We've seen a lot of things that were, that have been inverse, changed around, moved around. But functionally it is a deal that, as President Trump said, everyone will be a little bit disappointed with, but at least ends and moves us all into another chapter. And so that's sort of how the different actors came together it seems on this. And we'll see if it works.

Scott R. Anderson: So let's dig into the actual agreement and for listeners who maybe want to follow along at home, I should say, I am referring to what I think is the most official version we have, and these are the 20 points the Trump administration released on the White House's Twitter account.

I actually don't believe they posted on whitehouse.gov. I was trying to find a more print-friendly version. I could not find one as of yet. This is particularly important because while these same points have been reported in the media, I saw a copy on the Times, I think on the Post website as well, they haven't all picked up the image associated with it, which is a map that lays out the withdrawal stages, which you do want, which is part of the kind of equation to understand what they're talking about.

So, we start with two points of that kind of frame the document. I'm just gonna go over these, read these out really quickly.

People understand these are the kind of objective framing but we don't need to talk about them substantively. I want to get into more nitty-gritty.

Start by saying Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. And Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza who have suffered more than enough.

So these are the two kind of tone-setting objectives of these 20 points. Then we go to points three through six, where we really are getting a map to the end of the conflict. This looks a lot like an iteration of different ceasefire proposals we've seen that are intended to wind down hostilities.

Basically say, upon IM agreement, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will begin a withdrawal process––that is kind of laid out in stages in that image that I mentioned earlier. Military operations are going to stop within 72 hours. Hostages alive and deceased will be returned. And then it has a particular schedule and scale and where not only hostages but a number of prisoners or Gazans held by Israelis will also be released.

Talk to us about these sorts of terms. How do we end up on these sorts of terms? What does this reflect about the interest? How realistic is it? And, and how big a breakthrough is it to be able to arrive at this vision about how to wind down the hostilities?

Joel Braunold: I think that the terms that all hostages need to be released and then what the equation of Palestinians who have both been––some have been convicted, some are just people who are in administrative detention, including women and children––that they'd be released.

And so, you know, the terms of it is that all the hostages, both alive and dead, would be released within 72 hours. And then 250 Palestinians serving life sentences will be released. 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7th, including all women and children detained in that context.

And for every Israeli hostage who remains released is––well released to remain deceased––sorry, for every, no.

For every, for every body that Hamas returns, 15 deceased Gazans will also be returned. So we've had this awful situation where people are holding dead bodies up for dead bodies, right, were we're at that sort of–––

So, that equation, that's what, you know, the negotiators in Doha have been figuring out for a very long time. You know, it is a big lift, by the way. I, I'm not going to lie. Israel releasing 250 life sentence prisoners is not easy. And that, by the way, is the piece that requires a cabinet vote.

Even if Bibi doesn't want to bring the whole agreement, you cannot release prisoners in Israel without a cabinet decision. So that will have to go to cabinet. So, he has to find the votes for at least a hostage release deal. There's no legal way around that in Israeli stuff. The, you know, 0.6 is complicated.

Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful coexistence, and then the Israelis, at least it looks like, added this from the previous version that was released and to decommission their weapons. So not only do they have to commit, but they also have to decommission their weapons, but there's more decommissioning later, will be given amnesty.

So that's the exile. So you can, you can––they can be given amnesty and stay if they give up their weapons. Or, if they don't want to give up their weapons, it seems they can leave and be given safe passage to receiving countries. Now one of the big questions before we go on was like, well, what will force Israel to not go after these people?

You know, they've done it before. So, what it is, and that's where, for me, this executive order about Qatar becomes so interesting, right? The US has now at least an executive order, legally. I'm on Lawfare, so I will use the term legally loosely, but at least in EO for, so for as long as this administration is in place, this president has committed that if anyone attacks Qatar, it's basically attacking the United States, up to a military response.

Written in the executive order. I encourage everyone watching or listening to go read it. So if you’re Hamas and you are worried, well, what's the international commitment that if we leave in exile, that we're not going to be assassinated?

Well, if they go to Doha, and I'd also probably extend that to Turkey, because there are, there are Article Five, NATO group, you are protected. What's gonna, you know, as protected, it's as, as much as an international guarantee as you are going to get.

You've got Israel committing, which you can say is not worth toilet paper for you, but more importantly, you've got a US executive order about Doha and you've got Article Five NATO commitments about Turkey. If you––if those two countries want to accept you, that's a separate thing. But if they do that, that's safe passage and that's real. So, you know, in terms of real places that they can go, that's very important.

Scott R. Anderson: I do––because this is Lawfare, and I do feel as the international lawyer, a former State department lawyer, to flag this, I will say that is the sort of commitment that has traditionally been understood, particularly at the insistence of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under bipartisan leadership, to require Senate advice and consent as an actual international commitment.

Whether it's reflect––intended to be that or not. I also don't know if people are going to pick a fight over that. We saw a similar language in a Bahrain bilateral done that was done as executive agreement, I think, two or three years ago that kind of pushed the limits of what had been the traditional limits.

And this pushes a little further if it is intended to be a binding commitment. I think it's––the importance here is more, I suspect, symbolic.

Joel Braunold: I wouldn't say symbolic. I wouldn't say symbolic.

It is a Trump commitment, in the way that exactly himself––personal. I think it's very important to recognize that, also with Bibi Trump’s, I don't know, but it doesn't seem like he's insisting that this passes the Knesset.

This is an agreement between leaders. That's how Trump likes to work. However, you figure out your ancestors, whatever. I, with my pen of signing this, I am telling you, and I'm putting this in paper in the same way that he's chairing the board, right?

Like, which we'll get to, right? This is me, I'm committed, and I will say, just like what he tried to do for the Ukrainians, this, whatever you can say, he'll enrich himself. Throughout all that could be true, might be true, whatever. Him being there and invested in it is the best protection you can have for people who are dependent on him because they know that if they attack it, they're attacking him.

And that for you, if you are under that umbrella, is probably the best you can hope for. I can tell you that the Israelis will respect that far more than any UN Security Council Resolution.

Scott R. Anderson: Yeah. And, and notably I would say, I think it benefits a little bit from the fact that a subsequent administration, if this does actually contribute to a peace plan, is likely going to stick by that sort of commitment.

Yeah. Exactly. Even if it is, it doesn't have that kind of enduring meaningfulness of a treaty.

Joel Braunold: It––the U.S., from a bipartisan consensus, does not like people attacking Qatar, right. I, I think that's probably quite fair. So I don't think this is the most controversial thing that the Trump administration has ever committed to.

Scott R. Anderson: Yeah, absolutely. So, we now have a sense of like how the conflict is going to end. Exchange of hostages, exchange of prisoners of war. Yeah. The war, yeah, is going to end or is envisioned ending, pursuant to this agreement. We have this kind of multi-stage process cease, so I wanna be clear.

Joel Braunold: I think that's how the ceasefire happens.

The war end, of course, requires Israeli withdrawal, which we're gonna get to as we go on, on this, this particular part.

Scott R. Anderson: Fair point. The initial cessation of hostilities, the part that has been the sticking point really so far––and the goal of a lot of agreements. Then we get to points 7 through 11 here, we really are dealing with two things that are kind of intermingled.

Humanitarian relief and assistance, which we know has been a big pain point for Gaza, particularly over the last few months where we've seen a famine declaration, people saying actual famine is happening in a way that is, could have massive humanitarian consequence in Gaza over the summer.

So it's talking about bringing in assistance quickly, notably suggesting working with the United Nations and the Red Crescent, two agencies that currently aren't really being allowed to operate in Gaza. And then also shifting to the vision of how Gaza is going to be managed in a post-ceasefire, post initial phase of conflict. Situation talking about this temporary transitional governance body, a board where Trump will have involvement, but also we'll see Palestinian involvement and potentially other head of states.

And we've heard, not in the agreement, although he is mentioned here, I suppose, but it's discussed about Tony Blair playing a particularly significant role in this body, even though it's headed and chaired by President Trump. So talk to us, but let's break up the humanitarian side first, I guess.

Sure. How big a deal is this on the humanitarian front before we get to the governance front? Seeing the shift of a, away from the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which has been the focus and a heavily criticized element of how humanitarian system been delivered so far, towards a slightly more aggressive and kind of multi-front model that involves the United Nations and other more conventional humanitarian agencies.

Joel Braunold: Just for the viewers, if you see me squinting into a sign, I have the list up on my phone, so I'm just checking.

Scott R. Anderson: Of course.

Joel Braunold: I don't have it all memorized in my head. Okay. So points 7 and 8 are really about humanitarian assistance. Again, what I'm trying to do is compare the 20 points to what the published 20 ones were, whether that was true or not, just to see what the edits––

Point 7, there's no real difference, which––it's really about rehabilitation, infrastructure, water, other things coming in. Point 8 is about the United Nations. It's set, you know, the Israelis made sure that. Both parties won't interfere.

So it's not just that the Israelis won't interfere, but both parties. So any Hamas remnants or anyone else also won't interfere in terms of what's going on. But the Israelis didn't object to the UN or the Red Crescent, which has been a demand for the region and really the international community who rejected the GHF for various different reasons.

Both because of its murky beginnings. You know, we've gone through the GHF multiple times on these past podcasts, what it has been, what it could be, what it was, lots of different things. Whether this truly kills the GHF, whether it continues alongside other ones, this, this mechanism doesn't––but if no one is paying for the GHF and everyone's paying for the UN and they have the ability to move forward, unhindered, including the Islamic Red Cross, I can't imagine the GHF continuing to function.

It's an expensive modality. Maybe some of the people there will fold into something else. I'm not sure. But I don't really see that. The, the only important thing to say is which is important, the Rafah crossing will be open in both directions as per Jan 19th. And you know, it was reported later that there were PA people at the Rafah crossing.

They worked out a mechanism for that. So again, when we look at sovereignty questions, right, even if there's an envelope and everything else, and there's Israelis on the borders to make sure there's no smuggling, actually at the crossing point, it seems like there will be some function of Palestinian sovereignty, which again, for the PA, is essential for keeping that political horizon open if we're helping the modality.

That was January 19th, 2025.

Scott R. Anderson: And that reference to the January 19th, 2025, that's the Biden-negotiated ceasefire agreement is really interesting in these provisions. Parties were––

Joel Braunold: Yeah, the parties like, we figured Rafah, let's not screw up again. Let's just go back to what we agreed there. They figured out all of their mutual––a lot of this is how do you have dual-victory speeches, right?

That's the point of a peace agreement. Each side's going to claim that they won and didn't lose, right? The Israelis aren't talking about what's actually in the, that agreement. They just reference it because to reopen that whole file would be a nightmare. And again, the whole aim is ‘what's closed is closed, let's just push it on. Let's just move on and move on to the next one.’

Scott R. Anderson: So then we have paragraphs nine I mentioned before that sets up this governance body, mentions former Prime Minister Tony Blair, a chair or a board that's going to be chaired by President Trump. And that leads us into 10 and 11, two really interesting bullets.

10 being I think the one that sounds most like something that comes out of this administration in a lot of ways. 10, we have them talk about a Trump economic development plan that essentially says they're going to convene a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East.

This is me, quoting this particular agreement. Basically making a lot of promises about economic development plan. We don't know really what that's going to look like, of course, but at least they're going to convene a panel of experts, but emphasizing a desire to really build up a fairly grandiose vision of economic development in Gaza.

Realistic, or no, who knows? And then, specifically, bullet 11 talks about the special economic zone with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated.

Joel Braunold: Which by the way, with President Trump is no joke. Okay. Going back to the SEZs, which were actually a foundational piece of the Egyptian, of the Jordanian Israeli and the Egyptian Israeli peace agreements about having economic free zones.

Having a tariff-free zone in a tariff world is no joke. Like, oh, absolutely. People make fun of––whatever. That's a real thing for him.

Scott R. Anderson: No, it's interesting because the 10, paragraph 10, is such a grandiose set of statements that doesn't do very much, and paragraph 11 is a short, concise statement that actually does a lot in establishing economic zone of stripping tariffs.

It makes––let's go back to the, yeah. Well, let's go back to the governance structure though. Like, what do we know about this governance structure and what does it say about a lot of the bigger questions about the broader peace process?

Because among other things, it says this is holding and governing Gaza until the Palestinian Authority, once it undergoes reforms agreed to––or at least proposed, I should say––in the Kushner 2020 plan and the Saudi French proposal, it's eventually going to take over Gaza.

It's saying the Palestinian authority is a going to be a continuing body, and it's the one that's going to inherit Gaza. Ultimately, this body is an interim body with a bunch of international buy-in that's going to be governing it.

So, talk to us about how we got here and, and what this tells us about where the actors are thinking about the trajectory here.

Joel Braunold: I think the best way of talking is ends and means. Okay, so let's look at the ends. Okay. Alright. One of the biggest challenges about ending this conflict in Israel and Gaza in this war has been about ends, has been about ends.

What's the day after plan look like? And if you remember from Blinken Five Tokyo principles, you know, no, no occupation, no annexation of Gaza, which, by the way, is also in here. We can talk about the buffer zone when we get to the map, but like that's also in here. Like, Israel's not allowed to settle or annex any part of Gaza, which is significant.

And when coupled with the Trump statement saying, you will not be allowed to annex the West Bank, that's also significant. The––I'm just pulling it back up. So, the ends: the Israelis have said we're not allowing the PA back in. Full stop. That has been Netanyahu’s point, point, point, point. You know, at times when you really, really push local Palestinians, no Fatah.

Right? Okay, cool. What this says is, you said very correctly, it specifically says even after all of the Israeli edits, right? It says, this body will set a framework to handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such a time that the PA has completed its reform program as outlined. Right?

The Israelis added various proposals, including President Trump's peace plan. And then, and then this was in the original, the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely, effectively take back control in Gaza. Okay?

Now, the concept that the PA could instantaneously take control in Gaza, for me, is a myth. And to any serious person's myth for various reasons, the PA is at a very weak stage in terms of its bureaucratic and security ability. Mainly because Smotrich is starving it to death. And so it's––even if it's got an, it has the intention of having a bold reform program, can't really do that if you have no resources to move.

But if you actually look at the Saudi-French agenda, there's an entire annex of massive amounts of reforms that the PA committed to. In the Trump 2020 plan. The reforms are really on a postcard. It's just generally you need to be a Western economy and you need to have free society.

Now the Israelis are telling everyone, look, the PA lied to everyone they're never going to reform. So sure, we'll put over all of these guards and they're never going to meet them. One of the big questions of implementation of this is, who gets to decide when the PA is reformed or not?

If it's just Israel, then we're sort of back to like an Oslo Accord situation, where it's like they get to set the line and then say, if you've met the line, and again, this is one of the big questions about, will this be successful or not on a long term, is––to what extent does President Trump hold the parties to account?

Not just the PA, but also Israel. Like, if the PA truly reformed their prisoner payment system that they claim they're doing, and you know, they have to go through auditing and they do it, you know, politically Israel is not incentivized to say that they're doing it, right, 'cause they're not incentivized.

But if the US gives them, the US has to give them the credit and then move them to move on. The region is convinced that the PA is serious. This time, I would say that one of the most interesting developments has been, I would say from the first time since 2000 when Arafat said no to Camp David, this is the most united that the region has been around the Palestinian authority.

And I'm including in that, by the way, the UAE––who is not a particular fan of Abbas––Qatar and Turkey, which is kind of remarkable. Like the, there's a willingness and engagement and everything else, with the PA saying that this needs to be––and that there's a feeling like that the PA can actually reform that this time. They're serious.

Now, if they're not serious, their national project is over. Right? And so I think that there's an understanding that––and by the way, as unfair as that is to people who say, well, they have the right for self––national self-determination, regardless, the reform agenda is what this all hinges upon.

Now, if they meet their reforms, will they be credited for them? That's where this Board of Peace, I think, becomes very important. So, within that same thing, they, the edits, you know, originally it spoke about a new international body, but didn't say anything. The Israelis and the Trump folks basically called it the Board of Peace, headed by President Trump, right?

And then also said that Blair will be there. They wanted it explicit. Why? You know, there were multiple reasons. I'd say a, it's easier for Bibi to sell into his own people, but if the person's running it is Donald Trump, that's easier. Even if there's a PA component, 'cause Trump's [inaudible], so you can be calm.

If it's just some random international body, it's less calm. And then I think that I, I can't imagine that the President of the United States, who has a pretty full agenda, has the full time to run this. You know, it seems like Blair will be the actual head.

Now again, that's a difficult lift for a lot of Arabs, unsurprisingly, given the history. However, I go back to President Trump putting his name in signature means that he wants this to be successful. And again, if people have access to the president through this, and the present is personally committed on this, that's actually very good for the Palestinians.

I know that sounds very counterintuitive, but we we're dealing in a world where President Trump is the president for the next three and a bit years. And by the way, I don't know if this role expires when he stops being the president as an FYI. Right. But the importance of this is that if he's committed to this and wants to see peace––and to be fair, he has always spoke to, about his need to be peace.

And we'll get to some parts of how he versed himself before. It is the best protection for Palestinians if he wants to see it thriving and is holding to disagree that he himself has authored is the best protection if it, if it is, if he is there versus if it's just an international agreement.

Knowing that the Israelis, especially under Netanyahu, have tried to wriggle out of every agreement they've ever made with the Palestinians and the Palestinians don't particularly have the best track record of holding up to their own commitments either. So this is a different format, and again, it's far more personalized guarantorship rather than international institutions.

This isn't written like a legal treaty, so what is the legal treaty? What is the UN aspect of this? Like, is this, does this go under UN Security Council Resolution where every comma matters in terms of international law? Those things are going to be very important, but that's sort of the function.

But it's basically holding space, saying that the PA will be there. Now, when you look at the org chart, Blair put out it's like, internationals then Palestinians. And I can understand the frustration and from a sovereignty perspective, again, how this works is going to be important. Will the laws be PA laws, like property laws, like all the, like the actual bureaucrat, bureaucratics of life, garbage pickup, like all the normal stuff of life.

Like the PA has a functioning, under occupation, set of legal frameworks. Is that being imported? Or is it totally new here that then it's gonna be imported into the West Bank? These are big questions and like who's on the board and how that works is gonna be important. I will say that Mohammad Mustafa coming––who's the PA Prime Minister––from a World Bank background and an IMF kind of figurehead, is actually good for sort of international standards.

But yeah, that's sort of where that one's up to.

Scott R. Anderson: That brings us to Point 12, which I think is one of the most significant, maybe two most significant freestanding points in this agreement in my mind, which says no one will be forced to leave Gaza and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. And we will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

This is a pretty dramatic statement. That is not a reverse of Israeli policy, because Israel has never said openly, we want people to leave Gaza. But that has been a background anxiety and concern that has been motivating regional actors or actors and Gazans for a long time about how they approach the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the possibility that might leave and be relocated to a situation outside of active conflict zones.

This possibility of return has been a sticking point. This really provides a lot of clarity to do that in an exceptional way. It––that strikes me as like a bit of a breakthrough to get the Israelis on board with this.

Am I off on that or is this, is this not strike you as surprising, or is this really think a pretty notable concession?

Joel Braunold: The, the reversal is really President Trump's.

You know. President Trump came out, you know, on Bibi's first visit to Trump too, basically calling for the Gaza Riviera, where Palestinians leave and they have a better life somewhere else, and if they want to come back and work, they can come back and work.

This doesn't just say that if you leave, you can come back. Which, you are right, Scott, has been an anxiety from day one of this conflict in Gaza, that Israel will not allow them to, to return. But it specifically says, we're encouraging people to stay, which is completely defeating the entire––since President Trump said that in January, the entire Israeli polity wrapped around it saying we should be encouraging voluntary migration away from Gaza. There were units set up within the Israeli government to do so.

This is an inversion. ‘Nope, we're encouraging people to stay. That's now what we're doing.’ So––and by the way, that's a politically very big deal in Israel, that that's a complete inversion. They said the future of Gaza is Gaza without Gazans. All––at least, get rid of 800,000 of them through immigration.

And those who leave, who are––who claim refugeeship can't come back because they're claiming they have a right return for Israel. So they can't come back to Gaza.

This is not that. This is an inversion of that. So the vision that really has been guiding, I would say, a lot of Israeli policy really, truly, you know, to make Gaza uninhabitable in many different ways so that who would want to stay, right?

And that's part of the genocide convention. You make it uninhabitable. Lots of these questions. This is an inversion of that. We––if you do leave, you can come back. So all of those medical cases where there was this risk, could they come back? You now can come back, and we're encouraging you to stay and build a better life.

That is a complete 180. And that's very significant. And I know that it's underplayed 'cause it's not in the controversial what was changed or not, but it's important that it's a shift because ultimately the fear of the entire region is that, is Israel was trying to depopulate Gaza and create another Nakba.

This, literally, in the text, is saying, we're encouraging you to stay and build a better life. Now, under what context? Very important. But from a concept of, of Sumudnik, of like, staying on your land and staying steadfast, this is everything you could possibly want. And I think it––and there were no edits, it seems, from the published version to the agreed-upon version with the Israelis.

And I think that from a worst fear perspective, this got rid of the worst fear. And I think a theme we'll see throughout is that the visions for much of the Israeli right, that we can use the war in Gaza to finally put––to kill Oslo, to kill the concept of a Palestinian state, to move beyond this concept that we have to accept the status quo, that Palestinians live here and Israelis live here, that we can actually change the region and change this situation as much as we would need and want, this is a shift, right?

This is a, this is a slamming-the-door-shut and is what is driving, I would say, many members of Likud, the entirety of the far right in Israel, nuts. Because that door has been slammed shut. And that's very important. And this is––that point is very indicative, as are some points towards the end of the document.

Scott R. Anderson: So from there we get to paragraph 13, 14, and 15, which I view together as kind of the security dynamics provisions. Here, we see the agreement say Hamas is not going to have any role in governance, it's going to demilitarize, there's going to be a process demilitarizing all of Gaza under the supervision of international monitors, presumably managed by this interim authority.

Regional partners are going to guarantee that Hamas is not going to be––pose any threat to its neighbors or its people. I think this is essentially pulling Turkey and the Gulf States and Egypt and everyone else, and saying, we're going to work together to make sure Hamas does not become a terrorist group again.

And then the United States and Arab international partners are going to work together to develop a temporary international stabilization force to immediately deploy in Gaza. We don't know a hundred percent what this is going to look like, but they're going to work with Palestinian police forces. They'll be trained and vetted and supported in coordination with Jordanian Egyptian authorities.

Essentially, they're going to become the new security force in Gaza. Talk to us about how this mechanism appears set to come about. What more do we know about what this ISF is going to look like? Because it plays a pretty central role. Yeah. Do we have a sense about who's willing to step up and actually participate in the ISF?

This suggests that the United States is going to be part of it. Now, that might just be at a leadership level, advisory level, as opposed to a troop level. We'll have to wait and see. This administration has been pretty allergic to us, true participation in these sorts of things in other contexts, but obviously they have a more vested interest here.

So talk to us about where, what we know about this body.

Joel Braunold: So, the best, this is where the most edits it seems were, were put between the published version that was leaked, and then the, the White House version. And when you listen to Barak Ravid’s reporting––if you wanna believe it, I know a lot of people like get frustrated, whatever, but I think Barak's a decent journalist and a good one.

You know, this is where Trump said, okay, if you have edits on security, I could see why this is important, but I'm not letting you edit other parts, even for your own politics. And here on the edits, it's all about it. It seems that they're trying to model this over the Lebanon agreement vis-a-vis Hezbollah.

Like, we're not just going to hope that this happens. We will for, as you demilitarize, we'll withdraw. If you don't demilitarize, we won't withdraw. And that's really what these three paragraphs are saying. And that's very complicated, right? This is not something that is easily agreeable, because for Hamas, if the war ends and Israel doesn't leave, then what? That's not, that's not strong enough for them.

So what's the timetable of withdrawal? What are the statements? In addition, the Israelis updated this, that it's not just offensive infrastructure that needs to be destroyed. It's all infrastructure, right? Including, and they added like all military terror and offensive infrastructure including tunnels and weapons destructions will be destroyed.

So the question is, what is offensive infrastructure versus defensive infrastructure? And apparently that's one of the clarifications Hamas wants, like what counts as defensive versus offensive?

Because the, the agreement says offensive military infrastructure, it includes tunnels, production facilities will be destroyed and not rebuilt. And then there'll be independent monitors that will do decommissioning buyback programs like all normal DDR type stuff. Guarantees. And then like yeah, the Palestinian police forcing, I'm just going through the edits of this.

Yeah. So, it, you know, the Israelis are trying to make sure that whatever they agree to, it meets their security requirements vis-a-vis border security and everything else. And the, the big question is on 16, Israel still agrees not to occupy Gaza, but it's a phased withdrawal, basically. Like what?

And the agreement is the IDF with withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, the ISF and guarantors and the us, and the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Right. What they're doing is they're saying, look, there's a lot on, we're not just going to instantaneously withdraw.

If Hamas can reconstitute itself, it's not going to work for us. And we don't just want a promise of demilitarization, it has to happen. So once that happens, we can work out––that's why I'm saying it's very similar to the Lebanon model where they're complaining to the ceasefire monitor. Like there are 19 different objections, and then how does it move backwards and forwards.

In terms of who's providing the troops on the ground? We know that Indonesia has pledged 20,000 troops. They said it in their UN speech. We don't know who else there is, but I'm assuming there are other regional countries.

My guess––and again, it's a guess––seeing how weirdly President Trump keeps talking about the field marshal of Pakistan and the Pakistanis constantly seem to be talking about this agreement with Gaza, it would appear to me that Pakistan seems to be somewhat involved.

Which again, weird, but okay. But there'll be some members of this ISF force. It's important that the PA invites them, the PLO invites them for legal reasons. And I would assume that there would be some sort of UN mechanism that, that oversees this.

But if not, it could just be like the Lebanon agreement that is a trilateral agreement or a multilateral agreement that does it. But the, this is going to be a real area of contention as Hamas asked for edits. It seems again, in the leaks that the Trump administration said, look, if you are trying to have technical questions about demilitarization timetables, withdrawal timetables, we can talk about that.

Like, you know, but like the main points are set, so. I know they sound technical. These are very important details, right? This is the technical parts of how you actually end a war, like. But I also think it's smart that if you try and put a 50-page document of milestone A, milestone B, milestone C, you're just going to argue about something six stages down, and then you're never going to get there.

So the concept of just trying to get there as ideas and then figure out the rest of it isn't a bad strategy, but it is an important strategy if this is going to move on. And much like we spoke about before, about the PA eventually taking over, which is going to be essential for de demilitarization.

Like, are you giving your guns to Palestinians? Are you giving your guns to Arab forces? Are you giving your guns to multilateral forces? Are you giving your guns to the IDF? These are big questions that have big consequences depending on which way they go. So the details very much matter, but at least in Trump's head, it seems that these are details that can be figured out and that the Israelis have had their say.

And we'll see what Hamas says in terms of what they want as timetables. But the general construct that demilitarization will be led will be met with withdrawal. And that there'll be guarantors. That's gonna be the, the critical part. And how the guarantors speak to each other? Will the US truly guarantee this deal?

Like, if Israel doesn't do it, will the U.S. put pressure on them to do it? That's going to be the critical question. And that's what the, the Qatari and the Turks, if they have confidence in that, you know, President Erdoğan just spent alone time with President Trump, as did the Qataris.

If they have confidence, that confidence needs to be conveyed to Hamas in a way that they'll say, look, the Americans will really hold the Israelis to this because that's going to be the critical part.

But that's on those particular sections.

Scott R. Anderson: And then we get to paragraphs 16 and 17, which I think are operationally some of the most important ones. And it's got kind of three components as I think of it.

One, paragraph 16 begins with the simple statement, Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. Again, not something that technically Israel has said it intended to do up to this point, but it is clearly, they've, yeah, they've threatened to.

We've heard people in the Israeli government suggest there's an interest in doing it. And this has been a point of anxiety for Gazans and for people in the region throughout this conflict. Then they say the, as the ISF, the International Security Force establishes control and stability, the IDF will withdraw based upon benchmarks to be agreed upon, and eventually is going to hand back all the territory except for the security perimeter around the edge.

This is where the image comes into play, and the image actually clarifies a little bit of the benchmarks in a way that's not in the text. They basically say there's going to be an initial withdrawal following the hostage release, that's going to kind of, you know, kind of double the space that's currently not under IDF control.

Then there's going to be a second withdrawal when the ISF is fully mobilized. And its standards set in the Trump plan. So there appears to be like, there can be another withdrawal once the ISF is actually in play and operational. And then the third one is the security buffer zone, which is basically all along the land borders of Gaza.

There's going to be a strip that the Israelis will continue to control. Then we get to paragraph 17, which I think is actually really instrumental in understanding this agreement, which says that in the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above––meaning I think everything above, not just the paragraph above, including the scaled-up aid operation. So again, that's talked about towards the beginning, so it's everything above there––will proceed in the tariff-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF. And in my mind, I think this suggests that this isn't an agreement that's actually pending Hamas' participation. This is already agreement about how this is going to go.

Just Hamas' participation accelerates and escalates and changes some of the dynamics about how it would gone about. But this suggests that most of this plan is how Gaza is going to be managed at the end of this conflict, no matter what. Am I wrong about that or does that seem right to you?

Joel Braunold: You know, 17’s interesting.

It's saying that at least in the areas that Israel has in their view cleared, this will be the move forward. But there are more points below. Which is interesting. So those points apparently are requirements on Hamas agreeing we'll get to the points below because they're kind of important. And there are other parts of this that, you know, absent Hamas agreement, I don’t know how they happen.

But yeah, I, I think that the aim was to say, regard, yeah, I'm not, this is the plan. This is it, this is what's going to happen. And the––if it's basically, if Hamas's guarantors can't force Hamas to agree this is it, this is happening, right, this what's going to happen.

Now the, the political stuff vis-a-vis the Palestinians. You know, that––for the Arab states to participate in that, it needed to be very clear that Gazans will be staying put and everything else, and they're not being delayed.

So I think it's sort of, that's the deal that's sort of pushed from 17 upwards. When we get to points 18, 19, and 20––and we'll talk about why we've gone to 20 points rather than 21 in a second––it would seem that this is in the case of Hamas agreeing.

So when you look at 18, 19, and 20, these are extremely interesting points that link the day after to a political process between Israel and the Palestinians, which, where we were two weeks ago, where we were a year and a half ago, was unimaginable, which I think is also very important.

So point 18, which is very weird––well, firstly the next point disappeared. The original point 18, which was about not attacking Qatar anymore. And the important role of Qatar and basically saying Qatar's great. Okay, that was removed, but you had the Israeli apology to Qatar and now the EO. So I think that, again, that was probably removed because the Israelis––it's just too hard for them and they can spin an apology call whichever way, but functionally, I think they got what they needed.

Alright, 18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful coexistence to try and change the mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace. Now, the original phrasing of this apparently said, change minds and narratives to deradicalize the populations.

I don't think the Israelis wanted to claim that their population was radicalized. But they also still are within this, this is like a civil society call-out, which, you know, given the work, I, I used to be the head of a group called the Alliance for Middle East Peace. ALLMEP still exists. They've been doing great work.

They were really involved in the French Saudi conference. There was a whole civil society component. The fact that this now lives in here is a very good sign for civil society, that they're seen as serious,. But it's, it's really not just about––it says interfaith dialogue.

I don't actually think it's about imams and, and rabbis meeting. It's about inclusivity, about worldviews that have traditionally not been included in the peace process, which has been secular being included. And given the religious aspects of both societies, I actually think that's a learning that's very positive.

You know, a lot of civil society complains that the secular-driven, very international legal approach ignores where people in the region draw their authority from. And so actually having this in a document like this means it's finally broken through at the highest levels of diplomacy that you need to think about people's religious obligations very seriously, which I think is a very good thing, like from a professional peacebuilding perspective. So that's really great to see, right?

19 and 20 are just like Ramallah’'s dream. While Gaza redevelopment advances and when PA reform is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to a Palestinian self-determination and statehood. Statehood still existed even after the Israeli edits, which, which we recognize as desperation of the Palestinian people.

Okay? So we, the collective we, understand you want a state, so maybe the conditions will be in place. And then lastly, the US will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for a peaceful and prosperous coexistence.

Now, people say, well, it doesn't say the PLO. Well, the PLO is the sole recognized group for the recognition of the Palestinian people. No one else can negotiate with Israel on this.

So yes, it's at the end of the document and yes, you can complain that negotiations between the parties never worked and whatever else. I want to remind everyone where we were, like even during Biden.

During the change government of Bennett and Lapid, there was no process with the Palestinians. When Bibi got in, there was [inaudible], which, you know, didn't go anywhere because the cabinet said, we don't agree with this. Then you had October 7th, and the entire Israeli policy said, we're never talking to the Palestinians again.

Okay. Just, you know, and you had a policy of basically the government trying to starve out the Palestinians through restrictions of customs, revenues and everything else. And Ramallah was irrelevant.

Now, their relevancy in Jerusalem dropped to zero. The relevancy around the region kept going up and up, as more and more people were recognizing them, trying to find ways to financially support them and everything else.

When Trump got sworn in, the question was, is he going to even talk to the PA? Are they going to be relevant? And really, you know, there'd been a meeting with Witkoff and here, there and everywhere, but it was always in the context of Gaza. Okay? It was always in the context of, you know, Gaza, you know, what can you do? You know, invites in for security forces. Nothing really to do with Ramallah, not to do with Israeli, like Jerusalem, Ramallah conversations.

Here is a commitment to restart a, a political process. And a political process, not just a process on the technical, how do we make sure you don't collapse, but a political process that includes the politics of, you know, the final status issues and everything else.

And so even after October 7th and even through a Trump two, the concept of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and two states survives. Now I can already hear, even though it's just me and you, Scott, and our editor on this livestream, right? I can hear through the screen people screaming, being like, it's a trap, right?

It's all a trap. And it's discussed that, you know, we've done all this before and I fully understand the skepticism, you know. Definitely, there are points that I share at other points, peacebuilding is not human rights and accountability. And for those looking for this conflict to be solved at the ICC and the ICJ, this is going to be a bitter pill.

Of course. It's, and whether this is an ‘or’ or an ‘and’ is important, right? Is this an alternative to international justice or an addition to it? And there's always a tension between peacebuilding and, and the international court. We see this with Russia and the Ukraine. I don't see any world in which Putin ends up in the ICC.

I just don't. I, I don't believe it's possible. I, I just, it's one of these challenges of nuclear armed states and their leaders, right? You can make it uncomfortable. You know, you could say that states shouldn't do this, and how do conflicts end and what does it do and what does that do to international justice is a huge moral argument, and you could even say that this agreement is a moral atrocity while saying it's also maybe the most politically real thing that can move forward. I'm not going to judge anyone's morals about how they judge it.

But the fact that we are getting to a place as this, if this is the agreement that Hamas agrees, where we end up with the, with a broken process where unlike before, we have the entire region basically supporting the Palestinians, we're not at a point where the Saudis are undercutting a state of Palestine in order to sort of normalize as well, but are standing fully behind it in every statement.

You've got the Turks, you've got the Qataris, you've got the Sunni Arabs, you've got the Abraham Accord countries, you've got everyone standing behind saying, we want this to move forward, his is now the most important thing; that we've got a pathway out of this war in Gaza that leads to something that the U.S. is personally guaranteeing––is not, and was never, an obvious fact at any point.

Will it work? I don't know. I do not know if Hamas is going to agree. I can understand why they wouldn't. I think it would be a mistake.

I don't think it's ever going to get better for them than it is on this one. And I, I don't––I, and it's definitely not going to get better for anyone who's left in Gaza. And I know that right now as we're recording this, we're at the height of victory speeches in Israel, where they're like, there will never be a Palestinian state. They'll never reform. It's all a con.

And I know, because do you know what, when 80% of Israelis don't ever want there to be a Palestinian state and there's going to be elections this year, that's what people have to say now. If this is ever going to move forward towards a political solution, it will require a significant amount of push from America and the people who push the Trump administration to, to care about this.

It will mean that when the Saudis come to the White House, that I think is before the end of the year, they're going to have to put this on the agenda. When the Qataris in the UAE are going to have to continue to put this on the agenda, Turkey's going to have to continue to put this on the agenda, right? The pressure is not going to have to end if, please, God, this war ends.

It's going to need to be like, we need to continue to convert this into a political process, into something better. And if that sustained pressure can be there and the Trump administration and President Trump wants to be the guy who ended this. You know, this is still the man who put out a peace plan in 2000.

You know, the Trump, the Trump Deal of the Century plan, then there might be a pathway forward where there is a real political process with regional support that can get us somewhere what the outcome of that looks like. I don't know what the pieces of that look like. I don't know.

But I do think that as difficult as this is for many, many people who have been morally outraged by––the way also many in Israel who have been morally outraged by the concept that you could even facilitate the concept that there could even be a Palestinian state after this, right?

And also the global outrage of Israel's actions in the field, that there needs to be international consequences for those who perpetrated them. Like this is a very bitter pill to swallow. But conflicts, in my view, don't end in courtrooms. And that's very hard. And I don't begrudge anyone who morally finds this uncomfortable.

I don't begrudge anyone who doesn't trust the Trump administration or the Netanyahu government or anyone else, or anything like that. But the president is who he is. The government of his is who they are. And the limits of pressure are a reality that we dealt with in the Iran dealings, right, when we were doing the Iran deal.

You couldn't get everything you wanted and are also realistic here. And that's not satisfying to many people. And I get that. But that's where I think that this agreement is. And I think that there were enough pieces and what I would say precedents in there to be important.

And I'll close, I think this very long answer––and I think the last answer of this particular podcast with this: Amit Segal, who is the journalist probably closest to prime Minister Netanyahu and himself, is a very right wing person, spoke about the real danger of this agreement. And he said the real danger of this agreement is that it basically sets a precedent that if this prime minister and this president can even have the crack of a door open to a Palestinian state, that it's never going to be closed. And that's true.

And if he's saying that––you know, even as he's like trying to justify and spin for the Prime Minister in many different ways, it means that this is a precedent-setting piece.

And even though much in the international community, they're like, that's your precedent, that there could be a state when, you know the UK's recognizing calendars, recognizing. Yeah, with the Trump Republican party and this particular government after October 7^th, for that still to be an option is a big deal.

When they've desperately tried to control-alt-delete it, and that might not be enough for many, for most people, but that is still a thing that even the pro-Netanyahu camp who never want to see a Palestinian state recognizes the real risk at the heart of this, that there is a precedent that there will be a Palestinian political sovereign entity at the end of this, regardless of what happened on October 7^th if they reform.

And despite the skepticism that they can, if they do, and that reform is seen as real by objective observers, then that's a horizon and that's a political horizon that we've all been searching for.

Scott R. Anderson: Well, I think that is as good a point as any to end on as we are out of time. But I think we are going to have opportunity to revisit what is a pretty historic proposal on the table right now that we're waiting to get final word from, from Hamas and potentially from Israeli cabinet and the other folks who start to implement parts of it moving forward.

But we will reconvene then. Until then, Joel, thank you for coming here today on the Lawfare Podcast.

Joel Braunold: Always a pleasure, Scott.

Natalie Orpett: The Lawfare Podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get a free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare material supporter at our website, lawfaremedia.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters.

Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for our other podcasts, including Rational Security, Allies, The Aftermath, and Escalation, our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. Check out our written work at lawfaremedia.org.

The podcast is edited by Jen Patja and our audio engineer this episode was Ian Enright of Goat Rodeo. Our theme music is from ALIBI music. As always, thank you for listening.