Lawfare Daily: Ukraine After Year One of Trump’s Second Term, with Eric Ciaramella and Francis Farrell

[Intro]

Eric Ciaramella: I think the tragedy of where we are, a year into this administration, is that they really did have a unique opportunity to shake things up, and they squandered it, in large part, by focusing all of the pressure on Ukraine and putting minimal pressure on the Russian side.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Anastasiia Lapatina, Ukraine fellow at Lawfare with Francis Farrell, a frontline reporter at the Cleveland Dependent, and Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Francis Farrell: Is anyone in Europe still going to do anything if Russia's plan of just steadily degrading the Ukrainian military, which opens up holes to take more territory, and to take it quicker, and to demand more serious political capitulation, what will be that hard stop to that kind of scenario

Anastasiia Lapatina: In this episode, we'll look back at the first year of the Trump presidency through the lens of the war in Ukraine, and to discuss whether the ongoing peace talks have any chance of succeeding.

[Main Episode]

Let's go back in time to when President Trump was just reelected a year ago. What did each of you expect from the Trump administration when it comes to Ukraine back then? And did your expectations generally speaking come true or not? We can start with you, Eric.

Eric Ciaramella: Thanks, Nastya. So, I think many of us feared for the worst when Trump was reelected and expected him to quickly abandon Ukraine, cut off all aid, and put a tremendous amount of pressure on the Ukrainian leadership to come to a deal.

That happened in certain ways. I mean, we obviously all witnessed the Oval Office blow up now, almost a year ago in late February, but I think the worst still has not come to pass, and might not. You know, when Trump briefly suspended intelligence cooperation after the Oval Office meeting, it was met with a significant amount of pushback from, you know, Europeans, but also from members of his own party.

And that hold, which, you know, some reporting suggests, was not really a 100% hold in the first place was quickly reversed. And what we've seen instead, although there has been still a significant amount of diplomatic pressure on Ukraine to make concessions and to sort of soften its negotiating positions, the wholesale abandonment of Ukraine hasn't really happened.

So I would say that we're not quite in the worst case scenario that many of us anticipated. That being said, it is a completely different environment for Ukraine in this first year of Trump compared to you know, the three years under the Biden administration where, you know, the significant amount of constant military aid, you know, sort of holding hands in the international arena and diplomatically, so on and so forth—that's basically evaporated.

And, you know, you've seen Europe step up to a certain extent, maybe not as much as Ukraine has hoped for, but Europeans are having conversations about long-term support for Ukraine and, and their own security, frankly, in ways that I think many of them were surprised. So again, I would not say that we're in a good place, but it could have been worse.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Francis>

Francis Farrell: I would agree, of course with everything Eric said, I think from inside Ukraine, from inside Kyiv, the initial reaction was certainly predominantly dark and foreboding, when we think about that feeling that we had, it was about the fear specifically of a complete abandonment of Ukraine.

Having said that, I just wanna talk about the potential hopes that some people had at the time, especially in Ukraine, maybe those who, who weren't as deeply focused on Trump as a person and as a movement before, was the idea that okay, he's not on either side when it comes to, you know, his values or his conviction, but what he really wants to do is just end the was as soon as possible.

And if you know, that's peace that he, he wants as soon as possible, that will first and foremost require surely putting pressure on Russia as well to stop. And, because at that point it was Russia, if we remember, November, that was when they had actually the highest rate of gain on the battlefield. No one was talking about any European-Ukrainian counter-offensives anymore. No one was talking about the 1991 borders anymore. So at this point, with momentum looking like it was going in Russia's favor on the battlefield, it seemed like a Trump that was, you know, absolutely dead set on creating conditions for peace quickly that could be, end up in Ukraine's favor somehow.

In that sense, of course, I think we were disappointed. I remember going over this a lot, right, after the election, and basically understanding that since peace requires Russia first and foremost to stop, and they're not interested because even constitutionally looking at their annex provinces of Ukraine, they want a lot more Ukrainian territory.

At a minimum, what Trump will be more about is not about facilitating negotiations, but about where will he put his weight? Where will he throw the weight of the U.S. if we see that you know, Ukraine's still not interested in capitulating and Russia's not interested in stopping even for just a simple ceasefire.

And in that respect, you know, we haven't in a way moved anywhere over the whole year.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So, before we dive deeply into what actually went wrong, you know, with Trump's promise to end the war in 24 hours, or a week or a month, and all the other deadlines that clearly did not come to pass. Before we go there, I wanna sort of ground our conversation in what is really the key part of any kind of end-of-war scenario, and that is what's happening on the battlefield.

And so I wanna do that by asking you, Francis, how the situation on the battlefield has changed in the past year, and what is the general state of the front line now.

Francis Farrell: I still believe very strongly that, yes, the momentum of the frontline, the movement of the frontline and the general state of the war of attrition of course, which can continue at a very high intensity and has been doing not necessarily with much movement along the frontline is, still first and foremost the most important factor for an end-of-war scenario.

Simply because if Russia feels like it has a clear path to achieving its greater political goals of Ukrainian political capitulation by simply ignoring or paying lip service to peace negotiations and continuing forward, then they will continue to do that. And if Ukraine is forced to make painful concessions, those will be far more painful if their situation on the battlefield is worse.

And vice versa. If Ukraine's defense is rock solid, Russia's losses are simply unsustainable in terms of the troops that they're recruiting and losing on the battlefield and the equipment, and of course the economy factors in there as well, then that's the strongest card Ukraine can have for basically forcing Russia to decide, okay, we've had enough, we can't take more, we can't demand more, otherwise we will overextend. And for Russia, when we're talking about their domestic situation, you know, that's where Putin might say, you know, the need to forcefully mobilize, for example, is, is where we need to say that's enough.

So, having said that, we've been in between those two things for the whole year, things were looking very concerning.

As I mentioned back in November, 2024, when Trump was elected, they were moving forward a lot along the battlefield. But since then, we have kind of seen a basic pattern where Russia, despite having a huge advantage in manpower and especially in infantry, simply is unable to make a maneuver breakthrough, anywhere on the front line.

The Ukrainian, kind of, kill zone that is set up by, you know, hundreds and thousands of drone teams all along the front line is simply too strong for Russia to punch through with vehicles and maneuver and kind of take large amounts of territory in the same way Ukraine did, for example, in Kharkiv Oblast in 2022.

And for now, that kind of operation, that kind of success is what's needed to really change the political game. Until that happens, what we're talking about is a lot of infiltration, a lot of attrition, bit by bit moving forward and taking important cities. And you know, that process doesn't seem to be going in Ukraine's favor.

Most brigades are really running out of infantry at this point, but then there are some bright spots as well that Russia doesn't seem to be able to replace its losses. Overall, I would say the balance of power compared to November hasn't gone in too serious a direction one way or another.

But it's easy to say that now when we're talking about winter and when we're talking, when we see a traditional kind of winter stabilization along the front line, the thing that will really tell about, you know, where things go next year for example, is what happens in spring and summer when the weather gets warm, the leaves return to the trees, and that's when Russia will be really pushing for the kind of offensive that actually brings political weight.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So staying on the topic of the battlefield in the military for a moment, how much do we know about whether Ukraine is still getting any aid from the U.S. because it's, there were many different funding mechanisms under the Biden administration.

Do you know if any of that is still flowing and has there been a sort of a change in the dynamic of aid and is that happening any impact on the front line?

Francis Farrell: Well, if we rewind back to, for example January, 2024, when there was this holdup in the Congress for the next supplemental that was taking ages. And I remember doing a report from the front line about shell hunger which was proving to be a big problem for artillery and for holding back the Russians in general.

And then we had the Czech shell initiative come out of the Munich Security Conference. The conversation is very different since then, simply because now on the battlefield, and this is something every western military should understand about the war in Ukraine now, and understand about the war in the future, is that around 70 to 80% of casualties across the battlefield are being caused by drones specifically, mostly by these small FPV drones that each cost about the 10th of the price of a NATO-standard artillery shell.

What that means is that, when it comes to pure, you know, everyday tactical firepower, Ukraine with its homemade drone factories, which are now more and more independent of Chinese supply chains, are now able to provide most of the base firepower that they need to stop Russian advances. Of course, they need to organize this, they need people, they need pilots, they need training and so on, and artillery is still important, but that is less of a concern when it comes to U.S. aid than it was for example, two years ago.

What is needed, and it's very well known, is the higher advanced systems like the Patriot, the HIMARS— HIMARS has become less effective on the battlefield because Russians have gotten very good at jamming it, but there's still no replacing the Patriot. There's no replacing this flagship air defense system that is the only thing that can shoot down ballistic missiles.

And this is exactly why NATO and the U.S. agreed to this PURL Scheme for NATO countries. And I think just yesterday in U.S. Ambassador Whitaker said that Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, have been the biggest funders of these emergency shipments.

On top of that, there's still a lot going on. Intelligence wise, it's a very good thing that, you know, the intelligence support was restored when it comes to targeting, imagery, early warning for ballistic missile systems, and a lot more kind of day-to-day support from the U.S. intelligence community to the Ukrainian military on the ground.

And that is still leverage. You know, all of these things are still leverage that Trump would have over Ukraine if he decided to pull the plug and put maximum pressure on Zelenskyy to capitulate.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Eric, could you also say a few words about this PURL program and also about the Biden-era contracts that have been signed?

How much do we know about, you know, how those two funding mechanisms work? Am I right in understanding that, basically, Ukraine is not getting anything from the U.S. for free anymore, but it is getting systems from America that the Europeans are paying for? If I was to simplify it to one sentence.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I think that's right.

If you put intelligence sharing to the side, because I think that that has largely been preserved. I mean, it's a small cost compared to the cost of equipment and munitions, but it's a, you know, huge force multiplier. And my understanding is that has basically continued, if not increased, and that's still, you know, considered a donation, you know, a form of aid.

For the contracts, I mean, this was sort of an ingenious way that the previous administration structured it such that there would be a sort of long tail of deliveries for several years after the contracts were signed. And I, you know, that wasn't initially, the purpose of it was not to guard some of this aid in case, you know, there was a Trump 2.0.

But it was simply the fact that there was a long industrial ramp up that was necessary to start producing some of these—you know, munitions and pieces of equipment. So my understanding is that, you know, some of that is continuing and will continue for a few more years. And then the PURL Initiative is, is designed to allow for essentially Trump to claim a political victory saying that the American taxpayers aren't paying anymore. Biden was so stupid with 350 billion in aid to Ukraine and blah, blah, blah.

Again, fake numbers, but it allows 'em to say, we're not giving another dime to Ukraine. We're selling everything to the Europeans. Billions are pouring in. This is a great deal. And so it allows him to sort of satisfy both parts of his party, those who wanna support Ukraine and see the aid still flowing. And the MAGA wing that, you know, wants no more American aid to go.

So again, I mean, when you look at it, the still, the volumes though have gone down significantly compared to what was being provided under the previous administration. But as Francis was saying, the dynamics of the war have shifted significantly.

And so, when you add Ukrainian indigenous production of drones in particular into the mix, the steepness of the drop off from external aid is not having, you know, quite as serious an impact as it would've had, had Ukraine not been able to develop this indigenous capability.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Alright, so let's now try tackling sort of the, the main question of the conversation about Trump and his first year in power, which is his failed promise to end the war quickly.

There were, you know, a variety of different deadlines that he's given, threatening to cut aid to Ukraine, threatening to walk away from the war entirely. But the question is why, what went wrong? Why couldn't Trump settle the war quickly? And I'm just wondering what do you guys think, whether it was an impossible, sort of, an impossible task to begin with?

Or did the administration not exert enough pressure on either or both parties, or was it something else entirely? And we can start with Eric—

And I realized this is a kind of a huge question, so take this wherever you wanna take it.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah. I think the tragedy of where we are a year into this administration is that they really did have a unique opportunity to shake things up.

And they squandered it, in large part, by focusing all of the pressure on Ukraine and putting minimal pressure on the Russian side, with the exception of those sanctions that were announced in October against Rosneft and Lukoil, that being really the only example of meaningful pressure exerted on Moscow throughout the last year.

Instead, the administration, I think made a short-term, what proved to be a flawed calculation that the weaker party, in this case, Ukraine, if you could only put enough pressure on them to move their position significantly towards the stronger party, you could yield an agreement. And this, I mean, Trump was very transparent about this when he told Zelenskyy that he had no cards.

It turns out that Ukraine number one wasn't as weak as the American administration had calculated. So like Francis was saying, there's no readiness, you know, neither from Ukrainian society, nor from the leadership to capitulate completely. Certainly ,there is increased flexibility and the Ukrainians have moved some of their positions, in my view, in actually surprising ways.

And we can talk about that a little bit, but it's not coming anywhere close to the, the sort of capitulation framework that I think the Russians are still expecting.

At the same time, because of the battlefield trends that are sort of gradually, you know, working in Russia's favor and because the fact that there's not any real threat of a rupture with Washington, no real threat of additional pressure, Putin can kind of sit back and watch, essentially, us negotiating with ourselves this, this battle between Washington and Kyiv, with the Europeans sitting on the sidelines, and he doesn't have to lift a finger.

And so, you know, what would have been a better policy from the get go would really have been an assessment of the pressure points on both sides in particular, levying a significant amount of pressure against Russia because, I mean, not only because they're the aggressor, but you need to have both parties move in the direction of some sort of compromise. I mean, it's just not possible to, to do it by only pressuring one side.

And you know, I think there's a huge competence gap as well. I mean, Trump was boasting at the Hanukkah party in the White House in December. I found this guy, Steve Witkoff, he does real estate. He didn't know anything about Russia and I put him in charge of Russia.

So, it’s almost a feature of the administration and not a bug, but how are you supposed to mediate or negotiate, and possibly have a major role in overseeing and verifying some sort of ceasefire in the largest land war, interstate war that you know exists on the planet right now, when you have people with such low levels of expertise and competence.

And it's no wonder why we're all being sort of given whiplash when there's been these strange statements coming outta Witkoff and others expressing a huge amount of optimism about a breakthrough. We saw this after the Anchorage summit in August when Witkoff and Trump seemed to have fundamentally misunderstood what it was that the Russians were saying. And you know, he kind of said, oh, well peace is on the horizon, the Russians are completely fine with this, what they called Article Five-style guarantee for Ukraine, the territory. We can resolve that very quickly. Nothing to see here. This is gonna be easy.

And here we are six months later and really nothing has moved. So, you know, I think it's a flawed strategy, number one, about only pressuring the Ukrainian side. And number two, you still have a very low level of expertise and experience by the negotiating team. And that's where we are.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Francis, you have thoughts? I'm sure you do.

Francis Farrell: Yeah. I mean of course, 100% agree with everything Eric said. At the end of the day, I mean, it's just worth remembering again that when you start with Russia and you start with what Moscow's looking at when they're looking at this war and how much more of Ukraine they want, what are their political aims, which they believe that they have a path forward to achieving through a war of attrition. If you want peace, what should the reason be for them to stop.

That simple understanding was not there from the Trump team in the beginning. And, but also what's also been lacking is, yeah, as Eric said, an understanding of Ukraine. The most important thing here is remains territory and the idea, and Trump was throwing around the land swap term, you know, before Alaska. And since then that there has been this extra pressure put on Kyiv to leave Donetsk Oblast.

But at the end of the day we're still operating in a Ukraine, we're handing over territory. You know, with everything we've understood about Russian occupation, what happens there with a military that has fought, you know, tooth and nail for these parts of Eastern Ukraine, especially Donetsk Oblast, handing over territory is still way too far for the Ukrainian military, for the Ukrainian society. You know, even on my last trip, just last week, commanders and soldiers continued to tell me that they would refuse an order to leave positions I in Donetsk Oblast. And, t, that's still where we're at.

And I think Eric said very well, it was about key of Washington and Europe negotiating with themselves. Because the general rule, I think, I've had going forward over the past, no, over the past year and going forward, has been the simple idea that there are no peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for now. And there are no security guarantees in the future. The only thing that there are is the balance of power, so far.

And Trump and his team, for example, for some reason, didn't understand that that's what first needed to be addressed before these sides could be brought together for a peace deal.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Francis, you've already mentioned earlier the sort of Trump-optimists in Ukraine and the people who were kind of consciously optimistic, and I have written about this for Lawfare too, that there was part of the Ukrainian government and part of the society that I think, first and foremost was really disappointed with the Biden administration, and sort of from that disappointment stemmed this idea that Trump could be good for Ukraine because he'd be a lot more prone to risk than Biden, in that he would be willing to potentially exert more pressure on Russia.

And there are some ways in which the Trump administration is challenging Russia in a way that the Biden administration was not comfortable with. And so Eric already mentioned the sanctioning of Lukoil, but the U.S. has also, as far as I understand, has been playing a key role in Ukraine's long-range campaign against energy targets inside Russia and sort of providing crucial intelligence about the target targets and air defenses and sort of enabling that in a way that the Biden administration was not comfortable doing.

And recently, the U.S. has also been intercepting, you know, tankers of Russia's shadow fleet, and that has been treated as a, you know, certain level of escalation, although maybe not directly related to the war, but—

How do all of these actions that are clearly, I guess, you know, a bit more aggressive towards Russia than, than the Biden admin did, how do all of these actions coexist alongside Trump's, otherwise rather friendly approach to Russia and clearly a certain level of respect towards Putin?

So how does that coexist, and also are these sanctions and strikes and the—campaign, is that helping turn the war in Ukraine's favor in any way? Is that, is that having an impact on the balance of power that you and Francis mentioned? And Eric, we can start with you.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I mean, I think there are multiple factions within the administration, which even on a good day, you know, this administration is far from coordinated internally, but you know, you see some discontinuities from the overall policy arc, which as you noted, you know, Trump as the president sets the overall policy tone.

He has a friendly view towards Russia. He's skeptical of additional pressure on Russia. He's extremely suspicious of Zelenskyy in Ukraine. And you know, again, has no real sympathy, I think, for the Ukrainian cause and has a very fractured relationship with European allies.

Now, there are certain figures within the administration—I think, you know, when you look at Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, clearly he and his team had put together these sanctions, you know, months before October, and I think he probably caught Trump on a crabby day. And Trump wanted to do something, or at least was open to something, and Bessent was able to slide this onto his desk and say, let's do this, it'll help shape things up. And, he sort of agreed. The exception to the overall rule and it would, you know, it's a stretch to say that it's part of any particular strategy.

Then when you look at the, the tanker seizures, I mean that has nothing to do with Ukraine, that's all Venezuela and Iran. I think it's true that this administration is a little less concerned about escalation in certain scenarios, but actually more concerned about escalation vis-a-vis Russia in Ukraine.

And so, it's part of, you know, the reason behind, I think, Trump being unwilling to kind of go more firmly in Ukraine's direction, is that he is worried about some sort of Russian counter reaction in Ukraine and in Europe, which he is not prepared to deal with. I think he thinks he can basically get away with things on the high seas or in the Western Hemisphere because he and Putin have this unwritten understanding like, I'm not gonna make a mess in your backyard. Or, you know, not like what Biden did, and you don't touch me in my backyard. I mean, it's spheres of influence and I think he's been very transparent about that.

When you look at the intelligence activities, again, I would say that that is largely a bureaucratic feature of our administration, where the CIA is still pretty independent, and John Ratcliffe, the director, has largely deferred to the career staff to kind of continue doing things. And he's done a decent job protecting those programs and that cooperation, and it largely just hasn't risen to Trump's attention.

So again, I would say that there's, you know, it's a feature of the dysfunction of this administration rather than any kind of sign of a strategic shift. The previous administration for, again, for all of the criticisms by Ukrainians, it did have a very clear policy, supporting Ukraine was front and center, and one can disagree with the pace and the scale and whatnot of that support. But the administration never really wavered from that.

And I think here you have the opposite, where the default is really not to support Ukraine. And then you see these sort of bright spots shining through as the exception.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Francis, you wanna add anything?

Francis Farrell: Yeah, I'll just say that if it was part of a coordinated strategy and a coordinated message kind of passed on to Russia, that these are the consequences for repeatedly showing and proving that you're not interested in, in peace, despite all my efforts and despite my, you know, often friendly policy, then these, you know, isolated actions could have had some sustained impact.

And there were, you know, small as, as Eric said, bright spots where you also saw, you know, some reaction from the Russian side when you also, you could feel a little bit of concern in the, in the voice of Spokesperson Peskov, for example, when he was reacting to the sanctions or reacting to these deadlines.

Like it comes together the actual policy, the action, the rhetoric. But when Russia is proved, over and over again, that if they can just divert, distract, propose a meeting, and that's usually enough to, to basically let off any pressure that was there, then it doesn't really have any long-term effect.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So, why hasn't Trump walked away from the war entirely then?

If things are just not working out as he thought they are? Like what are the Trump administration's objectives vis-a-vis this war right now?

Eric Ciaramella: That's a good question, and I have been trying to puzzle through that myself. I do think that there is a significant pushback within the Republican party, particularly in the Senate against, you know, total abandonment of Ukraine and, you know, you have someone like Lindsey Graham who really kind of swings wildly in public, but seems to be the only consistent voice who is in Trump's ear on a weekly basis, who, over time, is pretty much arguing for more pressure on Russia and for supporting Ukraine.

I think that's part of it. And I think Graham probably, you know, represents at least a significant part of Republican senators. And so Trump is worried about doing something that would cause such blowback in his own party. And I think that's probably a significant factor this year, too, as we head into midterms. But it's not the only factor.

I mean, I think there is this bigger argument that Trump doesn't wanna look weak and he doesn't want his own version of the Biden administration withdrawal from Afghanistan, which let's put aside the fact that they were implementing an agreement that Trump reached with the Taliban under his first administration, and so on and so forth. But the images on screen of a country imploding is not something that, I think, Trump wants to be associated with.

So I think enough people spooked him into thinking that totally cutting Ukraine off would lead to some sort of catastrophic foreign policy debacle that would define his legacy. And I think that is enough of a fear factor that has kept a floor on, you know, how low he's willing to go.

I think also the third factor is the Europeans. The Europeans, particularly people like secretary general of NATO, Mark Rutte, have done a pretty good job managing Trump. And again, it looks distasteful when you see Trump just sort of tweeting out the texts he receives that are, Mr. Trump, you're the best in the world. You're so brilliant, so on and so forth.

But I think many of those leaders figured out what it takes to get to Trump's heart and stroking his ego works. And so you have people like Rutte who've managed to keep the train on the tracks in the broader transatlantic relationship, he played a key role it looks like in deescalating the Greenland crisis.

You have leaders in Europe like Giorgia Meloni, the prime minister of Italy, who is, you know, aligned with Trump on a lot of kind of ideological and culture war kind of policies. She's been a strong supporter of Ukraine and I think she's been in the president's ear. You have the president of Finland, Alexander Stubb, who played a round of golf with him last year, and apparently that had some influence.

You know, and overall, I think Trump, although he's had this built in hostility towards Europe at large, at the end of the day, I think he still does recognize that they are a wealthy and somewhat powerful set of countries that we have on our side. And if we wanna do anything in the world, you know, we need to kind of listen to them, a little bit, at least about their minimal interests.

And so, I've sort of seen this pattern of just extreme pressure and us looking like we're barreling towards a cliff, whether it's on Ukraine, whether it was the Greenland crisis, so on and so forth. And then he pulls back at the last minute. And I think those three factors that I laid out: the fear of weakness, the concerns about his own party, and the desire to maintain some minimal relationship with Europe are probably the guardrails that exist on policy towards Ukraine.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Speaking of Europe, Trump has obviously shifted much of the responsibility, especially financial responsibility for Russia's war on Ukraine to Europe. Has Europe been able to rise to this challenge? Is it being helpful at all? And has it been helpful in the last year?

Eric Ciaramella: I would say in part, yes. You know, we've talked already about the NATO mechanism where Europeans are paying for American weapons.

The European Union, the European Council, agreed in December to extend a $90 billion loan grant mechanism to Ukraine to, you know, fund its budget for the next couple of years. There's also been this coalition of the willing that France and the U.K. have been leading to develop these so-called security guarantees, which again, are not as nearly as coherent as they sound when you hear from the leaders in speeches, but it's not nothing.

I mean, the Europeans are having a much more serious conversation, including among their militaries, about what some sort of long-term support mission for Ukraine and, you know, again, re-armament plan, and so on and so forth, what that could look like.

And they're having these discussions largely with the U.S. as an observer on the sidelines, if not, not in the room entirely. So it's kind of working out a different muscle than they're used to. I mean, they're used to 75 years of the United States leading European security discussions through NATO.

And now the Europeans are having, I think, a much more realistic conversation about security in their own backyard. So I don't wanna say it's nothing.

At the same time, have they been able to mobilize the resources that are necessary to meet the challenge of the moment? Not yet. And so I think there is still a lot of work to be done. A lot of people were, you know, disappointed that the Europeans didn't move forward with seizing the immobilized Russian assets and making those—you know, turning them into this reparations loan for Ukraine.

That being said, now that they came up with this other 90 billion euro mechanism, the assets are still available down the road, which is a good thing. The next, you know, nine to 12 months are gonna feature some very tough discussions among the Europeans about their next seven-year budget. And, you know, the commission has already put on the table that there'll probably be at least a 100 billion euro line item for Ukraine.

Again, when you stretch that out over seven years, it's not nearly as much—is gonna be necessary. But I do think in as much as the Trump administration barrels towards the cliff and then pulls back at the last minute, the Europeans have an amazing ability to stare down a crisis and get to the 11th minute of the 11th hour, and then come up with some sort of solution that should have been obvious from the get go.

But it was necessary for them to go through all of this, sort of flailing and maneuvering in order to build the larger consensus to have a decision to move forward. So I kind of have faith in the Europeans to figure out the right thing in the end. Again, this all comes down to time though, and Ukraine, as France has been laying out, doesn't really have time to sit around and wait for, you know, 27 European leaders to duke it out among themselves and come to a belated decision.

So I do hope that in this year we're gonna see a little bit more proactive European strategizing about how to resource this war and Ukrainian defense going forward.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Francis?

Francis Farrell: Yeah, just one thing I would add to that, I mean, the view of, of course, it's, it's good to see the, the way that European countries got together and have this ability, as Eric said, to come together, especially in the moment, the darkest moments when it comes to Trump's Ukraine policy, you know, the coalition of the willing as a response to the Oval Office meeting.

And then right after Alaska, you know, this unprecedented gathering of European leaders together with Zelenskyy all in the room. Just to make sure they're there and saying that this is, you know, what happens if you just, you know, jump off this cliff into, into a new world where we want to be, you know, build a friendship with Russia and just put pressure on Ukraine.

And of course you know, I sympathize with the European leaders and theirvery difficult domestic economic situations and especially, you know, upcoming elections and the rise of the far right. I think we take for granted at the moment that we have in the U.K., France, Germany, Poland, you know, all still relatively centrist governments that, that have not gone off that cliff yet.

And then meanwhile we have countries like Norway really finally stepping up financially, understanding what, you know, what their right place in history is at this point. But at the same time, what really frustrates people inside Ukraine I think is the slightly, the delusional language that comes out around from the Europeans around security guarantees and this reassurance force, the understanding that, you know, especially given the fact that Russia has repeatedly said that this is an absolute deal breaker, you know, for them in, in terms of, of stopping, you know, having European troops and a NATO presence inside Ukraine.

And so talking more and more about something that is pretty much impossible, you know? And then of course there are all of the practical arguments about does, does the U.K. really have a brigade that they can deploy and rotate? Does France have one?

But, you know, so that delusional language is frustrating because in the times that we are, you know, when all of that future commitment, future reassurance is still hinging upon a ceasefire to appear magically out of nowhere in the conditions where Russia shows no intention of stopping what's really being discussed and, you know, is anyone in Europe still going to do anything if Russia's plan of just steadily degrading the Ukrainian military, which opens up holes to take more territory, and to take it quicker, and to demand more serious political capitulation, what will be that hard stop to that kind of scenario?

And for the moment from the Europeans, we're not seeing that next level of bravery.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Let's move to talking about the ongoing negotiations. So before we go into the nitty gritty of what's actually being negotiated and discussed recently, I just wanna ask, do either of you think that the current negotiations are actually serious? Like, do you think it's like sort of discontinuation of the dents that both Ukraine and Russia are having around Trump and just saying whatever and doing whatever to keep him engaged—

Or are both or either party actually are willing to compromise and ready for some sort of serious discussion on how to end the war as soon as possible? Eric?

Eric Ciaramella: I would say it's probably a bit of both. It's certainly a performance to stay in Trump's good graces, but at least on the Ukrainian side, I see significant signs of movement in ways that, to me, are surprising and I think are go beyond just trying to appear flexible in order to coax Trump into, you know, pivoting and supporting Ukraine.

I think the illusions of that have largely dissipated in Kyiv and—You know, I think because of certain personnel changes and strategic realizations about the way the war is going, I think you see the Ukrainian side actually revising its positions.

On the Russian side, you know, I can make an argument for how they might be willing to consider some sort of pause. I don't really see any evidence of movement on their side. But, you know, again, it's not to say that they're not taking the negotiation seriously at all. You know, I wouldn't go that far. I think they're trying to keep their options open and if they can get some sort of, you know, victory out of this negotiation, why not give it a shot?

But they don't lose anything from participating in it. So again, like, like we were talking about earlier, in large part, they've been comfortable sort of watching the U.S. side continue to beat down the Ukrainians after every round when there's no deal. You know, the Ukrainians have to move a bit more, the Ukrainians have to move a bit more.

But, you know, that's my overall impression. I do think, and maybe after Francis gives his overall reaction, I do wanna talk about some of these, let's call them creative ideas about the Donbas, because I think that's where the rubber might meet the road, in terms of yielding some sort of surprising outcome.

That even, you know, again, the skeptics, like all of us would, would sort of not see coming.

Francis Farrell: I would perhaps be a little more skeptical. I don't have inside information at the moment about what's going on in Abu Dhabi behind closed doors. But I think a lot of the trying to find creative solutions and appear flexible, I would agree that Ukraine probably doesn't have too much hope of, you know, Trump really turning around and had, having enough of Russia and putting pressure.

But a lot of it seems to be still minimizing, you know, avoiding the worst case scenario and minimizing the damage that Trump could do in the meantime. But I do, I think it's, it would be correct to jump straight to the question of the Dunbas, because I do understand how that, you know, that this is the big way, the big thing where, you know, we see evidence, right, that maybe public opinion is shifting a little bit in Ukraine.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So let me do a little bit of an intro first.

So the, as you both have pointed out, the main issue in the negotiations is the fate of the Donetsk, one of the two oblasts that make up the so-called Donbas region. And so the Russians basically occupy fully Luhansk oblast, but when it comes to Donetsk oblast, the Russians occupy roughly 80%.

And so essentially the Russians are demanding that Ukraine withdraw its forces from that oblast, from that region entirely, meaning they're asking Ukraine to just voluntarily give up a bunch of land that's hugely strategically important and has hundreds of thousands of people living there. And so, Ukraine has rejected this demand over and over, instead suggesting just freezing the fighting along the current line of contact instead.

So, yeah. Francis, do you wanna talk a little bit, I mean, you've been, you've been to all parts of Donbas many, many times, so can you just explain what, like, you know, the territory that is the biggest issue here, that the two sides are fighting over?

What exactly is it and why are the Russians so hyperfocused on it and why are the Ukrainians so hesitant to even consider giving it up?

Francis Farrell: So I was in Donbas just a week ago, actually in the cities of, of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, which are the two largest cities remaining under Ukrainian control. They each had populations of just over 100,000 people before the full-scale war. But there are other large urban areas there as well.

There's Lyman, Druzhkivka, which is already now a frontline city—and looking at how long it's taken for Russia to take by force and at what cost these large urban areas in Dunbas. Previously, we look at Pokrovsk, which really broke the, the Russian offensive ambitions in that area for a whole year before it was finally, almost now, but not quite completely taken.

You know, there, there was Bakhmut, there was Khrestivka, and of course, Ukraine is allocating and losing a lot of its own manpower to defend these cities as well. But fundamentally, still what this territory represents for Ukraine is the ability to attrite, Russian strategic, offensive potential, grind it down, and in doing so, reach a point strategically where they cannot, you know, go forward and actually threaten more of Ukraine.

I was speaking with a commander who was showing me some of his fortifications that had been built there recently. They go, you know, they're behind the city of Pokrovsk, but they go through Donetsk Oblast.

And then there's those cities itself, which are also very heavily fortified and to, to give up all of these areas. It does really open the gate for Russia to continue pursuing its offensives into other parts of eastern Ukraine, including Zaporizhzhia Oblast where, which is another region that Russia considers its own after having annexed it.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So it's not just a political sort of ideological question, it's also just like a hardcore military strategic value question, right>

Francis Farrell: That's the biggest, I think, motivation to not give it up for Ukraine. Of course, there is a moral side of things. And there is I think a genuine practical concern—

We saw Zelenskyy, I think when we had the 28-point plan presented, there was a change in his rhetoric. You know, there was, he was talking about potentially having to make those sacrifices otherwise, you know, losing, having to sacrifice a bit of dignity, otherwise they could lose their biggest partner.

And I think he was kind of testing the waters a little bit in terms of the Ukrainian population to see whether they would be ready for that. But once again, I cannot stress enough that when we, when it comes to the military, I really doubt we're in a position at the moment where that order would actually be followed on the ground to give up this territory.

From the Russian side, of course there is a lot of political significance, symbolic significance, all the way, going back to 2014, and then 2022, when after denazification and demilitarization, the strategic aim of the war was often called deliberation of Donbas. And that's still a focus, but, A, Russia cannot be trusted here to be negotiating in good faith unless there's a very good, solid hard reason for them not to go forward, you know, in the short-term or medium-term.

And secondly, at the end of the day, you know, you go back to what is their overall political aim. The full-scale invasion started with an attack on Kyiv with territorial ambitions of Odesa, of Kyiv, of the bigger part of Ukraine probably. And I personally, I think my view is just that this small capitulation, which people call a concession, a territorial concession will only, and can only snowball into, into Russia feeling like they can demand a larger and larger capitulation going forward.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So Eric, what are the creative proposals on the table for how to treat this seemingly unsolvable, impossible issue?

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I mean, just to put down my baseline, I mean, I am still skeptical, as Francis is, for all the reasons that he laid out. But at least there has not been a rejection. And in certain ways Zelenskyy has shown some openness to considering these ideas that have been put forward by the American side to turn the Donbas into a demilitarized and/or free economic zone. Things that sound good on paper. I mean, who doesn't love demilitarized zones and free economic activity?

You know, in practice it doesn't really make any sense because how are you going to regulate the security and law enforcement and commerce in this area? I mean, whose sovereignty would it be under? So if Ukrainians withdraw their, you know, conventional military positions, what's to say that Russia won't just, you know, either gradually or overnight flow its own forces in and defacto take it.

So that's, that—It seems in the Ukrainians that I've talked to basically understand that. So they're not going into this with any illusions, but, you know, I've been surprised to hear the level of thinking about these scenarios in a way that suggests that it's not just about the performance art for the sake of Trump, that there is some real serious consideration of what this could look like.

And I think that the change of personnel from Andriy Yermak, the former chief of staff, head of the presidential office who was fired by Zelenskyy late last year for, you know, over this ballooning corruption scandal and the appointment of Kyrylo Budanov, who's former head of the military intelligence, who you know, in my view is pretty realistic about the cost of a continued long war of attrition.

I mean, I do think there is some serious thinking there about what this could look like. The Ukrainians have stressed that there needs to be an international monitoring mission, internationally supervised transitional administration. I mean, it's not like this has never happened before.

There are examples in the Balkans, you know, when you look at something like the Brčko District in Bosnia, which, you know, was sort of left unresolved in the Dayton accords, and then there later was an agreement about sort of sharing of power and influence between the two entities in Bosnia with a strong international, really U.S. monitoring mission that you know, could call elections and could oversee law enforcement and so on. And actually, Brčko has, you know, in my understanding, been one of the areas of Bosnia that's been most successful from a governance perspective.

But it took an enormously strong hand from the United States. And the circumstances here are obviously different because you don't have two warring entities that the United States can exert control over, like you had in Bosnia. You have the Russians on one side, and so, you know, again, I, for listeners, it's gonna, it's gonna seem strange.

I agree that I don't see how this actually comes together in practice, but could you have some sort of framework agreement that the sides basically agree in principle on the idea of a demilitarized zone and free economic zone, and then the Russians would punt the question to the Ukrainians in a referendum, which itself would be very, very difficult and would lead to probably a lot of internal tension in Ukraine in the hopes that, you know, while either it fails and the Ukrainians are blamed for scuttling the peace agreement or it passes and then Ukraine has taken on this obligation to withdraw.

I can envision how that might happen, and again, I wouldn't put it as likely, but it's not a zero possibility.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So before we wrap up, one last question. If we're looking at 2026 and thinking about all of the things that we discussed today, is either party risking any sort of, you know, imminent collapse on the battlefield?

And then also what will determine whether either party will be more likely to agree to some sort of peace deal? Francis?

Francis Farrell: Yeah, so that's the big question going into next year in the battlefield. And I think it's important to say that it will, we'll have to see until probably late spring and early summer where that is really going, when traditionally, offensives pick up speed and Russia, especially with these current infiltration tactics they're using will have the advantage going forward under the, in the warm weather and the greenery.

I think at least for the first half of, of 2026, again, we won't see any kind of successful breakthrough. We might see things like what we saw around—in August last year, which was a kind of very large scale infiltration, which threatened to have operational consequences, but Ukraine was able to crush that and counter attack, and I think that will be the case still going forward.

For Ukraine, the big pressure point remains manpower and specifically the tension of still having to draw in new people through forced mobilization, which is basically an issue that cannot be fixed at this point. And that combined with the issue of not only combat losses on the battlefield, but desertion, we saw in the first 10 months of 2025, we saw as many cases of soldiers going AWOL as we did in the entire full-scale war going forward.

And the other thing, of course, will be the survivability of their drone teams on the battlefield, which is, when you look at the Russian side, their luxury is that because they're constantly sending in expendable single use infantry. While Ukraine has almost very little infantry to speak of left, all of the Russian drone teams we've heard of these elite Rubicon units, for example, are all focusing on, on killing Ukrainian drone teams.

While Ukrainian drone teams are mostly focused on just stopping these constant assaults, and it sounds like, you know little tactical details, but basically expanded across the front line on a strategic level, these are, I think, the biggest concerns going forward. But there are also, you know, there are also signs that, that Russia can simply not continue their assaults at the same pace.

They have the initiative, time is definitely on their side, but if we do reach a point where they simply do not have access to this constant stream of volunteer soldiers who are ready to be tricked to go through two weeks of training and then to be sent kind of into the meat grinder. I think that moment where Putin is presented with the need to mobilize forcibly on a large scale inside Russia will be the best chance for Ukraine to bring Moscow to a point where they're willing to wind things up, at least in the short term.

So that's going forward. I think for most of the year, we still will see what I think is often vaguely described as just incremental advances. The front is bogged down. I don't like that language because in media, because it often kind of masks the truth of the intensity of this attritional warfare.

But because we're dealing with such an intensely drone saturated tactical environment, neither side will have, or especially Russia, the ability to land a kind of final killing blow in the form of an operational breakthrough.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Eric, any last words?

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I mean, I would just add, again, one of the key questions is gonna be whether Europe can mobilize significant additional resources for Ukraine, recognizing, you know, the depth of the crisis if they don't.

And again, it may not be any sort of near term collapse, but kind of they're prolonging the agony by not being able to front load significant resources that, A, allow Ukraine to start transitioning from mere survival to some sort of longer-term planning.

It's something I argued in a recent foreign affairs article with my colleague Sophia Besch, that there really needs to be, you know, we need to move out of this paradigm of planning for just the next three, six, 12 months and be thinking over the course of, you know, five plus years about what Ukraine is going to need to re-arm and start making decisions now about acquisitions and training programs to get the pipeline of reserves and, you know, the schedule of equipment deliveries, such that they're not constantly running at sort of the end of the rope. So, but again, that requires resources and it's not gonna come from the United States. So that's the first thing.

The second thing I would add is just, you know, all eyes should remain on the negotiations, even if it does seem unserious and performative. I do still think that probably the biggest chance for some real pivot this year would come out of those talks, because as Francis laid out the dynamics on the battlefield, you know, don't lend themselves at this point to some sort of massive breakthrough by either side. But if you have some sort of, you know, initial framework ceasefire deal, as unlikely as it seems right now that would really, really change the dynamic here.

And so, you know, Ukrainians are walking this tightrope, trying not to be the ones blamed for, you know, what they probably see as the likely failure of the talks, but also preparing for the possibility that you know, there is gonna be a deal and they're gonna need to figure out how to implement something that is ultimately very unfair to Ukraine. And how do you make that the least bad and painful and damaging outcome possible?

So again, thinking about, you know, things like, if there is some sort of withdrawal from, you know, this fortress belt that Francis you know, very expertly laid out, how do you quickly construct fortifications, you know, at the next level back—And can you contract American help?

I mean, we have an Army Corps of Engineers to do it very quickly in that case that Ukraine is forced to withdraw. So you need to think through these things. Even if you don't want that outcome and you think it's unlikely, you still need to have a plan B. And I think, I hope that Ukrainians have learned over the past four years that while pushing for Plan A and hoping for Plan A, you'll always have to have something in reserve in case the situation turns against you.

Because it has before and Ukrainians have been caught off guard before not having a backup plan. So again, I hope that they're planning for all scenarios and we'll have to see what happens.

Anastasiia Lapatina: When it does, I'll invite the two of you back and we'll talk about it. But in the meantime, thank you guys. This was very interesting.

Eric Ciaramella: Thanks, Nastya.

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