Ohlin on Variation in the Meaning of Intent in Connection with IHL and the ICC

Further to the prior exchange between myself and Kevin Jon Heller regarding allegations of drone strikes targeting persons in the context of funerals or post-strike rescue activity, Jens David Ohlin has this very enlightening post on the potential gap between common law and civil law conceptions of "intent" and the manner in which this gap may add to confusion as to the use of that concept in the IHL and ICC settings.  As he illustrates, the interesting underlying issue is whether the Rome Statute might be read to use "intent" in a manner that would criminalize attacks where it is clear there will be collateral harm to civilians even though the purpose of the attack is to strike a proper military objective.   I leave it to others to debate whether that's a fair reading of the Rome Statute (see the comments to Kevin's original post, and the comments that will follow on the post from Jens); I will simply repeat my prior claim that IHL, for its part, is not best read as treating such scenarios as violating the principle against targeting civilians.