Racial Animus Claims May Play a Key Role in the TPS Cases

Two cases being argued before the Supreme Court on April 29 will determine, directly or indirectly, the fate of more than a million migrants in the United States. The suits relate to a statutorily created humanitarian program called Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the Trump administration’s effort—through agency actions effectuating executive orders—to terminate its benefits to as many beneficiaries as possible.

The specific cases before the Court, Mullin v. Dahlia Doe and Trump v. Fritz Emmanuel Lesley Miot, involve challenges, respectively, to then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s orders to terminate TPS status for about 7,000 Syrians and more than 353,000 Haitians. Lower courts blocked Noem’s orders—now defended by her successor, Markwayne Mullin—and the Court has taken the unusual step of granting “certiorari before judgment” in both cases, meaning before any court of appeals has ruled on the merits of either case.

Twice before in the past year, the High Court has reviewed TPS cases on its shadow docket—both times in a suit challenging Noem’s efforts to end TPS status for Venezuelans. On each occasion, the Court issued an emergency stay that, without explanation, blocked preliminary relief that the lower court judge had tried to afford. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented the first time, and she and Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan all dissented the second time. In Doe and Miot, however, the Court has permitted the preliminary relief afforded by Judges Katherine Failla of the Southern District of New York and Ana Reyes of the District of Columbia—postponements of the terminations—to stand pending the Court’s ruling.

Though the stakes of Doe and Miot are enormous in themselves to the migrants directly impacted—the State Department currently advises Americans not to travel to either country for any reason—the repercussions will be broader still. Noem attempted to terminate TPS status for every one of the 13 countries that came up for departmental review during her term. Those others include, as noted, Venezuela (about 600,000 TPS holders), Afghanistan (11,700), Cameroon (5,200), Nepal (7,200), Nicaragua (2,900), Honduras (51,000), South Sudan (230), Myanmar (4,000), Ethiopia (5,000), Somalia (more than 1,000), and Yemen (2,800). Four remaining countries have TPS designations that have not yet come up for review: El Salvador, Lebanon, Sudan, and Ukraine.

In all the challenges to Noem’s TPS cancellations to date, the plaintiffs have alleged that Noem did not remotely comply with the procedural dictates of the TPS statute, and that her cancellations were, therefore, “arbitrary and capricious,” “beyond statutory authority, and “contrary to law,” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Nevertheless, much of the Supreme Court argument in Doe and Miot will likely have nothing to do with either Noem’s compliance with procedural mandates nor the dangerousness of the conditions in Syria or Haiti. Instead, it will revolve around dry textual analysis of a provision of the TPS law that limits courts’ jurisdiction over the secretary’s TPS-related determinations. If the Court agrees with the government that that provision—8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)— simply renders Noem’s terminations unreviewable, then most of the migrants’ claims will fail, no matter how severely Noem may have flouted procedural mandates or how catastrophic the resulting humanitarian consequences might be.

However, even if the government wins the reviewability argument, some of the migrants’ claims will likely survive to another day in court. That’s because the plaintiffs in virtually every TPS case and, certainly, in both Doe and Miot have also raised constitutional arguments in their complaints. Specifically, they allege that Noem’s actions were motivated, at least in part, by racial or ethnic animus, in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. Under prior Supreme Court precedent, the TPS law’s jurisdiction-stripping provision most likely cannot bar those—a fact the government appears to begrudgingly concede in its Supreme Court reply brief. (“Only constitutional claims would conceivably not be barred,” U.S. Solicitor General John Sauer writes.)

In Miot, Judge Reyes accepted the TPS-holders’ equal protection argument as one of multiple bases for her order “staying” Noem’s termination—a form of preliminary relief available under the Administrative Procedure Act. Referring to statements by Noem that she found relevant, for instance—and which we’ll discuss in greater depth below—she wrote:

Kristi Noem has a First Amendment right to call immigrants killers, leeches, entitlement junkies, and any other inapt name she wants. Secretary Noem, however, is constrained by both our Constitution and the APA to apply faithfully the facts to the law in implementing the TPS program. The record to-date shows she has yet to do that. [Emphasis in original.]

In Doe, Judge Failla also granted a stay of Noem’s termination—but only on the basis of procedural irregularities. She rebuffed, at least at the preliminary relief stage, the equal protection claims, finding the plaintiffs’ definition of the protected class allegedly being discriminated against—“non-white, non-Europeans”—too “amorphous,” while there was insufficient evidence of “Syrian-specific animus.”

To be clear, the government contests the Miot plaintiffs’ racial animus claims—but on the merits, rather than on the basis of the jurisdiction-stripping clause. It argues that the statements of both Noem and Trump that Reyes relied upon in finding discriminatory intent were taken “out-of-context,” were “race-neutral,” and had “national-interest and foreign-relations justifications.”

So it is possible that the Supreme Court could vacate Reyes’ conclusions as to the constitutional claims, too. But it would be shocking if the Court simply brushed those aside as unreviewable, which would require overruling or circumventing longstanding prior precedent.

The TPS Statute

The TPS statute, enacted in 1990, is administered by the secretary of homeland security. (Though the statute gives the attorney general authority to administer its provisions, the attorney general has since delegated those powers to the homeland security secretary.)

Under the statute, if the secretary finds, “after consultation with appropriate agencies of the government, that there is an “ongoing armed conflict” in a state that would “pose a serious threat to [the] personal safety” of nationals being sent back to that state; or an “earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster” that renders a foreign state “unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return” of its nationals; or that there exist other “extraordinary and temporary conditions ... that prevent ... nationals of the state from returning ... in safety,” she can designate that country’s nationals eligible to apply for TPS status.

Such a designation then permits nationals of that country who are in the United States at the time of the designation to apply individually for TPS status. No individual receives TPS status automatically. Each individual must be vetted. Those with either a felony conviction or more than one misdemeanor conviction, for example, are ineligible. So are those suspected of terrorism, as well as a list of other serious crimes or wrongdoing. Once approved, a TPS holder can stay in the U.S. lawfully and obtain a work permit for as long as the country’s TPS designation lasts.

When the secretary grants a TPS designation, the secretary sets its duration to a period between six and 18 months. As the end of that period approaches, the secretary must perform a “periodic review,” as described at  8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A). “[A]fter consultation with appropriate agencies,” the statute says, she “shall review the conditions in the foreign state” and “shall determine whether the conditions for such designation under this subsection continue to be met.” If she finds that they are no longer met, she “shall” terminate the designation. But if she finds the conditions still exist, “the period of designation of the foreign state ... is extended for an additional period” of six to 18 months. Failure to perform the mandated periodic review also triggers automatic extension.

As foreshadowed above, there’s one last—but crucial—provision of the law we need to look at before turning to the facts. This is the one the TPS-holders refer to as the “jurisdiction-limiting” clause, and the government calls the “jurisdiction-stripping” clause. That section, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A), provides:

There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection.

Why doesn’t this section render both suits dead on arrival? The government says that it does.

Congress meant what it said: “There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state” for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). ... That language clearly bars respondents’ challenges to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s terminations of TPS for Syria and Haiti. ...  That commonsense reading is unsurprising: Foreign-policy-laden judgments like these are often unreviewable because courts are ill-equipped to evaluate them. ... It just means Congress opted to hold the Executive accountable through the political process, just as is the case for countless other foreign-policy and discre-tionary decisions.

(U.S. Solicitor General Sauer will argue the government’s case before the Supreme Court.)

The TPS-holders, on the other hand, argue that the clause only bars review of the secretary’s “determination[s],” and that that’s not what they are challenging in these lawsuits. They are challenging, rather, the secretary’s failure to follow statutorily mandated procedures as she conducted her review. In their Supreme Court brief, the Doe plaintiffs write:

Concluding otherwise would contravene this Court’s precedent interpreting “determination” in immigration cases and elsewhere. ... Those cases read bars on reviewing “determination[s]” to preserve review of claims challenging the agency’s compliance with procedural requirements and its interpretation of statutes ....

Adopting Petitioners’ position would dangerously expand the Secretary’s power in contravention of the strong presumption favoring judicial review of agency action and core tenets of administrative law. It would allow Petitioners to expand and contract the rights of millions of people by executive fiat, subverting the framework Congress established to constrain executive discretion.

(The Doe plaintiffs’ case will be argued before the Court by Ahilan Arulanantham of the University of California, Los Angeles School of Law’s Center for Immigration Law and Policy.)

Every district judge who’s presided over a challenge to one of Noem’s TPS cancellations to date has found that this provision did not bar review of migrants’ claims. However, this past February, two members of a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did conclude, in the context of an emergency stay petition, that the government was likely to prevail on its claim that Noem’s terminations of TPS status for Honduras, Nepal, and Nicaragua were unreviewable.

Procedural Irregularities

All challenges to TPS terminations to date allege that Noem failed to follow the statute’s mandates in section 1254a(b)(3)(A) for carrying out periodic reviews. In their Supreme Court brief, the Miot plaintiffs write:

The statute requires the Secretary to consult with appropriate agencies of government; to review the conditions in the designated country; to determine, based on that country-specific assessment, whether the country’s nationals can return in safety; and to then explain the basis of her determination in the Federal Register. Here, the Secretary did none of these things. She did not consult with the State Department; she ignored the evidence in the administrative record; she based the termination on U.S. national interest, not the conditions in Haiti; and she offered only pretextual grounds for her determination.

(Geoffrey Pipoly of Bryan Cave will argue the Miot plaintiffs’ case before the Court. Pipoly and his partner, Andrew Tauber, previewed the case with Lawfare here and here.)

Indeed, the very fact that 13 of 13 TPS designations to come up for review have been terminated raises questions on its face about whether the country-specific reviews the statute calls for have, in fact, been carried out in good faith. How is it that conditions around the globe have so markedly and ubiquitously improved?

In terms of the procedural irregularities of Noem’s TPS terminations, Haiti’s experience is instructive. Noem first tried to end Haiti’s TPS status on Feb. 28, 2025, about a month after she took office. Though Haiti’s previous designation, by its terms, was not due to expire for another year—on Feb. 3, 2026—Noem purported to end the previous designation prematurely through a procedure she called “partial vacatur.” The TPS statute contains no clause authorizing “vacatur”—partial or otherwise. In the 25 years since the TPS statute was enacted, no previous secretary had attempted such a thing.

On Nov. 28, 2025, after two courts blocked Noem’s “partial vacatur” of Haiti’s TPS status, Noem published her intent to terminate Haiti’s TPS status on a more conventional schedule: at the end of the existing term, on Feb. 3, 2026. But when Judge Reyes instructed the government to identify all “consultation[s] with appropriate agencies” that had occurred, in accordance with Noem’s obligations under section 1254a(b)(3)(A), the government could come up with only a single email exchange—one that did not discuss country conditions at all.

“[The government] stated that it had not consulted with the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, State’s regional office or Haiti desk, or Congress in reaching her decision,” Reyes wrote in her February ruling, staying the termination. The single email exchange the government pointed to occurred on Sept. 5, 2025—eight months after Noem’s original “partial vacatur” announcement. That was the day, Reyes noted, that a different federal judge had invalidated Noem’s attempted “partial vacatur” of Haiti’s TPS designation. Reyes then described that email exchange:

[A] DHS staffer emailed a State staffer at 4:55 p.m.: “Due to the litigation, we are re-reviewing country conditions in Haiti based on the original TPS deadline. Can you advise on State’s views on the matter?” The State staffer responded within 53 minutes: “State believes that there would be no foreign policy concerns with respect to a change in the TPS statue of Haiti.”

This was it. The full extent of the supposed “consultation with appropriate agencies.” [Citations to the certified administrative record omitted.]

The government argues in its Supreme Court reply brief that this exchange was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s “consultation” requirement. “If an emergency-room doctor asked a neurologist for a consult, ... and the neurologist confirmed that he saw no issues, no one would question that consultation occurred—no matter the length of the response or whether the doctor told the neurologist what to consider,” it writes.

Still, the consultation here included no discussion of country conditions or whether nationals could safely return. The omission is horrifying on a humanitarian level.

Haiti’s TPS status was first granted in 2010, after a 7.0 earthquake. It was then repeatedly extended as a series of catastrophes ensued—more earthquakes, epidemics, famine, the assassination of the president, and, finally, the breakdown of civil government, resulting in a nation dominated by marauding, murderous, kidnapping, paramilitary gangs. At the time of Noem’s November 2025 termination, the State Department maintained—and still maintains today—a maximal, Level 4 “Do Not Travel” Advisory for Haiti:

Violent crime is rampant in Haiti, especially in Port-au-Prince. The expansion of gang, organized crime, and terrorist activity has led to widespread violence.

...

Crimes include robbery, carjackings, sexual assault and kidnappings for ransom.

The State Department advises those who must go to Haiti to “[p]repare a will and any last instructions.” On the topic of kidnapping, it says:

Choose one family member to serve as the point of contact. If you are kidnapped or taken hostage, that person can communicate with kidnappers or hostage-takers, media, U.S. or foreign government agencies, and members of Congress.

Establish a proof of life protocol with your loved ones. If you are kidnapped, your loved ones will know specific questions (and answers) to ask the kidnappers to confirm that you are being held captive and are alive.

The department further advises those traveling to Haiti to consult its guidelines for high-risk travel, which recommend leaving “DNA samples with your medical provider and dental records with your family in case it is necessary for your family to access them to identify your remains.”

Attorneys for the Haitians in Miot argue in their brief that these dangers are not speculative. They point to news reports that, in February, the decapitated bodies of four women recently deported from the United States were found dumped in a river.

In her published termination memo, Noem did not assert that the country was “safe” for its nationals to return to, but asserted, rather, that unidentified “parts” of the country were “suitable” for return. Noem’s termination also rested on a finding that it was in the “national interest” for Haitian TPS holders to return. The provision under which Haiti originally received its TPS designation in 2010 was the catchall provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C), which does take into account “national interest”:

The secretary, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the government, may designate any foreign state ... under this subsection only if ...

(C) [the secretary] finds that there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety, unless [the secretary] finds that permitting the aliens to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.

But the TPS statute does not list “national interest” anywhere as a basis for termination. The government argues, nevertheless, that the “national interest” factor  is effectively imported into the termination provisions via the statute’s requirement, in section 1254a(b)(3)(A), that the secretary, during periodic reviews, determine “whether the conditions for such designation ... continue to be met.”

The plaintiffs protest that section 1254a(b)(3)(A) also requires that the secretary “review the conditions in the [designated] foreign state.” (Emphasis added.) “Because U.S. national interest is not a condition ‘in’ a foreign state,” the Miot attorneys write in their Supreme Court brief, “it has no part in the periodic review process and is not a permissible basis to terminate a TPS designation.” Furthermore, it “makes sense,” they continue, that Congress would give the secretary greater discretion when granting a designation than when terminating it, given the “reliance interests” of the beneficiaries of these humanitarian programs. How could “national interest” justify sending longtime, vetted TPS-holders back to an unsafe country? (One of the named plaintiffs in the Miot case, a toxicology lab assistant with spinal tuberculosis, has been living in the United States for more than 30 years, and does not speak French or Creole, according to Reyes’s ruling.)

Certiorari Before Judgment

It appears that the government was eager to make the Dahlia Doe case, involving Syrians, its test case at the Supreme Court. Syria was a rare instance in which there was a story to tell—at least superficially—supporting the notion that country conditions had substantially improved since the designation was granted. As its petition for certiorari noted, the regime of dictator Hafez al-Assad had fallen in December 2024; President Trump met with the new leader, President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, in May 2025; and Trump had announced that he would be lifting sanctions against the country. 

Still, as Judge Failla later noted in granting a preliminary injunction against termination of Syria’s TPS status on Nov. 18, 2025, conditions do not yet appear to have markedly improved. The State Department’s “Do Not Travel” advisory for the country, for instance, was still in effect when Secretary Noem, in September 2025, published notice of her termination. The advisory warned that “No part of Syria is safe from violence” due to “terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping, hostage taking, and armed conflict.”

After Failla granted a stay of the termination, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the government’s emergency request to lift her stay in February, the government petitioned the Supreme Court not just for a stay, but for certiorari before judgment.

It was an extraordinary case in which to do so. Because of the compressed timeline—Syria’s TPS status was due to expire just days after the Nov. 18, 2025, preliminary injunction hearing—there was no written ruling at all. Judge Failla had ruled orally from the bench. For the same reason, there was no administrative record—the record showing what, if any, internal agency consultations and analysis had occurred prior to Noem’s termination decision. The government had successfully opposed the Syrian plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of one, citing the exigent timeline.

On March 10, after the Miot attorneys learned of the government’s petition in Doe, they filed a conditional petition for certiorari before judgment of their own. Although the plaintiffs opposed certiorari in either case—especially Doe, given the inchoate state of that record—they wanted the Haitians’ case to be consolidated if the Supreme Court did grant certiorari in Doe. The next day, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court for an emergency stay in the Miot case, seeking certiorari before judgment there, too. On March 16, the Court granted certiorari in both cases.

That the Supreme Court was willing to grant certiorari before judgment in Doe—a case consisting of just an oral ruling with no administrative record—might mean that at least four justices (the number required to grant certiorari) believe the case can be decided on the basis of the jurisdiction-limiting clause alone.

If so, then the equal protection claims in these cases—the ones that have the best chance of surviving that clause—loom large.

(On March 14, Failla did order the government—over its objection—to file an administrative record. The “consultations with appropriate agencies” in that case, it turns out, also consisted of a single email exchange.)

Equal Protection Claims

In Miot, Judge Reyes focused on the statements and actions of both Trump and Noem in concluding that the termination was motivated, at least in part, by racial or ethnic animus.

President Trump has made—freely, at times even boastfully—several derogatory statements about Haitians and other nonwhite foreigners. To start, he has repeatedly invoked racist tropes of national purity, declaring that “illegal immigrants”—a category he wrongly assigns to Haitian TPS holders—are “poisoning the blood” of America. ... He has, Plaintiffs allege, complained that recently admitted nonwhite Africans would “never ‘go back to their huts’ in Africa.” ...  He has complained further that nonwhite immigration is an “invasion,” creating a “dumping ground” that is “destroying our country.” ... He has described immigrants as “not people,” ... “snakes,” ... , and “garbage” ... who have “bad genes” .... He has also stated that he prefers immigrants from “nice”—predominantly white—countries like Norway, Sweden, and Denmark over immigrants from “shithole countries” .... 

President Trump has referred to Haiti as a “shithole country,” suggested Haitians “probably have AIDS,” and complained that Haitian immigration is “like a death wish for our country.” ... He has also promoted the false conspiracy theory that Haitian immigrants were “eating the pets of the people” in Springfield, Ohio. ...  About two weeks after the Termination, he again described Haiti as a “filthy, dirty, [and] disgusting” “shithole country.” ... He stated: “I have also announced a permanent pause on Third World migration, including from hellholes like Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia and many other countries.” ... Then continued, “Why is it we only take people from shithole countries, right? Why cannot we have some people from Norway, Sweden, just a few, let us have a few, from Denmark.” ...

Plaintiffs allege that after taking office, putting words to practice, “President Trump made his preference for white immigrants the official policy of the United States.” ... On the one hand, his administration eliminated “the lawful immigration status not only of Haitians but of immigrants from other predominantly nonwhite countries.” ... On the other, it “gave special priority” to white South African immigrants, admitting them into the United States as refugees. ... And, of course, Plaintiffs further allege that President Trump targeted the TPS designations of nonwhite countries. He described utilizing the TPS program as “a certain little trick,” and groused that TPS recipients “are illegal immigrants as far as [he is] concerned.” [Citations omitted.]

***

Plaintiffs claim President Trump made numerous derogatory statements about nonwhite immigrants, and Haitians particularly, close in time to Secretary Noem’s three TPS decisions about Haiti. ... In June 2025, the same month as Secretary Noem’s second action, President Trump instituted a travel ban that imposed visa restrictions on 19 countries—including Haiti—each of which is predominantly nonwhite. ... [In December,] ... he allegedly “called nonwhite Somali immigrants—and Somalian U.S. Rep. Ilhan Omar, an American citizen—‘garbage.’” ... Echoing his previous comments that Haitians are undesirable because they come from a “shithole country,” President Trump said that Somali immigrants “come from hell and they complain and do nothing but bitch, we don’t want them in our country.” Id. These are just a few of many examples.

The Government contends that Plaintiffs take the derogatory statements out of context. ... But, whatever the context and at whatever level of sensitivity one considers them, the statements are what they are: unmitigated expressions of animus towards nonwhite foreigners.

With respect to Noem, Reyes relied largely on Noem’s frequent public statements averring that she was following Trump’s directives. But Noem’s own statements “reinforce[d] the inference of racial animus,” Reyes concluded. She was particularly troubled by Noem’s X post of Dec. 1, 2025, just three days after her Nov. 28 termination notice for Haitian TPS status: 

I just met with the President.

I am recommending a full travel ban on every damn country that's been flooding our nation with killers, leeches, and entitlement junkies.

Our forefathers built this nation on blood, sweat, and the unyielding love of freedom—not for foreign…

— Secretary Kristi Noem (@EnvoyNoem) December 1, 2025

Reyes concluded:

Secretary Noem has described Haitians—and people from eighteen other nonwhite countries—as “leeches,” “entitlement junkies,” and “foreign invaders” who “suck dry our hard-earned tax dollars,” and has expressly claimed that “WE DON’T WANT THEM. NOT ONE.” … Plaintiffs allege that she separately accused TPS holders of being “poorly vetted migrants” who include “MS-13 gang members to known terrorists and murderers.”

Though a closer call, even if the Court ignored President Trump’s statements altogether, Secretary Noem’s expressed animus towards nonwhite foreigners would support a stay.

The government argues that neither Trump’s nor Noem’s statements suffice to show that Noem’s termination of Haiti’s TPS designation was motivated, at least in part, by racial animus.

None [of the statements] involves race; many were made before the election; and most have nothing to do with TPS. ... Such “statements—remote in time and made in unrelated contexts—. . . fail to raise a plausible inference that” any determination “was motivated by animus.” . . . The only comments respondents cite that are “explicitly tied to the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation” ... are benign statements that Haiti’s TPS designation would be terminated and that TPS extensions would not “be allowed . . .  going forward the way that they [we]re” under the prior Administration. ...

Miot respondents further err by relying ... almost exclusively on statements by the President. Those statements do not suggest racial animus on their own terms. Moreover, respondents identify no workable theory under which they could impute the President’s supposed animus to the Secretary.

In the TPS cases, there is no question that the Supreme Court will make a momentous ruling on the meaning and breadth of the statute’s jurisdiction-limiting clause. That ruling will likely reverberate outside the context of TPS cases. The immigration laws are strewn with jurisdiction-stripping clauses. Many cases now being litigated over Trump administration actions—including novel policies for removing noncitizens to third countries or removals that may be intended to punish First Amendment-protected speech—have led to disputes over the proper interpretation of such jurisdiction-limiting provisions as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(9) or 1252(b)(5) or 1252(f)(1). The Court’s ruling in Doe and Miot is likely to have widespread spillover effects in hundreds of other immigration cases that federal courts are now grappling with. 

But even confining its impact to the TPS cases, the ruling will be momentous. Assuming it finds that some claims are barred, it seems likely that the equal protection claims will survive. If so, that may leave additional difficult line-drawing questions for the lower courts. Agency decisions that are motivated by racial animus are, almost by definition, “arbitrary and capricious,” “contrary to law,” and “beyond statutory authority.” The migrants’ procedural objections have been intertwined—almost inextricably—with their equal protection claims.

On the other hand, if the Court rules entirely for the government in these cases, effectively ordering dismissals of the TPS challenges, the resulting humanitarian calamity would be incalculable and unconscionable.