Risks to NATO Food Security in the Age of Hybrid Threats

NATO has long been concerned with the weaponization of food, such as aid blockades, market manipulation, and attacks on physical infrastructure to achieve broader political or geopolitical goals. Today, however, those risks are expanding into the digital and biological domains. Modern agriculture increasingly relies on networked technologies such as drones, sensors, and blockchain-based supply chains that improve efficiency but create new vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. Food systems are increasingly vulnerable to what NATO defines as hybrid threats—those that blur the line between war and peace by combining cyber operations, economic coercion, disinformation, and sabotage.

In response to growing concerns about such an uncertain geopolitical environment, NATO is redoubling its emphasis on resilience as a core pillar of collective security. Yet the full range of food systems threats remains underexamined. If resilience is meant to ensure that societies can withstand and recover from disruption, then food security—both within NATO countries and across the global supply chains they depend on—must be treated as a central component, not a peripheral concern, of the alliance’s hybrid threat posture.

The digital transformation of agriculture has been rapid and uneven. From automated feeding systems and precision agriculture to artificial intelligence-driven yield optimization and real-time logistics data, new technologies promise greater resilience and profitability for farmers across both the Global North and South. Yet as NATO has warned repeatedly in other critical infrastructure sectors, increased connectivity without adequate security creates new vulnerabilities. Agrifood supply chains are no exception.

Cyber risks amplify long-standing structural weaknesses in the food system. Much of the sector depends on aging infrastructure that was not designed to withstand modern cyber threats. Coordination remains limited between food producers, cybersecurity experts, and national security institutions—mirroring the very civil-military and public-private gaps NATO has sought to close through its resilience and preparedness agenda. At the same time, chokepoints exist throughout the food value chain, from processing facilities and cold storage to transportation and distribution networks.

The consequences of disruption could be profound. A cyberattack that manipulates storage temperatures could spoil vast quantities of food. A ransomware attack on a major distributor could halt deliveries to hospitals, schools, or entire regions. These are not theoretical scenarios. In recent years, major producers and distributors—including JBS Foods, Hood Dairy, Dole, and Sysco—have all suffered cyberattacks, in some cases incurring millions of dollars in costs to restore operations. While many of these attacks were carried out by private-sector actors, the FBI has confirmed that foreign entities are trying to disrupt the U.S. agriculture industry, opening the door for hostile foreign actors like Russia to leverage these vulnerabilities in the future.

The pace of these attacks is accelerating. In the United States alone, 40 cyber incidents were reported in the agrifood sector in 2024’s first quarter, a stark uptick from a decade prior, when reported incidents were in the single digits. For NATO allies, many of which share integrated food markets and rely on transatlantic and global supply chains, such disruptions would not stop at national borders. In an era of hybrid warfare, food systems present an attractive target for both non-state actors and state adversaries seeking to impose economic pain, undermine public trust, and exploit societal vulnerabilities below the threshold of armed conflict.

At the same time, modern biological threats compound these risks. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, NATO and allied governments have become more attuned to the security implications of biological hazards. Yet attention has focused primarily on human health, leaving agricultural systems comparatively exposed. Pests, plant pathogens, and zoonotic diseases are becoming more frequent and more severe, threatening food production and economic stability. Climate change is accelerating these trends, allowing diseases and invasive species to spread into new regions—often faster than regulatory or surveillance systems can adapt.

Within allied governments, responsibilities for addressing these risks remain fragmented. Defense establishments, including those involved in NATO planning, have long considered biological threats in the context of force protection. Civilian agencies, such as agriculture ministries, increasingly warn about agroterrorism—the deliberate spread of plant or animal diseases to disrupt food supplies and erode public confidence. Yet these communities rarely operate from a shared threat picture, leaving critical gaps in prevention, detection, and response. A recent study by one of this article’s authors found that approaches to food security among NATO member states are often siloed, and many member states lack their own institutional coordination mechanisms to address the nexus of climate, food, and national security threats across ministries.

Hybrid threats thrive in the seams between sectors and jurisdictions. Food systems sit at the intersection of multiple vulnerabilities: climate stress, technological dependence, complex global supply chains, and limited cross-sector expertise. The workforce and policymaking communities responsible for protecting these systems often lack training at the nexus of food security, cyber risk, and biological threats. Meanwhile, the stakeholders involved—from farmers and food companies to intelligence services and militaries—have little experience working together.

Now is the right moment for NATO to update its resilience agenda to address this gap. Currently, NATO has seven baseline resilience requirements for member states, including food and water resilience. Yet these requirements were adopted in 2016 and do not reflect the current threat landscape. Ensuring food security in today’s world will require breaking down silos between civilian and security institutions, investing in cybersecurity and biosecurity, and integrating food systems into national and alliance-level risk assessments. Resilience is not only about tanks, networks, or power grids. It is also about ensuring that societies can function under the pressure posed by new technologies and security risks.

To ensure their own stability, NATO member states must also continue to invest in global food systems. This should include supporting adaptation to extreme weather and climate shocks in environments outside Europe and North America, and sharing cyber and biosecurity best practices with other regions. Such investments can help prevent bad actors from using food as leverage over other countries to discourage opposition in international and multilateral fora, as Russia did with African countries regarding the Ukraine war.

In the 21st century, food is no longer just sustenance. In the context of hybrid warfare, it is also a strategic vulnerability and, if adequately protected, a source of collective strength. NATO’s renewed focus on resilience and hybrid threats offers an opportunity to act before food systems become the next front line.