Inside Trump’s Second-Term National Security Strategy

What does “America First” look like in national security? Though the recently released Trump second-term National Security Strategy (NSS) is not a complete strategy—but then again, the NSSs never are—the document nevertheless provides some clues. Border security is the primary element of national security, according to the strategy, because mass migration is the principal threat to national security. The document makes clear that the sovereignty of our nation is paramount, even while it advocates “cultivating resistance” in European nations to their “current trajectories.”

Although the NSS accurately states that a “‘strategy’ is a concrete, realistic plan that explains the “essential connection between ends and means,” it doesn’t meet the standards of its own test by failing to connect its list of “ends” to its list of “means” in a coherent way. It also doesn’t explicitly prioritize the priorities it articulates—it just provides a list of five concepts. (Perhaps they’re in priority order? It doesn’t say.) On the other hand, the NSS is clear about which regions are most important, with the Western Hemisphere taking priority for the first time in a long time, following a sphere of influence approach with some major exceptions.

The strategy admits it has a purposefully narrower focus, and as a result, a shorter time horizon than previous NSSs: the United States is only concerned about the affairs of countries if their activities “directly threaten our interests.” There is no focus on indirect threats that may later threaten American interests, much less on building or maintaining a stable international system for long-term security.

The NSS does provide some concrete details on how this administration thinks about America’s place in the world. The document may only be 33 pages, but there are many novel one-liners and potentially conflicting concepts that warrant analysis in more detail than is possible here. However, three key questions provide a substantial overview of the America First foreign policy, demonstrate crucial gaps, and identify striking differences from previous NSSs

What is America at Its Core, and What Needs to Be Protected?

Although the NSS is a national security and foreign policy document, it provides valuable insight into how the administration defines America’s essence and what it seeks to defend. The new NSS presents a more limited conception of America than its recent predecessors. It implicitly narrows who may count as the subject of protection through references to traditional families, merit, and economic participation. This normative baseline does more than describe national identity; it sets the standard by which policy choices and exercise of government power will be justified.

From a national security perspective, understanding how the administration views America at its core is critical to understanding how it views threats to that central ideal and which strategies it will prioritize to protect America. A key phrase emphasizes a desire for “the continued survival and safety of the United States as an independent, sovereign republic whose government secures the God-given natural rights of its citizens and prioritizes their well-being and interests” (emphasis added). This is a unique NSS statement about the purpose of government in the United States, particularly given the focus on God-given natural rights rather than rights granted by the state. Protection of core rights and liberties is listed as the second of five of the administration’s priorities and uses a similar phrase—the purpose of the American government is to secure “God-given natural rights” of American citizens. It goes on to say that “to this end, departments and agencies of the United States Government have been granted fearsome powers” (unclear if this means the powers granted by God or the Constitution) and that those powers “must never be abused.” The focus, however—here and elsewhere—is on God-given rights.

The 2017 Trump NSS, which reads “[t]he Constitution grants our national government not only specified powers necessary to protect our God-given rights and liberties but also safeguards them,” makes a similar argument, although with greater emphasis on the Constitution. To be fair, Obama’s 2015 NSS does not mention the Constitution and instead focuses on “universal values” (although his 2010 NSS repeatedly invokes the Constitution, at one point saying that staying true to our values and Constitution is our “lodestar”). In sum, the current NSS makes clear the purpose of the American republic is to ensure God-given rights are protected.

In another section, the NSS asserts that America stands for “competence and merit” instead of “radical ideologies” that grant favored-group status. This is likely meant as a criticism of diversity, equity, and inclusion, as well as adjacent concepts such as critical race theory. But on its face, the logic would not only apply to progressive frameworks but would equally apply to exclusionary ideologies that privilege or exclude individuals on the basis of race or ethnicity, such as white nationalism. The scope of this competence and merit, however, is limited. It explicitly clarifies that it is about Americans, not supporting the finding or recruiting of meritorious and competent people from other countries.

While the NSS clarifies it is about Americans, this does not necessarily mean all Americans, but rather a subset of them. It states the country needs “growing numbers of strong, traditional families.” While it does not define “traditional,” the current administration tends to focus on families with heterosexual, married parents based on Christian values. For example, in a October 2024 virtual fireside chat, then-candidate Trump said “the family is really the foundation of a prosperous and good society” and “we believe that faith in God and our Judeo-Christian values are essential to a healthy American society.”

The NSS also states that the administration has a policy preference for gainfully employed citizens, with “no one sitting on the sidelines.” This is presumably a reference to recipients of food stamps, unemployment, disability, and possibly even Social Security benefits—all of which the administration has consistently criticized.​ Note his previous NSS instead used the phrase “unleashing the potential of all Americans.”

American values regularly play a crucial role in the NSS, although the specific definition of values may vary some from NSS to NSS. Obama’s 2010 NSS emphasized respect for universal values at home and around the world. And Obama’s 2015 NSS focused on living “our values at home while promoting universal values abroad,” integrating this ethos into the strategy and claiming that “defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest.” A section titled “Values” takes up four of the 32 pages of Obama’s 2010 NSS. The first pillar in Trump’s 2017 NSS includes protecting “the American way of life” which is not explicitly defined but includes “protected free press, free speech, and free thought,” ​​a commitment to “protecting the rights and dignity of every citizen,” and a history of defeating “fascism, imperialism, and Soviet communism” which “eliminated any doubts about the power and durability of republican democracy when it is sustained by a free, proud, and unified people.”

What Are the Threats?

Unlike previous NSSs, this document provides neither a clear pacing threat (a systemic threat to the United States that challenges America economically, technologically, politically and militarily and sets the speed and focus of our capability building) nor a list of prioritized, explicit threats. Notably absent is any framework for great power competition or strategic competition with China or Russia. China is not mentioned until page 23, Russia until page 29, and Iran until page 32 (excluding an early reference to the president’s purported role in ending the Israel-Iran conflict). North Korea is entirely omitted. While some concerns related to China—such as foreign ownership of key assets in the Western Hemisphere and threats to vital sea lanes—appear earlier, they are not developed as central threats, more so economic challenges for the United States. Terrorism is addressed only briefly: The NSS advises wariness of resurging Islamist terrorist activity in Africa, calls for hemispheric cooperation against narco-terrorists (using a debatable definition of terrorism), and includes a broad mandate to protect against invasion by unchecked migration and other cross-border threats like terrorism, drugs, espionage, and human trafficking.

This is a monumental shift from previous NSSs. Biden’s 2022 NSS explicitly names China as the pacing challenge for the U.S. military, and lists outcompeting China and constraining Russia as top priorities. Trump’s previous NSS outlined three sets of challengers—“the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups.”

Yet, for the current Trump administration, the dominant threat is mass migration. According to the NSS, mass migration strains domestic resources, increases violence and other crime, weakens social cohesion, distorts labor markets, and undermines national security. The document does not articulate exactly how it undermines national security nor how it constitutes a primary threat to America. Related issues, such as drugs or human trafficking, are presented as cross-border dangers but are listed as cross-border threats in addition to “unchecked migration.” While control of one’s borders is a non-controversial national security interest, and Trump’s 2017 NSS listed it as the top priority, the reader is forced to infer that migrants increase crime and weaken social cohesion (assuming demographic shifts) and therefore present a paramount security risk, without providing a substantive analytical argument explaining why such changes eclipse other homeland concerns—such as threats to critical infrastructure or the risk of major terrorist attacks. The NSS simply asserts this priority, leaving the reader without the necessary logical bridge to justify the focus on migration.

This stance is especially noteworthy given America’s historical identity as a nation of immigrants, aside from its Native American populations. The NSS’s framing suggests a particular concern with non-European migration. Notably, its goal is not confined to curbing “illegal” immigration, but rather to reducing mass migration of all kinds on the grounds that migration “weaken[s] social cohesion”—a rationale that rests on the assumption that newcomers differ fundamentally from existing citizens. This is strikingly different from Trump’s 2017 NSS, which states “[t]he United States understands the contributions immigrants have made to our Nation throughout its history. Illegal immigration, however, burdens the economy, hurts American workers, presents public safety risks, and enriches smugglers and other criminals.”

Further discussion of mass migration appears in the section on Europe. Although the prospect of additional Russian aggression is acknowledged, the NSS centers its attention on the “stark prospect of civilizational erasure.” The implication is that non-European immigrants could erode European culture and potentially undermine alliances with the United States. It argues that current migration policies make it far from obvious that certain European countries will have strong enough economies and militaries to remain reliable allies—but the direct link between migration and decreasing economic and military power is assumed rather than explained.

The NSS elevates mass migration to the primary national security challenge and relegates strategic competition, terrorism, and other traditional threats to secondary status. This is not simply a reordering of threats; it’s a reconceptualization of “national security threat” that brings sociocultural debates on demographic change, social cohesion, and implications for state strength to the fore.

What Are We Offering?

As other analysts have noted, this NSS rejects the idea that a common set of values will unite U.S. allies and partners or bring new allies or partners into our sphere of influence. It does state that the United States has unrivaled soft power, but the document appears to focus primarily on economics and markets. Alliances except for Europe (with which we have cultural affinity)are purely matters of economic interests. The strategy does not touch on traditional elements of U.S. soft power—international organizations (which it states need to be reformed to support state sovereignty), State Department diplomacy (primarily mentioned to identify business opportunities and help American companies succeed), aid (focused more on transitioning away from aid), media, etc., all of which have lost support and funding at varying levels since the administration began.

The NSS assumes the United States will remain the “global partner of first choice” simply because of free-market capitalism, openness, transparency, and commitment to freedom and innovation. The issue is that without common values or an international system in which they are protected, and unless economic incentives align, there is no reason for other states to assist or accept U.S. interests.

The new NSS implicitly recognizes that the United States may lose some influence by generally conforming to a spheres-of-influence approach to foreign affairs, with the United States having primacy in the Western Hemisphere, albeit with recognition of some important exceptions. Terrorist activity, for one, transcends regional confines. Additionally, the administration recognizes the need to keep adversaries from “dominating the Middle East” and chokepoints in the Middle East and “crucial sea lanes” in the Indo-Pacific. Specifically, it claims “foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country,” but the truth is that “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.” This is a fairly drastic shift from previous NSSs that argued that America must act as a global leader in a global system. For example, Obama’s 2015 NSS stated that it “affirms America’s leadership role within a rules-based international order.” Even Trump’s 2017 NSS claimed that “[w]e learned the difficult lesson that when America does not lead, malign actors fill the void to the disadvantage of the United States.”

Trump’s new NSS explicitly rejects “the ill-fated concept of global domination for itself” but also strives to prevent the “global, and in some cases even regional, domination of others.” Specific to China, the 2025 framework for engagement appears to aim to create a mutually advantageous economic relationship with China, while criticizing previous economic efforts aimed at bringing China into our rules-based order as failures. While it is accurate that earlier efforts were unsuccessful, it is not clear that allowing China to advance its own order (even if only regional) will yield a better national security outcome for the United States. How can the United States cede power in the Indo-Pacific to China while also “keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes, and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical materials” (which are core national interests according to the document)?

The role of economics (access to our markets and financial systems) and the private sector are among the primary tools this administration plans to use to influence other countries. In Africa, the NSS states there will be “no long-term American presence or commitments.” Perhaps this means no U.S. government long-term involvement and instead, engagement with private industry. It's not clear. The U.S. government will focus on “rebalancing global trade relationships”;the NSS notably argues that bets on “free trade” were “hugely misguided and destructive.”

In the section on the Western Hemisphere, the NSS states, “[e]very U.S. Government official that interacts with these countries should understand that part of their job is to help American companies compete and succeed.” Regrettably, the NSS makes an assumption crucial to its strategy that U.S. business interests will always align with U.S. interests. This is simply not true. Private investment in some countries may be low due to concerns about corruption and a weak rule of law, or it may simply not make economic sense, even if the United States wants a stronger relationship with said country for national security reasons. The NSS says nothing about the means by which the government will address this mismatch in interests.

The NSS also emphasizes deterrence, highlighting the need for the most powerful, lethal, and technologically advanced military and a credible nuclear deterrent. Some form of deterrence has been a steadfast component of previous NSSs. We might expect a less prominent role for deterrence with this NSS's narrower national interest focus and a predisposition toward “non-interventionism.” Although the NSS states it has a “focused definition of national interest,” it doesn’t actually provide a single definition but does provide five bullets that contain core national interests, with quite a few elements contained in each (listed above in the “what are we trying to protect” section).

This NSS predisposition towards non-intervention is based not on a rules-based international system under the United Nations Charter, but instead on the idea that the “laws of nature and nature’s God” provide a separate but equal station for all nations. However, the NSS also has a stated priority of preventing regional disputes from spiraling into global wars. This may end up being an easy lift, with one section stating the “resources required boil down to presidential diplomacy” and that it will require “relatively minor costs of time and attention.” Yet later, the NSS states that these negotiations involve both military might and economic leverage, which—if not bolstered by credible threats—will not be successful. As a result, there is a lack of clarity on when and how the United States will intervene around the world.

In sum, the NSS marks a shift from global leadership to one of transactionalism. Acknowledging the need for soft power without addressing previous decisions to make significant cuts to these capabilities, the NSS ends up relying primarily on economics and deterrence. Yet it leaves unresolved how exactly the United States will respond to interest divergence between the U.S. government and American companies or among its allies and partners, nor how it will credibly prevent instability without convincing commitments to engage.

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NSSs are never fully articulated strategies. So it’s not surprising that this NSS offers a vision of America’s security priorities but leaves key questions unanswered on prioritization of threats and the means the government will use to achieve its goals. The National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy are still forthcoming and will likely provide more answers to the above questions. However, the elements available now are markedly different from previous NSSs, including those from President Trump’s first administration, and paint a stark vision of America. One day, the United States will have to reckon with these conflicting views of itself.