Key Questions to Prevent Enrichment and Verify Compliance
Editor’s Note: The Trump administration has put forward an unprecedented nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, which has unclear verification procedures and protections against enrichment. As Congress reviews the agreement, Logan Mintz of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and MIT’s Matthew Sharp detail a series of questions that must be answered before the agreement is allowed to go through.
Daniel Byman
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The U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement that the Trump administration has just delivered to Congress falls short of two key nonproliferation standards: At Saudi insistence, it does not outright prohibit Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium domestically, nor does it require the strongest international verification standard—the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Additional Protocol (AP). The omission of these standards is at the core of opposition to the deal from some nonproliferation champions, who argue that it “compromises essential nonproliferation guardrails.”
Some proponents of civil nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia contend that rigid insistence around the norm of including the AP and barring domestic enrichment in civil nuclear agreements (also known as 123 agreements) can be self-defeating if it makes cooperation—and therefore the expansion of U.S. influence—impossible. Alternatives to these long-standing norms are possible, but they should be pursued only if they are better than the existing standard. We are open to the argument made by supporters of the U.S.-Saudi deal that its provision of a two-year study on the viability of enrichment and a bilateral verification arrangement are a strong alternative to the two norms the deal does not include, but these claims require validation and depend on how the deal is implemented.
During Congress’s 90-day review of the deal, legislators should ask deliberate questions to determine whether the agreement credibly contains the spread of enrichment and implements the highest standards of verification. We have suggested some questions here. If the answers are not credible, then the deal risks weakening the global regime that has for decades prevented the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons. The situation in Iran is just the latest example of how an indigenous enrichment program without robust safeguards can exacerbate regional tensions and ensnare U.S. resources.
Containing the Spread of Enrichment
Historically, the United States has sought to contain the spread of enrichment technology because it is one of the main pathways for acquiring a nuclear weapon. A country with enrichment technology inherently has a latent nuclear weapons capability, and most of the 14 countries in the world that have enrichment facilities also have nuclear weapons. Providing enrichment technology to Saudi Arabia would set a dangerous precedent, especially as the United States pursues 19 more 123 agreements by the end of 2028, potentially with countries as diverse as Ghana and Malaysia.
Some experts worry that by pursuing a strict position on enrichment the United States could turn off potential partners and give them reason to consider more permissive suppliers like Russia or China, but this concern may be overblown. Both countries bundle enriched fuel as part of their reactor sales and have little incentive to encourage indigenous programs. And neither was able to woo Saudi Arabia away from the United States with the promise of less stringent nonproliferation requirements during the decade of U.S.-Saudi negotiations.
How does the agreement prevent Saudi Arabia from enriching on its own or with another partner?
Most 123 agreements do not outright ban enrichment but require prior consent from Washington before using U.S. material and equipment for enriching. The Saudi 123 similarly requires prior consent, and this reportedly (although not explicit in the public text) takes the form of a two-year study—the Joint Enrichment and Conversion Study (JECS)—on whether a “black box” enrichment facility is commercially viable in the kingdom. In this scenario, a black box facility would be constructed in the kingdom, but a U.S. entity would own and operate it. Such a setup would provide Riyadh with the enriched uranium product, but not the sensitive technology to produce it.
One weakness of the traditional “prior consent” standard is that it usually does not foreclose the risk that countries could pursue enrichment from non-U.S. sources. The Saudi deal may do just that by requiring Riyadh to partner exclusively with Washington. If the United States is the exclusive and indefinite, and not just preferred, partner for Saudi nuclear imports, this arrangement would set an admirable precedent by placing the Saudi decision to enrich squarely in U.S. hands. With non-U.S. alternatives off limits, a study concluding that a U.S. black box facility is inadvisable could rule out enrichment in Saudi Arabia entirely. While the best-case scenario from a nonproliferation perspective would be a deal that bans enrichment in the kingdom altogether, such a conclusion would be the next best option. The administration should clarify the exclusivity of this partnership so that the deal can be properly evaluated on its ability to constrain the spread of proliferation-sensitive technology.
Will the JECS include participants who can appropriately weigh the risks and benefits of enrichment in Saudi Arabia?
The JECS will drive the long-term proliferation consequences of the deal, so its composition and structure are critical. The study should include representatives who can contribute a balance of commercial and noncommercial input: U.S. and Saudi industry leaders, including U.S. enrichment companies and reactor developers and Saudi utilities and mining companies, and international experts on uranium markets, geologic deposits, and safeguards from the Nuclear Energy Agency and IAEA.
This is not the first time that the United States has incorporated a fuel cycle study into a 123 agreement. The United States has the experience of its 123 agreement with South Korea, which included a preexisting, well-defined, Joint Fuel Cycle Study (JFCS) that drew on a wide range of technical experts and government officials and addressed Seoul’s interest in acquiring reprocessing technology.
If the JECS recommends moving forward with a U.S. black box facility in Saudi Arabia, what mechanisms would prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring enrichment technology?
The U.S.-Saudi JECS, like the U.S.-Korean JFCS, should examine the proliferation and security risks of enrichment. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, “we will have to get one.” Any evaluation of a black box facility should consider the possibility that Saudi Arabia illicitly acquires this sensitive capability through espionage, technology leakage, or unsanctioned spread of expertise by cleared U.S. operators. The A.Q. Khan network demonstrated the stakes of leaks from enrichment facilities—they laid the groundwork for nuclear weapons programs in Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Even if the black box facility functions under the best of circumstances, a force majeure, such as a regime change or breakdown in U.S.-Saudi relations, could jeopardize containment of the technology. What would prevent Riyadh from using a threat to break open the black box as a bargaining chip for other matters?
To that end, a study should investigate how to safeguard a black box facility in the kingdom. The black box facility would undoubtedly fall under Saudi Arabia’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but Riyadh may have to rely on the facility’s U.S. operator to provide the IAEA with sensitive enrichment information. The costs of this U.S. involvement and the IAEA’s efforts will need to be detailed. The JECS should highlight more controls than just IAEA safeguards.
The study should also investigate the adequacy of controls to prevent the transfer of technology to Saudi Arabia and the extent to which these restrictions could compromise the economic viability of the effort, the specific technology and equipment to be controlled (possibly including maintenance systems, process software, and instrumentation), and where replacement parts would be manufactured, how they would be acquired and installed, and who would cover their costs. Implementing both the IAEA safeguards and black-box-specific controls will drive up the operating costs of this facility, potentially weakening the case for commercial viability.
To what extent will the JECS consider how a U.S. enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia could exacerbate regional instability?
Riyadh may be committed to nonproliferation, but the study should assess how an enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia could provoke attacks from state or non-state actors in the region. The current conflict with Iran has shown Tehran’s willingness to strike key Saudi locations, and the Houthis are no stranger to targeting Saudi energy infrastructure. Saudi Arabia may not have malign intent regarding its enrichment ambitions, but it only takes the perception of a nuclear hedge to heighten regional tensions and prompt preemptive action.
The United Arab Emirates’ 123 agreement allows reconsideration of its prohibition on domestic enrichment in certain circumstances. Most other countries in the region have not yet negotiated a 123 agreement, so their ability to enrich is unrestricted. Efforts to constrain Iranian enrichment remain very much an open question. If Riyadh is allowed to enrich, it could spur a race to a nuclear hedge in the region.
Will the JECS consider the extent to which it is cost-competitive for Saudi Arabia to host the full fuel cycle—including enrichment and conversion—compared to obtaining materials and services on the international market?
To be sufficiently comprehensive, the study should investigate the claims of significant uranium deposits on which the Saudi government has predicated its enrichment goals—and clarify the amount, concentration, and grade of uranium that can be recovered economically. From there, the JECS should assess the scale and timeline of domestic fuel demand, break-even utilization rate, and price competitiveness against the international market. If energy security is a real motivation for domestic enrichment, true independence would require mining, milling, conversion, and fuel fabrication capabilities, too. The study should assess the expected capital investment, rate of return, and cost-competitiveness versus the international market on these fuel cycle activities as well.
How determinative is the conclusion of the JECS?
Regardless of the conclusion, a study may still allow for additional deliberations regarding the future of enrichment in the kingdom. After 10 years, the JFCS found that further exploration was needed, and the United States has not approved reprocessing in South Korea to date. In the Saudi case, the United States and others in the international community could demonstrate alternatives to enrichment on Saudi territory, such as equity in U.S. companies operating in the United States or relying on other fuel arrangements.
Meeting Practical Verification Objectives
The second key nonproliferation norm for 123 agreements involves verification. The United States has long advocated for strong verification, and since the 1990s, the AP has been the international and U.S. standard. The AP was negotiated as an amendment to comprehensive safeguards agreements to allow credible verification of undeclared nuclear activities, after Iraq and North Korea proved comprehensive safeguards agreements were inadequate for this purpose.
A few holdout states, including Saudi Arabia, have been reluctant to sign an AP, in part because of the intrusive access it affords to IAEA inspectors. The kingdom’s resistance to the AP has been a persistent impediment to a U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement. U.S. negotiators seem to have navigated Saudi concerns by replacing the AP with a separate, bilateral verification provision. Congress will need to assess how this bilateral agreement compares to the AP in its nonproliferation assurances for detecting an undeclared nuclear weapons program.
Does the U.S.-Saudi deal’s bilateral safeguards provision include a legal obligation for Saudi Arabia to provide all information required by the AP to the IAEA?
The AP requires a state to provide the IAEA with reports on its import of sensitive equipment components, uranium mining, and research and development work. The bilateral agreement also requires provision of information to the IAEA, often in strikingly similar terms. It is important to place side by side the information requirements under the bilateral safeguards agreement and the AP, both in terms of the specific information required and the scope across the Saudi program where that requirement applies. Where there are gaps, the verification implications should be explained.
Does the U.S.-Saudi agreement provide the IAEA with the legal authorities and modalities to routinely inspect undeclared locations?
Saudi Arabia’s existing comprehensive safeguards agreement provides the IAEA the authority to conduct routine or ad-hoc visits to declared nuclear sites. A “special inspection” authority with potentially broader scope is also contained in that agreement, although it is used much more rarely. But even the most expansive implementation of the inspection tools provided by Saudi Arabia’s comprehensive safeguards agreement is not a replacement for the AP’s access authorities regarding undeclared activities.
The AP provides the IAEA with additional access to places outside of declared nuclear facilities to pursue any undeclared nuclear activities with appropriate tools, such as environmental sampling. The AP’s access authorities proved essential in the case of Iran, where the IAEA detected traces of nuclear material at undeclared locations. In the Saudi case, the bilateral agreement provides some AP-like access provisions, but it is not clear whether those authorities will extend the IAEA’s reach outside of declared nuclear sites. This should be evaluated.
How are IAEA verification measures under the bilateral safeguards agreement made enforceable?
The fact that the IAEA is not a party to the U.S.-Saudi bilateral safeguards agreement that accompanied the 123 agreement could pose authority and enforcement challenges. To implement verification measures contained in the bilateral agreement, inspectors will require instruction from the IAEA’s Board of Governors, a fact acknowledged by IAEA officials and the text of the agreement.
The administration should be asked to explain its strategy for gaining the necessary support from the Board of Governors’ 35 members, which include China and Russia. Traditional safeguards agreements or the AP, to which the IAEA is a party, are made enforceable through procedures for reporting compliance problems to the board and, where necessary, curtailing cooperation or referring an issue to the UN Security Council. The threat of these procedures backs up every IAEA request and presses a state to fully cooperate.
Absent the IAEA’s direct participation in the agreement, it is not clear where such accountability and enforcement procedures will come from in this case. A good answer to this question is important to the credibility of the bilateral agreement, in terms of its own nonproliferation value and that of any other future bilateral arrangements that follow this precedent.
Will the U.S.-Saudi agreement discourage other countries from implementing the AP in favor of their own bilateral arrangements with a lower verification standard?
When the IAEA’s board approved the model AP in 1997, it requested that the full text become the standard for all additional protocols to safeguards agreements. Even if the specific measures in the novel U.S.-Saudi bilateral agreement provide strong verification, it still represents a departure from the international standard and opens the door for others to develop their own alternatives.
The point of establishing the AP as a verification standard was to settle board debates about what is or is not adequate. Having stepped away from that standard, the administration should explain how it will ensure robust international evaluation of the adequacy of any other bilateral verification agreements similarly put forward to the board going forward.
Setting the Standard for 123 Agreements
Separate from its consideration of the Saudi 123 agreement, the U.S. legislative branch can install more general guardrails on all 123 agreements going forward through standalone legislation addressing their implementation. A 123 agreement provides the framework for cooperation, but the executive branch will still need to authorize technology transfer and license shipments of nuclear equipment and material. Congress could influence that process with legislation that requires classified hearings and presidential certification for all nuclear-related exports to countries that have no AP and no bar against enrichment and reprocessing. Countries without these triggers—and the U.S. industry that supplies them—would be able to enjoy a more streamlined licensing process.
Supporters of the U.S.-Saudi deal are right to consider alternative approaches to advancing nonproliferation—especially if they are even stronger than the original norms in practice. Congress should consider carefully whether the alternatives put forth in this arrangement are a credible alternative to the established norms, or if they represent U.S. concessions on key nonproliferation priorities. A retreat from nonproliferation would not just be detrimental for regional stability—it would jeopardize the carefully recovered public confidence in nuclear energy as a solution for climate change and energy security. Distinguishing the reality of this draft agreement requires compelling answers to these critical questions.
