Lawfare Daily: Attempted Assassination of Pope John Paul II During the Cold War, with Serhii Plokhy, November 17

Serhii Plokhy, Mykhailo Soldatenko
Tuesday, November 17, 2026, 7:00 AM
Mykhailo Soldatenko sits down with Harvard historian Serhii Plokhii to discuss his new book, “Killing the Pope.”

Lawfare Contributing Editor Mykhailo Soldatenko sits down with Harvard History Professor Serhii Plokhy to discuss his new book, "Killing the Pope," which tells the history of an attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II during the Cold War and related investigations, trials, and propaganda battles. The book also explores who was behind the assassination, including whether there are any signs of security services or organized crime involvement.

 

 

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[Intro]

Oscar Jonsson: The General Staff does a lot of things by virtue of being on top of the military system. But in terms of kind of what’s analytically interesting and relevant I group them into, you know, command being the ultimate command post of the Russian Armed Forces and the architecture for commanding the Russian Armed Forces, military districts, the joint strategic commands from the highest levels.

Justin Sherman: It’s the Lawfare Podcast. I’m Justin Sherman, contributing editor at Lawfare and CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, with Oscar Jonsson, author of the new book, “The Russian General Staff.”

Oscar Jonsson: But it’s still hard to see that hope, if we only do a little bit more of the exact same thing we’re doing, you know, we’re gonna win.

And I think, you know, from the Russian perspective, you know, that’s what they’re getting wrong, but also, you know, they don’t have that many other options to win this war.

Justin Sherman: Today, we’re talking about his book on Russia’s General Staff, its evolution and its role in the Russian system, and the Russian military’s evolving thought, planning, lessons from Ukraine, and gaps in understanding modern warfare.

[Main podcast]

You’ve written several books already in your career, including one that I often use when I teach on Russia called The Russian Understanding of War, so folks can check that out. And now, as we heard in the introduction, you’re out with a new book, congratulations on that, titled The Russian General Staff.

So why this book and why now?

Oscar Jonsson: Well, first of all, thank you very much, Justin. Why this book? It’s actually connected because while writing The Russian Understanding of War, I sought the sources of Russian military theory and the Russian system, and I really saw the strongest and most, you know, powerful actor in developing military theory is the General Staff.

And many of the sources and the top officers and institutions were in some way connected to General Staff, and that kind of really piqued my interest. And when I started to research it, it’s like, hey what, you know, what’s known about the Russian General Staff? What do they do? I found almost nothing.

A few article, the last decades, and the last books, I mean, over 20 years old, et cetera. So, I started researching a little bit, and I… that kind of just cemented, you know, two things. First, there’s been very little work done about what this is, and second is I should make this into book. Well, maybe third, like this is a really important institution.

So, those three convictions led me to work on this and the question why now, well, this is something that actually started before the war in Ukraine, and I have been I mean, I started the first research, which was, you know, more of a couple of articles, but in that process, maybe in 2024 sometime, I kind of just decide, okay, this is gonna be, this is gonna be a book.

Like, this is big enough to be a book. This is novel enough to be a book, so that’s it. That’s why I, that’s why I wrote it.

Justin Sherman: Well, you cover quite a bit in the book, the history, the theoretical evolutions, the politics, the organizational structure. Start by giving us the 101 of the Russian general staff going back in time, how did the Russian General Staff come about?

And you talk about this in the book in some detail, how does the Russian General Staff compare to the role of the General Staff in other countries, including the United States?

Oscar Jonsson: Yeah, I think, I mean, going back to when the General Staff started, that’s, you know, that’s you can put very different starting points.

The, the most recent important one is really the Second World War or the Great Fatherland War, as it’s known in Russia where it took its modern shape. But if you want to really answer it you need to roll back all the way to Gustavus Adolphus when he revolutionized tactics, and I’m not saying that only because I’m a Swede.

But when you started combining you know, infantry, cavalry, light artillery, it just increased demands and complexity of the staff, and you couldn’t have a, you know, task-specific staff that you just threw, threw together. You started to make it a permanent function, and this, you know, was the background to the Prussian General Staff, which is the, probably the most original intellectual, you know, forefather for all the subsequent general staffs.

But then the… kind of the next push came in the late 19th century when you started to have, you know, telegraph, railroads which meant that mobilization, logistics, and communications were so much faster, which basically meant you needed to do all the thinking and preparation in peace times because, you know, the oft-repeated cliché is that, you know, wars are faster and faster, or you can do faster and faster things in war.

And, you know, we’ve been talking like that for centuries. But at the time it was, you know, drastic shifts the way you could mobilize personnel, the way you could communicate. So, you just needed more planning, logistics, communications. You needed to professionalize this, and you need to have it in peacetime.

And that’s kind of what the Prussians did, and that you know, spilled over, you know, after the Bolshevik assumed power. They took a lot of the imperial Russian officers that was very inspired by the Prussian General Staff and started incorporating that and kind of led up to the most important trial in the Second World War, after which you’ve had kind of the same system.

And then you ask, well, how does it compare to the other places? And I think one of the one of the most important reasons why the General Staff is so understudied is because it’s so different in particular for the American one. So, the closest equivalent you have is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff he’s an advisor, you know.

His tasks are, you know, to formulate a strategy. It’s more theorizing. It’s to harmonize you know, requirements, advocate for joint, to liaise with Congress. But he, you know, he’s outside the operational command chain, which in the U.S. runs from president to defense minister to component commanders.

The component commanders are having a very, very strong role, which is, again, something very different from the Russian system. In the Russian system, the General Staff takes the best and the brightest officers from quite an early age, you know, late 20s, early 30s. You separate them from the branches, from the Air Force, the Navy, the Army, and you put them into the General Staff academies and it’s basically its own profession, more or less its own branch within the Russian Armed Forces.

They go through the highest academies, and then they get out on the other end to be in the leading position throughout the Russian Armed Forces. Whereas again the Joint Chief of Staff in the U.S. you know, you get seconded there a couple of years, but then you go back to the branches or a component command but it’s not your entire permanent professional identity, which is in the Russian system.

So, it’s very different. Also, the Joint Chief of Staff in the U.S. is significantly smaller than the General Staff in the Russian system, which is, I mean, maybe 10,000 in total or such, whereas the Joint Staff in the U.S. is around 1,500. I mean, roughly. Rough number… rough numbers. So, quite large, you know, differences, and I think that’s a reason why, because we’re not look, we’re, you know, assuming it’s something that’s similar to what we have, we’re not really looking at how it’s different.

Justin Sherman: A statement that could apply to quite a bit. Yeah, the size-

Oscar Jonsson: Mm-hmm ...

Justin Sherman: definitely stood out in your book when you would talk about that compared to other countries. So, when Putin came to power, he started, of course over the ensuing years making a number of reforms to the military, to the intelligence and security services, et cetera.

Obviously, one goal of those reforms being to consolidate power, but there were other things at play. So how did those early Putin regime reforms impact the general staff and sort of its role within this broader Russian system?

Oscar Jonsson: Yeah, I mean, just as you noted, when Putin came to power, he started very slowly, cautiously consolidate control of all of the parts of Russian society.

I mean, this is maybe long forgotten now, where he’s viewed more as a autocrat or maybe totalitarian that just controls everything, whereas when he started, you know, he was cautious and meticulous about his power struggles and one was, you know, establishing control over the military. So, one of the first thing he did was to send Sergei Ivanov, one of his longtime buddies from Leningrad KGB in 1975, who followed him throughout, and Ivanov later became head of the presidential administration, you know, the most important bureaucrat in the Russian system.

He sent Ivanov to become defense minister. Ivanov took a number of fights with the really unwieldy general staff at the time. The general staff were, they were involved in politics, they were criticizing political leadership, including, I mean, Ivanov was also cautious when he started, you know.

He started making speeches basically on the first big fight was that Yeltsin had done something quite extraordinary for civil-military relations. He made the chief of general staff directly subordinate to the president. In other words, he didn’t go through the defense minister. So, you know, Yeltsin sat down with the chief of general staff, and then he sat down with the defense minister and had a kind of parallel chains because Yeltsin wanted control over everything.

So, he wanted to have some sort of competition between the ministry and the military in this case. And in 2004 Putin reversed that and changed, you know, in... With a lot of criticism from the general staff, by the way. All the military heavyweights were against this but then they were subordinated under his close colleague, Ivanov.

And then up until, I think, 2008 is the latest date I find in the book where chief of general staff actually goes out and is overtly critical to the political leadership. Like from 2000, 2008, you have you have a general staff that takes political fights, and then with the dismissal of the then chief of general staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, that is no more.

Like that’s kind of since then the Russian general staff had just not had that, that self-confidence. They’ve not taken political fights. They’ve been, let’s say, a very loyal servant

Justin Sherman: You describe how the general staff was at one point tasked with developing a plan for the wartime organization for the entire state, which obviously these days, and we’ll get in a bit to the current war on Ukraine but, you know, these days seems like quite a relevant thing that they would be tasked with this sort of statewide wartime organization plan.

So, what was that tasking, and did that result at the time in anything meaningful for the Russian government?

Oscar Jonsson: Yeah, again, this is an interesting concept. I think it’s probably quite alien for an American listener. But it’s actually quite similar to something we have in Sweden. In Sweden it’s called the total defense concepts, which is, you know, military defense and civilian defense, and it’s everything the state needs to function in war.

In Russia, you had the, the task was set out in 2013 that you needed to create a военная организация государства, the wartime organization of the state. And it was… and it made a lot of power ministries nervous because and it was also all the Russian media that the Russian military will get kind of command rights over all the other agencies.

And that might feel like a, you know, like a bureaucratic distinction, but it’s not. It’s basically if the armed forces can tell the FSB to, you know, do X, Y, Z, go X, go A, B, C. That says something about hierarchy. And this was quite a long power struggle. It took seven years until it was resolved, and a lot of analysts speculated that, you know, the armed force is gonna, it’s gonna be a power grab, they’re gonna subsume control of all the other agencies.

And in the end it all fizzled out. It all fizzled out with, yes, the armed forces and general staff in particular getting responsibility for kind of planning, but then they only have the authority to coordinate with all the other agencies, which basically is nothing. Like, you can call someone and you say, hey, you know, screw you, and then you haven’t coordinated.

Whereas if you command you have authority to send them places. So, it fizzled out, and I think that reinforces the argument I’m driving about you know, on the one hand you have a vastly expanding military instrument, but at the same time you have a dramatically decreasing political influence from the Russian top military leadership.

Justin Sherman: Did the Russian general staff, listeners can tell we’re sort of marching towards the present, did the Russian general staff play any role in the initial invasion of Ukraine over a decade now ago? And if so, what was that role? And if not, you know, why did they not play a role?

Oscar Jonsson: Yeah, that’s a great question.

And I mean, the book is divided in kind of first, hey, what did, what does the general staff do, a little bit of background, and then it’s generating military theory, it’s commanding the armed forces, and it’s influencing politics. And then the last chapter, which is almost a part of the book is empirics, all Russian, total selection of Russian major wars and interventions, and really what did the military expertise say before going to war, and how did they act at the start of the war?

And investigating 2014, it is really clear based on the alternative explanations and how it was done, that it was the former or, and current FSB directors who sat together. That is Vladimir Putin, Nikolai Patrushev, Alexander Bortnikov, who sat together and kind of decided, hey, let’s do this Crimea thing.

There’s some versions that say that Shoigu was there, the then defense mis- minister, but it doesn’t seem like the most likely situation. Rather, what transpired was very FSB heavy with some activity directed by Shoigu’s… the defense ministry personnel, but very little from the Russian general staff whatsoever.

I mean, obviously they are commanding the military forces that was used, but when I’m looking at it, who took any important decisions anywhere along the way and who impacted policy, I don’t find any, any support from the general staff. And I find it really interesting that the way the EU and the U.S. sanctioned Russia really backs this up.

They sanction the FSB people, they sanction Shoigu’s aide, and they sanction the head of the GRU, which was a part of Crimea, but not the chief of… well, sorry, they sanction the chief of general staff, Gerasimov, but only for the buildup of forces on the border to Ukraine, but nothing for the activity in Crimea, whereas the other people were explicitly sanctioned for their activity in Crimea.

And I mean, sanctions is not, you know, truth or fact, but it kind of backs the argument of the rest of literature we said they had a very minor role. I mean, yes, when you’re moving VDV, it’s commanded by the general staff and the regional headquarters in Rostov, which is now, you know, handling the war in Ukraine, but very little suggests that they had a major role.

Justin Sherman: Okay. That’s a, we might come back to that, that sanctions point. You mentioned the GRU, which is a great segue. You know, this to me is one of, I mean, there’s many interesting obviously parts of your book, but this was one that really stood out to me, and I thought was very interesting in terms of how you discuss it.

You know, the GRU obviously, as you alluded to, being Russia’s military intelligence agency just because I know somebody is listening and wagging their finger at me and saying it should technically be GU these days we’ll just say-

Oscar Jonsson: Mm-hmm. Yeah ...

Justin Sherman: We’re gonna stick with GRU as, as everyone does. But, as you mentioned, the GRU is under the command of the general staff. And so, I’m just I really am looking forward to getting your thoughts here on, you know, how to you does this chain of reporting operate? What does it mean that you know, the military intelligence agency is under the general staff?

And, you know, from your perspective, given how notoriously aggressive, you know, risk-tolerant, violent right, assassination, sabotage, et cetera, the GRU is, does the general staff actually have sway over this organization, or how does that... I just wanna get all your thoughts on how this how this operates today.

Oscar Jonsson: It is a really good question and one that I have some ideas, but I don’t have conclusive answers. I mean, you know, on... from a technical level, it’s quite clear. Like under Russian constitution, you know, it’s a part of the general staff. It leads under chief of general staff. On the literature of intelligence agencies, you can find that, for instance, the SVR, the foreign intelligence service, and the FSB, the domestic security service, you know, they have their daily briefings with Putin but the GRU doesn’t seem to have that, the same access.

And in the security council, which is the most important decision-making format for, you know, security and military affairs, which Putin meets with every week there’s no permanent representation of the GRU. There is a permanent representation of SVR and FSB. There’s a non-permanent representation of the chief of general staff, but none for the GRU.

So, this suggests, on the one hand, that it is actually... You know, it’s a subunit that, you know, the chief of general staff directs. But I don’t... I’m not swayed by that. And again, this is where I’m... This is more of, you know, Oscar’s guesstimate from my best reading and looking at Russian sources and the way it’s discussed.

I think the following. I mean, the GRU, the EU, the GRU does three main things, I would say. You know, first is kind of military intelligence gathering, which is, you know, your traditional, you know, measuring roads, bridges, harbors, looking at capability building of the adversary and all the classic military intelligence things.

The second is of course commanding and using and leading the Spetsnaz brigades and also, you know, some sort of non-official, you know, military forces which kind of exploded with this war. But then the most important thing, and the thing you’re asking is you know, you can group it in the political war against the West.

And my guess is that the first two things are being handled by the general staff in a classical military hierarchy, i.e., you know, military intelligence, Spetsnaz brigades and other kind of military formations. I think that’s quite classic military stuff. But the political war against the West, I would guess it’s run on the political level.

It’s definitely coordinated by the political leadership and if you know, if you’re gonna go poison some Russian dissident in the UK or, you know, shoot a Chechen in, in Berlin, et cetera, you know, it’s not the chief of general staff who draws up those plans and it’s not him who gives the green light, would be my guess.

But, you know, you have to take it for what it is.

Justin Sherman: Yeah, I appreciate all that. As you said, obviously it’s opaque, but that’s helpful to get your thoughts. Obviously, it’s apples and oranges, but as you noted earlier with the differences with the U.S. system, I mean, it’s just sort of a crazy idea from an American view, right, that, you know, the, let’s say the Joint Chiefs in, in a different world would be, you know, over, like nominally overseeing a group that, you know, runs assassination programs. That would just be-

Oscar Jonsson: Yeah, exactly ...

Justin Sherman: utterly bizarre. So.

Oscar Jonsson: No, but no, and I think that’s a good, that’s a good use because, you know, the military intelligence part is basically probably the Defense Intelligence Agency. Well, you know what they’re doing, like looking at tanks and stuff. But the thing is GRU is also doing a little bit of CIA, and it’s also doing a little bit of NSA.

And I think, you know, depending on which, which of these doors you open you actually probably have different chains of commands.

Justin Sherman: Yeah. So, beyond the GRU then, ‘cause obviously that’s just one part, what are the other major roles and functions that the General Staff has today, and how much influence do you think they have in the current day Putin system?

Oscar Jonsson: No, I think those are really, I mean, the General Staff does a lot of things by virtue of being on top of the military system. But in terms of kind of what’s analytically interesting and relevant I group them into, you know, command being the ultimate command post of the Russian Armed Forces and the architecture for commanding the Russian Armed Forces, military districts, the joint strategic commands from the highest levels.

It is generating military theory and preparing Russia and developing strategic foresight, preparing Russia for future war and for future conflict, and preparing the entire state you know, putting the intellectual foundation to where Russia should be. And I mean, foresight and strategic planning is really important in the Russian system.

And then as a political actor, and you ask how much influence. Well, I think the trajectory from this book is really one way. It’s from a very strong and influential general staff that played politics in the ‘90s and 2000s down to in the 2010s and 2020s, a very subordinated servant that does not, you know, speak truth to power or at least, you know, voice their best military advice.

And I mean, the, you know, the 2022 invasion is just a culmination of this. It is a long trend, but you know, the, at no point did the Russian Chief of General Staff publicly say, stand up and say, you know, hey guys, you know, if we wanna, you know, invade the largest country in Europe, then, you know, it’s not gonna cut it with 120,000 men.

And by the way, we’re a mobilization force, like we need to mobilize. Which is none of what happened. It was quite obvious that it was as a, you know, security services plan by, you know, we’re gonna walk in there with a coup d’état, we’re not gonna face serious resistance, it’s gonna be over in 10 days.

Because, you know, the chief of general staff, he, if anyone, knows that the Russian Armed Forces is a mobilization army. And if you take away, you know, 30%, which is mobilized personnel in the units, and you take away around 30% which are conscripts, you know, no wonder you get hollow forces, you know, driving into Ukraine, and that’s, you know, you don’t have any infantry.

That’s why Ukrainian soldiers can walk up with a what’s the English title? I would say bazooka. It’s not called a bazooka, but you know, anti-tank weapons, thank you, and just, you know, hit the Russian wagons. It’s because they don’t have any infantry in there. So, all these things the Russian general staff knew very well, and that’s why head of French military intelligence, by the way, said, you know what?

It’s only 120,000 troops. I don’t think it will be any war because this is not how you would wanna fight large-scale war in Europe. Which was kind of the right conclusion. You know, today Russia has over 700,000 men in the war. But it was the wrong conclusion because it wasn’t military rationale in any way dictating the concept of operations in Ukraine in 2022.

And that is kind of the answer to, the ultimate answer to the question, how much influence does military expertise have in the Russian system? Well, well, not enough to, you know, influence the most consequential policy decision been taking you know, for decades in the Russian system

Justin Sherman: This relates, I mean, you call out in the book that one of your core arguments is that since Putin took power, the general staff has come under increasing political control.

And again, as you alluded to, given the state of the autocratic system in Russia today, that’s not gonna necessarily surprise anybody but what makes it such a significant point in your view that there is that political control of the general staff?

Oscar Jonsson: Yeah. Well, I mean, you know, we’re all Clausewitz and I think most of us and, you know, war is the continuation of politics by other means.

And Clausewitz talks very much to the political subordination of the military, and that’s kind of in, you know, Huntington’s model of civil military relations. Like it is no novelty that the military subordinate to politics. Yeah, you know, kind of always has been in most states most of the time, recent time.

But what I’m kind of illustrating here is something different, and that is the… that is the yesmanship to the point where you start to produce really bad policy, which is an actor who is either unable, unwilling, or is completely disregarded in providing the best military expertise because it doesn’t influence politics.

And why this is interesting is also because I kind of map out the trajectory of this change, because it hasn’t always been that. And I mean, in, you know, in the Afghanistan intervention in ‘79, the general staff took a fight and said, hey, this is a really bad idea. In the First Chechen War, the general staff took a fight and said, hey, this is a really bad idea.

And you had, you know, 500 plus sackings, you had 500 plus resignations. And the general staff actually, you know, they stood their ground and they took political fights. And I think that change is what is important. It’s not necessarily the conclusion that, you know, the military’s subordinate to the political leadership.

It is how that anatomy looks like in practice and how it has developed. That’s kinda what I’m getting at.

Justin Sherman: You also write that the general staff’s role in generating military theory about future war has up until 2022 primarily focused on two key concepts: non-contact warfare, parentheses standoff weaponry, and the role of non-military means, economic, information, cyber, political warfare, and so on.

So, I wanna take these separately in order, so let’s start with non-contact warfare. What do you think the Russian military and the general staff is taking away from the Putin regime’s full-scale war on Ukraine vis-a-vis non-contact warfare?

Oscar Jonsson: Well, you know, maybe if I’ll be so cheeky I’ll start in the reverse order to talk about the non-military war because you know, it sounds very maybe exotic and distant when you read my words to me like that.

But I think, you know, from a pragmatic and practical perspective from the Russian leadership it is quite straightforward. So, if they are looking at us as Westerners, they see our main strategy is to use non-military means to avoid getting into military conflict. So, everything they’re seeing what we’re doing is, you know, economic sanctions, political isolation, and an indirect strategy of supporting Ukraine.

They’re seeing us trying to leverage a strategy of non-military means to win, basically. And an important part of that is, you know, what they see is intelligence operation, information warfare, ideological warfare, you know, trying to trick you know, former Soviet states that, you know, have democratic revolutions, overthrow, you know, pro-Kremlin leaders and, you know, replace them with pro-European leaders.

And they’re seeing, like, you know, this is our game. Like, this is what we do. And they’re seeing, you know, right now they’re seeing us doing quite well. I think that’s one of the reason why you’re seeing the last week these warnings of increased Russian, you know, intelligence subversion operations in Europe is because they’re seeing the way the table is set right now isn’t looking that great for Russia.

They need to do something to flip the table. They are seeing that we, our strategy of non-military means to avoid military conflict with them is kind of working. We’re kind of winning in terms of, you know, Russian power hollowing out and making you know, no gains on the front line, and they’re putting all their hopes into bombing campaign of Ukraine.

I think that’s why they’re seeing such a vulnerability of non-military means, and they thus emphasizing the importance to think about non-military means. And because their main conflict is not with Ukraine, it’s with the West. They’re seeing Ukraine just as a mere manifestation of a broader conflict with the West.

Us trying to get to Russia cause a regime collapse through supporting Ukraine. They see us using Ukraine just as a means of getting to the Russian leadership. That’s why the importance of non-military means is at the center of Russian theorizing, and you go to related, you know, non-contact warfare.

This is a concept that was coined from a Russian lieutenant general in the mid-2000s, but this is basically the most important intellectual theme for the Russian military theorists. The last 30 years has been the Gulf War. In the Gulf War, the, the Iraqi army had Soviet material, Soviet doctrine, and they were completely defeated by the U.S. and some allies in what was, you know, titled Revolution in Military Affairs.

But it was complete situational awareness superiority in command and control, coupled with long-range weaponry. And with the successful application of that, you know, the, the ground component was just short and dynamic and kind of secondary to the long-range precision strike and the tempo and the complete situational awareness.

The lesson from this was that Western high tech beats Soviet mass, and this is what really scared the Russian general staff and all the military theorists because they were like, hey, this is how we’re gonna fight, but this new NATO technology is completely gonna beat us. And since that day, the Russians have been thinking a lot about non-contact warfare.

Non-contact warfare, that means, you know, increasing weapon ranges. And Slipchenko, Vladimir Slipchenko, who coined this, he kind of said – he was quite radical – he said, you know, we’re gonna take away the branches, Army, Navy, Air Force. Instead, we’re gonna have strategic offense and strategic defense.

Because his vision was really just, you know, two sides lobbing long-range missiles at each other. And I mean, in some sense, we’re kinda getting there 20 years later with Ukraine. But this was it, and I think that this has been at the core of Russian theorizing because, you know, if a war would start if NATO would attack Russia, how would it look like?

The main scenario from a Russian perspective has been it would be a massed aerospace attack that would try to disable political military leadership. It would be kind of overwhelming force in the initial period of war, and it would be short and sweet because that’s, you know, that’s how Western states plan war, right?

And you know, when you listen to this, you basically realize that this is exactly, all of this is what went down in Iran this spring. Like, this is exactly how Russia thought that NATO would fight Russia. And Russian military strategic concept before the war was active defense. And why was it active?

Well, it was some sort of maneuver defense that meant just, you know, conserve your fighting power, stay in the fight in the initial period of war, to basically survive the initial… NATO assault and then we’ll win by attrition because, you know, NATO production rates and NATO magazine depth only allows for short and victorious wars.

And the Russian thinking was, you know, as long as we withstand the initial assault and maintain functionality, we will win. And again, very similar to what Iran has been doing. So…You know, these are why these two concepts are so important, because one is like this is how West thinks of winning, and the other one is if it starts to military fight, then it will be considerable content of, on non-contact warfare.

And that’s why Russia’s been thinking so much about the threat from this, but also how to do it themself. And the war in Ukraine is Russia’s first application of large-scale bombings from a distance. And honestly, it’s their best and almost only bet to win this war is to bomb… is a strike campaign.

They’re actually losing territory with record casualties in the front line, and the front line will not break the Ukrainian armed forces. But their bombing campaign and that’s the lesson, that they can have you know, standoff weaponry. That’s how they can hope to win a war, and we’ll see how about that.

Justin Sherman: Zooming back out then and looking writ large at the Russian general staff and also some of what you just described with evolving Russian military thought and planning, are there, maybe you just mentioned some of these, are there a few things that stand out to you that Russia is getting the most right about modern war?

And then, you know, what are they conversely getting the most wrong about modern warfare?

Oscar Jonsson: Well, it’s a good question because I think it’s, you know, maybe that’s it, you know, the diagnose of what they’re getting most wrong is also shared a bit in the West, and I think that’s the, you know, strikes does not equal strategy.

And I think, you know, throughout military history, this kind of terror bombings and strategic bomb campaigns, they seldom produce a decisive advantage in any relevant timeframe. And then again I’m just raising Iran as a, you know, as a good example. Like the strikes were great, but it did not produce a political win.

And that is, you know, same for Russia, like they’ve been bombing Ukraine constantly for over four years. And yes, they’re gonna, they’re gonna, this winter they’re gonna produce, you know, much severe damage to critical infrastructure and industry and economic potential. But it’s still hard to see that hope, if we only do a little bit more of the exact same thing we’re doing, you know, we’re gonna win.

And I think, you know, from the Russian perspective, you know, that, that’s what they’re getting wrong, but also, you know, they don’t have that many other options to win this war. And what they’re getting right, I think, you know, definitely attrition. And again, if I can get back to… Slipchenko coined non-contact warfare, he had such a fascinating exchange with Makhmud Gareyev who was deputy chief of general staff and chair of the, you know, academy of military sciences.

And basically Slipchenko had this revolutionary way of seeing, hey, it’s only gonna be standoff weaponry and missiles. And Slipchenko kind of won in the bureaucracy and in the general staff because a lot of his revolutionary thinking was adopted by leadership, key leadership in the general staff.

However, Gareyev he said, do you know what the problem is? Well, it’s in many things. He said, look at Russian history instead of looking to the future. Look at Russian history. You know, what we always win wars on is mobilization industrial production And it’s so interesting that it was kind of his, you know, back-looking view that, that became Russian strategy.

You know, the initial part of the war in 2022, yes, you had a bombing campaign all over Ukraine but quite quickly it just became an attrition industrial production. And I think that’s what Russia’s getting most right, because if you look at the production figure and cost for things such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, cheap cruise missiles drones, jet-powered drones, there’s no cost-efficient way of defending against this.

You know, this constant race of adaptation, et cetera. But they know that, you know, the, the West does not have industrial capacity to handle this with... And that’s, you know, that’s why Russia right now Ukraine is intercepting basically around 0% of Russian ballistic missiles, because we’re out of Patriot interceptors.

They were very much aided and abetted by U.S. and partners burning it all in the Middle East, but, you know, that’s their bet on attrition I think they’re getting the most right.

Justin Sherman: You mentioned things that you think, which is interesting, that the West also shares in terms of misunderstanding or getting wrong as the Russians do.

Are there… this is, I guess, a very leading question but are there elements of Russian military thought and planning that you talk about in your book that you think certain European countries have a better grasp on than the United States? And if so, what are some of those top areas?

Oscar Jonsson: Well, I think I don’t wanna be overly academic about it, but the question if, is a country has a better understanding or not, and I was giving a talk here in Sweden a couple weeks ago, and I was giving all my views and then they asked, you know, hey, you know, what you’re saying makes a lot of sense but, you know, isn’t everyone listening to you?

And I mean, and when they say everyone, he’s talking about political and military leadership in Sweden. And I said, I mean, maybe someone’s listening, but that doesn’t mean that they’re doing something. So, I think that, I mean, yes, Sweden as a country has long given a particular importance to studying Russian military thought and would have, you know, Russian research program and different institutions that had carried kind of Russian knowledge.

Does that mean that, you know, all of the armed forces understand it, that the political level understand it? No. So I think that, you know, you rather have islands of expert communities and the degree in which that is, you know, shared within a country is uncertain. But, you know, elements of Russian military thought, I think that is much more I think it’s more natural for many European countries.

I mean, Finland and Sweden in particular have been very strong on Russia studies for, you know, geographical and obvious and historical reasons. I think what made Sweden a bit distinct is that, you know, even during the most peaceful years, we kept a number of Russia research programs alive, so it’s still a bit living.

And I mean, you had a few institutions in the U.S. of course, as well but it’s rather, I would say, islands of expertise that are still out there.

Justin Sherman: Policymakers certainly, and in Europe turn to you for insights on what to do about these issues. So, what do you think are the biggest takeaways for the West about the Russian general staff and evolving Russian military thought and planning and war?

And what would you recommend to Western or European or U.S. policymakers that we should be doing right now?

Oscar Jonsson: Well, I think the most important takeaway when I think about this book is relating back to discussion that has been, we’ve been having for a number of years. And that is that a number of European intelligence agencies has been very explicit in saying, you know, Russia will be ready for new war in three years, in five years, in seven years.

And it doesn’t really matter what you land exactly on the year, but all of these are assumptions on Russian reconstitution, personnel and material. These are assumption on when Russian capability would be at X level, and thus Russia would launch the next war. The problem though, as I show in the book, is that there’s absolutely no support in the cases that I’ve investigated that political leadership will listen to you know, military expertise and/or that military expertise will tell the truth to power.

Rather again, I mean, the example for 2022, like Russian Armed Forces mobilization army and they would have needed very different disposition of forces to invade that country, you know, had they been asked. And I think this is, you know, we cannot, you know, predict I mean, we cannot predict anything, but we cannot understand Russia’s next war by just looking at military readiness.

You know, when Russia has, you know, recruited 200,000 more soldiers or produced 200 more tanks, et cetera. So that, that’s kind of the biggest takeaway, like, you know, we need to do away with all those projections of Russia being ready in one or two or three years because, you know, strength is relative.

And it might well be that right now when there’s serial Patriot interceptors available in the entire West and Russia produces around 720 ballistic missiles a year, maybe now they have the most relevant capability gap rather than when, you know, European countries’ defense spending are starting to give results.

I’m just throwing that out to be a bit provocative. What U.S. and Western policymakers should be doing right now, well, I think in terms of that, I think it’s really trying to understand the mechanics between the political decision-making in Russia, and I think it’s you know, my book has tried to help, you know, the interaction between the military and the political one.

But it’s really to, it’s really to prepare ourselves because if you buy the, the argument that, you know, the Russian General Staff theories are saying directly is that, you know, NATO is the enemy, the West is the enemy and the war in Ukraine is just a manifestation. That means that, you know, if you have a ceasefire in Ukraine, you know, nothing’s gonna change for European or transatlantic security.

It just mean that the energy will be directed elsewhere because you know, the conflict is not just about Ukraine. It’s about it’s about Western Russia, and it’s about Russia seeing the West trying to dismember the entire Russian state. So, I think that if you buy that, if you understand that argument, if you buy that argument, there’s a lot of other things that are downstream from that in terms of you know, readiness, in terms of building capability, in terms of building military and non-military defenses, and that is, you know, what I think that the U.S. and Western policymakers should be doing right now.

And, you know, if I may add a little bit of a, you know, pet peeve is you know, the relevant capabilities. I mean, you know, we saw Gulf States completely disregarding the threat from cheap one-way attack drones for four years. You know, the writing was on the wall, and I think I still see a lot of that in, you know, Western military circles.

They, you know, obvious implementation of new technologies are there. They’re readily available, but we are still not internalizing the lessons. Not like, not even the simple lessons you know, much less the complex lessons that are kind of out in the open.

Justin Sherman: Well, on that, we are in violent agreement.

That is all the time we have. Oscar, thanks very much for joining us.

Oscar Jonsson: Well, thank you for the invitation.

[Outro]

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Serhii Plokhy is a history professor at Harvard University and expert on the history of the Cold War and Ukraine. He is the author of the book, "The Nuclear Age: An Epic Race for Arms, Power and Survival."
Mykhailo Soldatenko is an attorney in Ukraine and New York and an S.J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. He was previously a senior associate at a leading Ukrainian law firm, practicing international dispute resolution.

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