Lawfare Daily: The Dangers of Privatized, Automated Immigration Enforcement

[Intro]

Chinmayi Sharma: Because of the data and technology that these vendors provide, the federal government is getting access to information that it used to rely on states for. And it is getting access to technology that means that immigration enforcement requires less manpower to do the things that the human labor did before.

Tyler McBrien: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Tyler McBrien, managing editor of Lawfare with Chini Sharma, an associate professor at Fordham Law School and contributing editor here at Lawfare.

Chinmayi Sharma: Under the auspices of national security authorities, we've seen kind of this system being used to marginalize communities that have been marginalized under the banner of national security for a long time.

Tyler McBrien: Today, we're talking about Chini’s forthcoming law review article, “Immigration Enforcement Intermediaries,” and the automation and privatization of U.S. Federal Immigration Architecture.

[Main Podcast]

So Chini, you have a forthcoming law review paper called “Immigration Enforcement Intermediaries.” In it, you describe the current U.S. immigration enforcement system in a few ways.

I'll just name two of them. You call it an automated ecosystem of interconnected tech platforms. You also call it a code-based Leviathan. So with those terms in mind, what is the current U.S. immigration enforcement system that we have? And then briefly, we can get into it more later. How did we get here?

Chinmayi Sharma: Absolutely. And, like, shout out to you guys. I think that the docuseries that you're hosting does a great job of, like, not just the tech infrastructure, but, like, broadly what is happening with the relationship of the government and the private sector. But I think there's kind of three pillars here, two that are, like, the traditional loci of power in immigration enforcement, and that's a federal government in states.

And then the new emerging node of power is private vendors. Private vendors have been involved for a long time, but their role has fundamentally changed. And it is not because we have generative AI all of a sudden, though that is how people seem to think about it, but it is, and this would require, I think, more excavating of, like, the combination of socioeconomic, political developments that led to this, but vendors now have a very close rel—tech vendors have a very close relationship with the federal government in a way that we haven't seen before, except for perhaps the defense industrial co—the military industrial complex.

So what's happening here, we have a, and we call it an ecosystem, we call it a stack. It's essentially a re-architecting of how immigration enforcement works today, in that once upon a time, it was a very manual process. You have the federal government that has the onus of responsibility for immigration enforcement, and you have states, and states were necessary for effective immigration enforcement why because the federal government neither has the manpower to do it, what it wants to do, or the information to do what it wants to do.

States have robust information about their constituents, they have more manpower, they're closer to the ground. They can efficiently carry out certain activities that the federal government would rely on. And so the Constitution says that the federal government can't force states to help. States can't actively interfere with the federal government's immigration initiatives, but they don't have to help.

And so there was a tug of war of power, and yes, over time, more power shifted towards the federal government, and we can talk about kind of, like, why that shift happened, but states still had, like, a negotiating position, like a platform from which they could say, “We will cooperate in these ways and not in these ways.”

And that has changed, and that is because the rise of these tech solutions that are now being invested in unprecedented amounts that, you know, we say things like exponentially increasing very casually, but it truly is increasing in a non-linear way. And because of the data and technology that these vendors provide, the federal government is getting access to information that it used to rely on states for, and it is getting access to technology that means that immigration enforcement requires less manpower to do the things that the human labor did before.

Of course, the incredibly ambitious and problematic deportation goals today will require quite a bit of manpower, but a lot of what humans did before was replaced. Broadly speaking, like, what are these tech solutions? Companies that have contracted with the federal government for a long time are continuing to provide solutions, but now we have new, smaller tech companies come in and anybody who knows anything about government procurement knows, one, that it's incredibly boring, and two, that it's incredibly important, but three, it's incredibly onerous.

It's very hard to meet the requirements to contract with the government, and it is also very hard to break in as a new entity because there are various things about how the government does business, that it just wants to go back to trusted vendors. But the reason these new entities can break into the ecosystem is because there is this new emphasis on interoperability.

Another unsexy term, but basically what that means is this apparatus is built to interconnect everything that the private sector is providing is designed to play nicely with the other systems that other companies are providing. And what that does is create resilience in this automated architecture that we didn't have before, and it improves the capabilities that this architecture has because now a company is not just limited to what they have, both in technical capabilities and data, they can benefit from the data sources and capabilities that other vendors are providing.

So now we just kind of have a, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts kind of a situation of privatized automation and data streams that the federal government has at its disposal that has supercharged immigration enforcement.

Tyler McBrien: Yeah. Thank you so much for that actually very succinct answer to a monster of a question.

I mean, I, this is one of the challenges I think that we were facing making “Deportation Inc.,” the series, is that it's just such, the U.S. immigration system is so massive in terms of scale, number of actors, geographic scope, even that it can be just so, so hard to visualize or wrap one's head around.

And so I think one way to get at that is we'll definitely dig into so much of what you just spoke about, but one way is to just take one vendor and maybe one technology and start there, which is where, what, where you started in, in your article with Palantir OS. So could you tell me a bit about this particular software and its role in the immigration system and then more importantly, why you chose to, you know, begin the article with Palantir?

Chinmayi Sharma: Palantir, I think a decade plus ago was kind of an if you know, you know, cool, new analytics company that was doing fancy Excel, not obviously fancy Excel, but just like very complex mining of data to find insights. And that's kind of generally what people knew about it. But as early as over a decade ago, or about a decade ago, Palantir was already working with DHS.

These were contracts that were not getting the most attention, and that's because the backdrop of, you know, we talked about kind of like, how do we get here? One piece of how we got here is immigration got a makeover and this is not to be facetious or make light of a serious thing, but post-9/11, immigration went from a, we're kind of like maintaining house, managing our borders, preventing contraband and enforcing kind of rough quotas that we have on entrance to the United States.

And it wasn't something that got quite as much attention, I mean, not nearly as much attention as it's getting today. Post 2001, immigration became a national security problem, and really what immigration became, because of the nature of nine eleven as the terrorist attack, became an intelligence problem.

It wasn't just that we have these overt threats to the country, but we actually have these very subtle, sophisticated actors that embed within the country and have the capacity to cause very real harm. Now, a different way to have looked at it is this is a national security issue that is related to a handful of individuals with certain ideologies, completely unrelated to their status as immigrants.

But what happened, and there's a lot of great literature on why this is what happened, is it became about the immigrants that entered the country pose a very serious threat to us, hashtag not all immigrants, but enough that this is now something that we are not just monitoring it for quota purposes we are monitoring it to make sure that nobody's a threat.

And so when something becomes an intelligence problem, it becomes a data problem. Intelligence is data. Data needs to be in a format that is usable and you need to have the technology to be able to use it well, and so Palantir enters the system, enters the ecosystem of immigration enforcement by providing something called the ICM, that's the Investigative Case Management system.

And in 2014, DHS procured it for about $42 million. It's been renewed consistently since then. And what it is basically a very sophisticated, though now it seems rudimentary database that brought together a lot of data about immigration. And so the purpose of taking a lot of data and putting it in one place and contracting with a company like Palantir that is known for and specialized in analytics is to take advantage of that data at scale to use the information to identify where the threats are and where you should prioritize limited government resources.

So that's Palantir's kind of origin story here with immigration. Immigration OS is like an enormous level up. We have now evolved past ICM to something that can be characterized as like a new layer of technology on top of ICM. But what this new layer of technology does is it kind of opens up new pipelines to new data sources that did not exist before.

So we now have federal authorization or mandates for data sharing from other parts of the government, including states and localities, but we also have a technology layer on top of ICM that Palantir has built that says we can actually take in data from all of these tech vendors as long as they use the data standards or data formats that we require.

And once we can do that, we are just funneling in new information that we can use our advanced analytics software on to identify the insights that the immigration enforcement regime wants to carry out its goals. I guess the last thing I'll say is like, what's the role that it's playing? We in our paper call it a hub and spokes model and Palantir and Immigration OS, but really just like the suite of centralizing technologies and interoperable technologies that Palantir provides is the hub.

It is, can be visualized as like the part of the wheel that combines all of the spokes, and the spokes are these other data sources, many of which are private technology vendors. And so the reason we start with Palantir, and the reason I imagine we'll end the conversation with Palantir is because it is the one piece of the system that feels fundamentally integral and the DHS procurement documents around Palantir actually confirm that they have taken various steps like single source contracts.

And what a single source contract is basically, we're not entertaining other bidders. We are going with this vendor, but we have to justify it because generally contracts need to be competitive and we're justifying it by saying no other company can provide us this set of capabilities that we need at the cost and at the speed that Palantir can.

And so it is this like keystone to the entire enterprise.

Tyler McBrien: As you mentioned, Palantir used to be an if you know, you know, kind of a company. And now, of course, it is in the headlines, it is something of a specter to certain parts of the country, people concerned with surveillance and civil liberties, constitutional protections, et cetera.

But one insight from your paper that I thought was really interesting was that you sort of make this argument that, yes these very powerful technologies can be very scary in this regard and cause all these harms, but a lot of times they oversell what they can actually do. And there's a true dystopian worry here that it's actually in these errors and mistakes that even more harm can come.

And this is not just hypothetical it's happening. Could you talk a bit about that? 'Cause that really kind of, you know, jumped off the page at me.

Chinmayi Sharma: On one hand, it is true that we have technologies entering this space that are doing things that the government couldn't do before. On the other hand, and this should be a surprise to nobody and not considered at all a controversial statement, the private sector oversells, that's part of a business model, especially in the tech world where often, like, your minimum viable product just becomes your product because it is the thing that somebody will pay for, right?

And especially in the government contracting context, the government, once it invests in a technology system, becomes dependent on it because it builds the rest of its institutions around that system, and so then they become legacy systems that just kind of get auto-renewed over time because it would be very onerous, cost prohibitive even, to swap it out for another alternative.

And the reason all this is relevant is it takes away more incentive from the private sector to continue to deliver the highest quality, most cutting-edge products. If you know that you kind of have somewhat inelastic demand from your main customer, the logic just doesn't support going above and beyond as the A+ student.

And this was seen in the cybersecurity context, like there's a lot of reporting around how some of the worst cybersecurity is in the private sector's products and services that they provide to the government. Why is this a dystopian reality? It is an awful world in which we have so much data that we can perfectly accurately identify individuals who might be violating immigration laws, identify exactly where they are, and bring automated enforcement actions against them.

That is scary for many reasons that we can talk about, but it is even scarier to have systems that are shoddily built, prone to inaccuracies, and as we talked about, when there isn't as much incentive to go above and beyond in the responsible and careful design of systems, we know very little about just how inaccurate these systems are, and that's because very real violence is being enabled by these systems.

They are, for example, Palantir’s building this, a system called Elite. Essentially what it does is it aggregates information, including tips from hotlines to ICE, and taking all of that information, it identifies hotspots of areas that are going to have a large number of individuals that are of interest to federal immigration enforcement, and for every individual, we'll pull up dossiers about that individual, including photo, address, phone number, place of work, other people living in the household, even social media content.

And some of this data is, like, provided by companies like Thomas Reuters. And why is that scary? That information could be wrong. And now you have masked ICE agents sometimes not clearly presenting as ICE agents, knocking on doors, infringing on individuals, liberty, private spaces, potentially using this information pretextually to go after individuals that they don't actually believe to be violating immigration laws all with faulty information.

So you have individuals that are being detained wrongfully. You also have kind of like products that ICE agents are trained and directed to treat as authoritative. And why is it concerning when that's faulty? For example, there are apps out there that are meant to identify whether or not an individual is legally within the country and what their status is as an immigrant.

And so you can have individuals, there are cases that are reported about this individuals presenting birth certificates, like paper documents to the ICE agent, and the ICE agents like my Mobile Fortify app has said that you are in fact lying to me right now, and I have to trust the app. And like what that, the combination of inaccurate systems with what you see in that example is there's long documented behavior of just deferring to outputs from systems.

We think or believe they're more accurate. We tend to want to delegate judgment. We think these systems are neutral, especially when we don't know the error rates, but beyond that, if you think, and there's reason to believe there's nefarious intent in these actions, they provide great cover for something that you would otherwise want justification to do.

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Tyler McBrien: Yeah. I mean, the words Orwellian and Kafka-esque are thrown around too much nowadays, but they, these are situations in which they seem fairly apt. But I wanna take a step back for a second and throw up a counterargument, which you've already started poking holes in anyway, but which I wanna hear you—

We could take it in a few different directions, but—And you address this in the paper, but the counterargument could be the government routinely outsources core capacities to private vendors, sometimes to, to great benefit to, to, to citizens and the people government serve. In terms of immigration enforcement especially the, you know, the American people voted for this admi- administration who campaigned on these immigration numbers that the government under its current capacities could never hit. And so they have to contract out to private vendors.

What is wrong with every, everything I just said or—Or what is right about what I just said? I mean, we could take it in the direction of why it's un—unique, the unique harms in the immigration context or the lack of democratic oversight and the opacity of the system.

But, you know, you also addressed these counterarguments. So I just wanted to open the floor to that part.

Chinmayi Sharma: No, I'm so glad you did. And I am going to try to be coherent and organized in responding, but it's one of those areas where there's just so many different ways to approach that line of logic. And it kind of depends on your priors.

So I don't think that I've really hidden the ball on my views of the immigration enforcement system. I think that you can say, “I believe that we should have stringent immigration enforcement, but the way it's being carried out today is unacceptable under various legal principles, both in technical legality, but also in, like, fundamental principles about how we want the law to operate in the world.”

Now, if that's the case, then what we are seeing is the delegation of a critical executive function to private vendors. This relationship is not something that's happening through bills passed by our representatives in Congress. It's not happening through agency action that's subject to public notice and comment.

It is happening through contracts. It is happening through contracts that I'm not sure that there are people out there that care about the DFAR or the FAR, which are the enormous statutes that regulate how you can contract. And so what this means is we are shielding these policy decisions from public accountability.

There is not kind of public awareness of how this is happening. There is not public input into the terms of the contracts. And then you can go back to, well, yeah, but we picked an executive. We picked an executive. Courts have said that actually the executive has enormous power, should not be encumbered in its use of that power and has a lot of discretion to discern how it wants to take care of the faithful execution of the laws, right?

All of that might be true, but you might still believe, and this is a separate paper that I'm writing because I'm clearly existentially preoccupied with the executive branch's use of automation, that even if we have a unitary executive with this enormous amount of power, we still believe that there are other things in the government that provide some friction in execution of a president's will in a way that maintains the legitimacy of that use of power.

And some of those things are informing the public, involving some degree of public participation, incorporating some amount of, like, human judgment in the way something is executed. What we have when we use systems instead of agencies to carry out what an executive wants is, there is no longer any risk that you're going to have individuals not comply or exercise discretion in ways that are contrary to what the president wants, or even have the knowledge that they would get from being the on the ground enforcers of a law or a policy that would lead them to potentially whistleblow, cooperate with Congress, share something with the media, even leak information, resign in protest.

Because so much of this is happening as technical specifications in esoteric contracts that are made between the government and private vendors. And then there's all of these legal—Once something's a national security issue, you have more justification to withhold information. Once you're incorporating private vendors into the process, they have protections over things like trade secrets.

The federal government has some amount of immunity. They're now questions over to what degree do private vendors that are carrying out government functions also have immunity. You now have, just like these many layers of things that are technically laws and doctrine that further shield what's happening from public accountability.

And so the justification for a unitary executive is democracy put that person in power, and so democracy should have something to say about the way the power is used. And so if the justification is we put that person in power, then we should have the information and the ability to provide input to eventually decide we no longer want them to be in power.

So everything I'm explaining is the way this is working is denying the public that information. And then, because this is a valid viewpoint that I don't think people should be quite so hesitant to stand behind is, you can think we are wrong about the way we are approaching immigration, that it is not the national security issue that we have painted it in broad strokes to be, that is not the humane or autonomy-respecting way to have go about maintaining our borders.

We can agree that there might be some amount of control that has to exist at borders, but to paint the broad stroke of every potential immigrant in the country, whether they want to enter the country or are already in the country, is going to be seen as a potential national security threat has led to a way of thinking about immigration that makes the problem even worse because if you have the capacity to go after 10 people and you have 100,000 that qualify for individuals that you can enforce against, you have quite a bit of discretion over the 10 people you go after, and there is no shortage of evidence that those 10 people aren't picked randomly.

And so under the auspices of national security authorities, we've seen kind of this system being used to marginalize communities that have been marginalized under the banner of national security for a long time.

Tyler McBrien: One more question on the harms because I think we've already painted the picture of quite an intractable problem, but I think one of the most worrying aspects is this point that you make that, that these surveillance technologies that are being developed in the immigration context are not limited as such.

And in fact, it's, these companies are incentivized to grow their business and expand it beyond the immigration context and there's no shortage of capacity problems elsewhere in government so this could be generalized. Could you speak a bit about that danger whether speculative or already here and happening?

Chinmayi Sharma: Absolutely. And thank you for bringing that up. It's one of those things where I was like, I could ramble for ages about the harms. And this is a concerning one that is unique to not just automation, but also the role of private vendors as providing the tools and data that the federal government is using.

And so I'll kind of go through two ways that there's scope creep here. When the federal government procures systems, they kind of get the first cut at, “This is what we want, this is how we want it to be built. These are the specifications we have.”

Specifications are not kind of neutral directives on system design. They are baked in policy determinations, like what is a threshold that triggers some notice or kind of action? One great example, and by great, I mean, horrific example is I believe it was about 2017, though the reporting happened much later, it came out that at the executive's behest, a automated tool that recommends whether or not an individual should be detained when found to be in violation of immigration law or suspected in violation of immigrant migration law was changed overnight without any public awareness—Again, this reporting came out years later, to categorically deny recommendations that somebody not be detained.

So under law, you have ICE agents that are provided with the discretion to say, “This individual doesn't need to be detained.” But when they turn to rely on a tool, the tool is designed in a way that discretion is, no longer operates on the ground.

Now, how does this lead to scope creep? Well, there is a common problem, well-reported, that states and localities don't have the resources to do what they need to do. There's a whole conversation right now about states and localities that are being looped into federal immigration enforcement have even less resources to cooperate and meet these enormous goals with deportation.

And when you don't have resources, modernization or automating things becomes incredibly tempting. Now, states are not going to go out and say, “Palantir, build me a new bespoke system that serves my approach to policy determinations around how we're gonna cooperate with the federal government. What is going to happen and what is happening?”

And we've seen this in the, in criminal law enforcement context through products like Gotham, is that they're going to buy off the shelf products. And what are these off the shelf products? They are packaged versions of what was built for the federal government. And what does that mean when states and localities buy these products?

They are potentially completely unknowingly embedding into their systems the policy determinations that were made upstream in designing the products for the federal government. So that's one kind of scope creep. States are now kind of roped into this mission, even if they're doing it unknowingly.

Second scope creep, we should all care about this issue because we should care about immigrants. We should also care about this issue because immigration and the way we treat immigrants in this country has often been a canary in the minefield of what is to come for the rest of the population. It's something that, and this is something that automation does and we've seen with both federal government surveillance and commercial surveillance, it normalizes and desensitizes the public to certain kinds of activities.

We are no longer weirded out by the idea that ALPR cameras are tracking our license plates wherever we go, collecting this data and able to monitor our movements, because it's been around for a while. Now, ALPR data, many contracts say we are only sharing this with federal immigration enforcement under these terms and conditions.

However, those are limitations put in contract. Those contracts can be changed. They don't even have to be changed. There's also many documented cases of even, for example, sanctuary cities that say, “We are actually categorically not sharing this data with federal immigration enforcement because we do not wanna cooperate in this regime.”

What is that dependent on? It depends on individuals complying with that, and there are many cases of individuals sharing that information with ICE agents anyway. So all of this is the restrictions on a technology once it is built and out there feel very thin. And the incentive for both the private sector and the government is to expand how they're used.

The federal government doesn't just want data for immigration enforcement. They want data across the board for law enforcement, for intelligence and national security, even when it doesn't relate to immigrants. That is the interest, that's why we have the Fourth Amendment, because we think that's going to be the default position of the government.

Why is the private sector predisposed or inclined to expand where they use this? That is more business. Those are more contracts, that is more profit. And so now we have the private sector and the federal government's incentives aligning, and that's a scary thing for the public. And so I think it is very likely, and we are kind of already seeing this that these technologies start being used outside of the immigration context.

Tyler McBrien: So again, you have painted, I would say, a pretty bleak picture, probably both for those who favor fidelity to our immigration enforcement laws and those who are, who also, who disagree with them entirely. I mean, there's so many of what we just talked about, the entrench- entrenchment of the technologies and the companies, how now profit can drive policy decisions, how this sector is insulated from oversight.

The other branches, there's deference now that it's been securitized. But your paper also gets into recommendations for interventions or proposals that reform and not of the sort that are you know, typical of what you would hear in like a very unsexy procurement context. The audience largely is if I'm not mistaken, the states and what can be done within our system of federalism specifically.

So turning to the end here, what do you propose given the, just the scope of this—I hesitate to even call it a policy problem because it's a systemic it's system-wide. So if you could lay out some of those interventions.

Chinmayi Sharma: Yeah. It's important to paint a realistic picture of something so you know what you're up against, and it's also important to recognize, like, that's not the end of the story.

What do we do if we just give up in the face of that? And states have actually been kind of like the bastions of hope in this context in that they are doing what they can, and sorry, not just states, sub-federal entities. You have localities resisting their state and the federal government where the state wants to cooperate with the federal government, the locality says like, “We do not want a part of this.”

Like Austin is a classic example of this; these sub-federal entities are resisting, have resisted in the past. I mean, even before this enormous automation apparatus, we had sanctuary cities. And I think that they are ... I mean, immigration enforcement started with the story of federalism. The federal government relied on states to some degree and states had a negotiating position with the federal government on how much they wanna help and how much they don't want to help.

And I think it comes back to federalism of states do have their own spheres of power, and within those spheres of power, they are capable of protecting their constituents. They can proactively ensure that there are protections for their constituents that go above and beyond what the federal government and how the Constitution is being interpreted would give those constituents.

And so it can be everything from banning the use of things like biometric surveillance and facial recognition by law enforcement. And the reason we talked about kind of the scope creep, once law enforcement has it, they can share that information with DHS. It doesn't have to be something that was only collected in the immigration context.

And so banning facial recognition and biometric surveillance is at least one way in which you take away like a big key that the federal government uses to match individuals to other sorts of identifying information to build these dossiers. Now, this is a step, it's an important step, it's a small step.

There is so much other information that's being collected, like you have information from utilities bills, you have information from your grocery loyalty card and what you tend to buy, and the amount of insight you can get from that seemingly innocuous information is enormous. So you can also have enshrined in your state constitutions increased protections for privacy above and beyond what the Fourth Amendment might provide.

You can have privacy protections that you say within this state, we actually extended to immigrants in the way that the Federal Constitution has not been interpreted to extend to immigrants. They can be explicit about the kind of digital privacy that is protected. There are also conversations around can states through constitutions or statutes say that we are going to provide immigrants the capacity to bring vivid actions and why is this important?

Just kind of not going into the legality of it. Once upon a time, doctrine had been interpreted in a way that makes it very hard for immigrants to bring a lawsuit against the federal government saying, “You have violated my constitutional rights and your actions against me.” And now states are using their spheres of authority to say, “We are granting the constituents of this state, including immigrants, the capacity to sue for violations of rights.”

There's a lot of nuance there. There's a lot of conversation on the scope of that, but that is something that is being pushed. I mean, I can go on about the different structures that can be set up, but like what states can do is to go beyond contractual restrictions on just sharing of information because as we talked about, those are paper thin.

They rely on human compliance and they're also leaky. So for example, a state might have a contract that says, "Do not share this information with ICE." But the state also sells this data to data brokers who then sell the data to ICE, or you can have states that make this information available on their websites so that they can then be scraped and then made available to ICE.

There's just a lot of leaks in that, and so what states can do and what some are doing is dismantling the apparatus itself. Take out the pieces, the spokes to the hub model, these data streams, the use of these vendors that are known to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement, cut off their access to information about your constituents, do not provide the business services that they might rely on, do not use these off the shelf products.

It's not just law passing, but about proactively dismantling the architecture that's allowing for this. One thing that I've just loved to give a shout out to an entity that was not called out in the paper, but is a form of resistance that we had not thought of, but is really heartening. There is a Canadian union, BCGEU, that is a minority shareholder in Thomas Reuters.

And since 2020, but this has been reinvigorated in a huge way recently, they are using their rights as shareholders to try to unearth information that many suspect that Thomas Reuters is withholding about its cooperations with ICE. And so Thomas Reuter's public statements are, “We share this information for serious criminal investigations. We do not cooperate with ICE.”

There is reason and reporting to suggest that is not the case. And so now these shareholders are saying, “We have the right to make proposals, and the proposals that they're making are for human rights impact assessments into Thomas Reuter's business activities and books.”

And what that will do is it'll uncover information that has otherwise maybe through litigation or investigative reporting previously been unknown to the public. And so even in the corporate context, there are things to do to resist, to signal discomfort to say, “I wanna change company practice from the inside as a shareholder.”

Tyler McBrien: Well, as you've said, there are so many different directions we can go even from here, even after having spoken about it for 45 minutes, but a reminder that this is a deeply entrenched, but not entirely insurmountable problem. It seems like a good place to close. The paper was really important, really thought provoking.

I hope it's the first of a series of papers exploring this research agenda. So Chini, thank you so much for joining me.

Chinmayi Sharma: Thank you so much for having me.

[Outro]

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