More on Woodward and Classified Information
Earlier this week Michael Isikoff wrote about the classified secrets revealed by top officials in Woodward’s Obama’s Wars and asked whether there is a double standard in the Obama administration’s prosecutions of lower-level leakers of classified information. I build on some of Isikoff’s reporting (in particular his revelation that one official under indictment for leaking is seeking to invoke the leaks in Woodward’s book as a basis to dismiss the indictment against him), and some points I made in my previous
Earlier this week Michael Isikoff wrote about the classified secrets revealed by top officials in Woodward’s Obama’s Wars and asked whether there is a double standard in the Obama administration’s prosecutions of lower-level leakers of classified information. I build on some of Isikoff’s reporting (in particular his revelation that one official under indictment for leaking is seeking to invoke the leaks in Woodward’s book as a basis to dismiss the indictment against him), and some points I made in my previous post on this topic, in this op-ed. After listing what I see as the national security harms from top-level leaks of sensitive secrets, I conclude: “‘The hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained,’ Justice Stewart noted. Woodward's book reveals a secrecy system that is truly ineffective, one that massively overclassifies at the same time that it tolerates open and selective leaking from the top about important secrets that is not obviously principled or in the national interest but that does render the system non-credible.”
Jack Goldsmith is the Learned Hand Professor at Harvard Law School, co-founder of Lawfare, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003-2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002-2003.
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