Poland’s Undelivered Liberal Promises

On June 1, the far-right candidate Karol Nawrocki defeated liberal Rafał Trzaskowski in Poland’s nationwide presidential election. Prior to its win, the right-wing populist party, Law and Justice, had been consolidating power for eight years. The victorious but fragile Civic Coalition, ranging from left to center-right, had promised to relax Poland’s abortion ban, introduce same-sex partnerships, restore the rule of law, and prosecute right-wing politicians. To implement their ideas, the coalition needed a president who wouldn’t veto new legislation or pardon politicians from Law and Justice’s government.

The presidential election was a real test of the country’s will to secure democratic change. At the same time, however, it served as a referendum on the current ruling coalition—which is divided by internal conflicts and the contradictory stances held by its parties—and a forum for expressing discontent with both mainstream parties.

Nawrocki’s victory has called Civic Coalition’s promises into question, pushing them into a defensive position and forcing them to rethink their strategy. Yet the election’s first round also showed the potential for the left to unite and allow liberals to realize their plans.

The difference in the second round was less than 2 percent of the popular vote, making it the smallest victory in any Polish presidential election after 1989. At the same time, the turnout of 71.63 percent was the highest in Poland’s history of presidential elections and the second highest in the history of free elections after the 2023 parliamentary elections. This outcome suggests the extent of polarization in the culture war between the right-wing camp and the liberals, neatly splitting the country’s population along ideological lines.

This picture, however, might be misleading. Polish presidential elections are held in two rounds. If no candidate achieves 50 percent of votes during the first round, a second round is held between the candidates who achieved the highest results. The two candidates have to appeal to the voters of the candidates who weren’t elected during the first round. The first round showed growing support for various far-right parties and movements across all segments of Polish society (together around 22 percent) but also decent support for the left and the far left, whose candidates together achieved around 10 percent, suggesting that, even with a far-right president, the left can continue to animate Polish society.                                                   

The Role of Third Parties and Young People

Third-choice parties strongly criticized the “duopoly”—referring to the division between the liberal Civic Coalition led by Donald Tusk (which Trzaskowski belongs to) and the right-wing Law and Justice party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, which supported Nawrocki. Third-party politicians argued that the two biggest parties have been handing power back and forth for 20 years after failing to build a center-right coalition in 2005, and that in practice their politics are not significantly different. They pointed to politicians like Radek Sikorski, who had been minister of defense in a government formed by Law and Justice (2005-2007) and minister of foreign affairs in governments formed by Civic Platform (2007-2014 and 2023 to the present); former Law and Justice Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who before obtaining a government position had been an adviser to Donald Tusk; and current Polish President Andrzej Duda, who was a member of the centrist Liberal Union, a party to which Tusk also belonged. Critics of the duopoly also argued that both Kaczyński and Tusk have been active in parliamentary politics for over 30 years, suggesting they should hand the reins of power over to a new generation.

Since most of the parties opposing the duopoly are right-wing, both presidential candidates tried to appeal to the far right after the first round in the hopes of winning over their base. Nawrocki, for example, signed a declaration given to him by Konfederacja’s Mentzen. Unlike the mainstream of Law and Justice, which embraces some aspects of the welfare state, major public investments, and public health care, Mentzen’s economic stance is neoliberal. Mentzen’s declaration had eight points that demanded, among other things, that the candidate promise to veto a new law extending criminalization of hate speech to protect the LGBTQ+ community and women; never raise taxes; veto Ukraine’s attempts to join NATO and refrain from sending Polish troops to Ukraine; reject any extension of the European Union’s ability to influence Polish politics; and refuse to increase limits on firearm possession. Trzaskowski, the liberal candidate, refused to sign this declaration but met Mentzen for an interview on his YouTube channel and had a beer with him and Radek Sikorski afterward in a bar Mentzen owns.

Though Trzaskowski winked at Metzen’s electorate, he strongly criticized the views and public appearances of another presidential candidate, Grzegorz Braun. The success of this former member of Konfederacja, who received 6.34 percent of the vote, was probably the election’s biggest shock for liberals and leftists alike. Braun’s public appearances have been characterized by hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric—including antisemitism; hate speech toward Poland’s Ukrainian minority, women, migrants, and Muslims; and attacks on the LGBTQ+ community. He has also praised dictatorships he sees as a promising alternative to the Western model of democracy, including Russia and China. A failed filmmaker, Braun has often engaged in performative, sensationalist acts—including attacking a menorah lit in the Polish Parliament with a fire extinguisher. Braun is not attached to either Law and Justice or Konfederacja, but his actions have normalized extremism in right-wing circles; Nawrocki did not openly criticize him during the campaign.

In contrast, in the lead-up to the second round of voting, the Trzaskowski campaign tried to mobilize the centrist and leftist electorate, especially those who did not vote in the first round. Although mobilization grew between rounds, it was not enough to deliver victory. Over one million fewer people voted for Trzaskowski than for the liberal coalition in 2023. Meanwhile, Nawrocki gained over a million votes compared to the joint result of Law and Justice and Konfederacja in 2023.

In the first round, among the youngest voters (18-29)—who were the second most mobilized group (72.8 percent)—the main split was among supporters of far-right candidate Sławomir Mentzen (36.1 percent) of Konfederacja, and far-left candidate Adrian Zandberg (19.7 percent) of Razem. What’s surprising is that in the second round, Nawrocki won among younger voters (ages 18-39) who supported the liberal coalition in the last election. This suggests that, overall, the official narrative of Nawrocki’s campaign—that he was running as an independent candidate only supported by Law and Justice—combined with his strong criticism of the establishment, put him in a better position to take the third-party vote.

Trzaskowski won among middle-aged voters, who generally favor Civic Coalition, and managed to establish some gains among older voters. The overall difference between the main candidates was so small that the initial exit polls announced a victory for Trzaskowski, which changed in the late polls; Trzaskowski even made a victory speech. But it was Nawrocki—unknown to most of the public a year ago—who became the president-elect. Though there are some doubts about the results in a number of commissions where a recount is taking place, they are unlikely to change the result.

Nawrocki’s Background

The facts that emerged about Nawrocki this year might seem to be disqualifying. At the beginning of his campaign, he highlighted his background as a historian, appointed by Law and Justice to run the Institute of National Remembrance and the Museum of the Second World War. His campaign also emphasized his masculinity, playing up his past as a boxer and bodyguard and releasing videos of him lifting weights—a clear pitch to the far-right electorate. This narrative was contrasted with that of Trzaskowski, who the right-wing media portrayed as effeminate and elitist—calling him “rainbow Rafał” in reference to the fact that he walks every year in Warsaw’s Pride Parade.

However, the campaign’s narrative began to unravel in the final weeks before the elections. During a debate, Nawrocki claimed that he was a “normal” citizen who owned only one piece of property. He made this comment in the context of the high price of apartments, sparking proposals to tax owners of multiple properties in order to slow purchases of property as an investment—which inflates prices and forces many young families into debt.

After the debate, the media quickly discovered that Nawrocki had lied: He owned a second apartment. The circumstances under which he had obtained the apartment were dubious and convoluted. According to Gazeta Wyborcza, he had manipulated a disabled pensioner (who was in police custody at the time) into signing an agreement to give Nawrocki his apartment, in exchange for various promises—all of which Nawrocki failed to keep.

Other scandals soon followed. Liberal media uncovered Nawrocki’s alleged contacts with neo-Nazi football fans and gangsters. Although these allegations were based on unverifiable rumors, Nawrocki himself admitted that during his PhD studies in history he took part in a hooligan brawl in which he represented fans of the Gdańsk team against supporters of the Poznań team.

Journalists from the Polish site Onet.pl published an article about the nature of Nawrocki’s work in an expensive hotel in Gdańsk as a bodyguard. Their reporting was based on interviews with anonymous sources who said they were prepared to confirm their accusations under oath in court. They claimed that Nawrocki made money from putting sex workers in touch with the hotel’s clients. (Although sex work is legal in Poland, it is a crime for a third person to profit from it.) Nawrocki denied the accusation and sued the website in civil court—litigation that could take years to resolve.

During the final debate of the campaign, when Trzaskowski started talking about Warsaw’s efforts to create public care for the elderly, Nawrocki inserted a tobacco product, Snus, in his mouth onstage; he later claimed that he was chewing gum. During the same debate he also made a bizarre comment when Trzaskowski mentioned the issue of civil partnerships for same-sex couples, raising various kinds of relationships that could be legalized, like “a veteran’s relationship with a young man.”

The Future of the Liberal Coalition

After Nawrocki’s victory, Donald Tusk immediately called for a vote of confidence for his government—which he won—and announced a reconstruction of the coalition. The move was a symbolic attempt to prove the liberal government’s unity. Nevertheless, it reveals Tusk’s defensive strategy, calculated to ensure the party’s survival in the broadest form possible in the face of the growing right wing, consolidated by Nawrocki’s victory.

According to polls, however, support for Civic Coalition and its coalition partners has declined further since the election, suggesting that the party would not be able to form a government if elections were held today. The most likely governing coalition that would emerge now would comprise Law and Justice and Konfederacja. With Nawrocki in the presidential palace, this scenario would push Poland even further to the right than the previous Law and Justice government.

In the meantime, however, the Polish president has little real power, meaning there will likely be few changes to the government’s functions. Legislative and executive power is in the hands of the prime minister—Tusk—who is elected by parliamentary majority. The president has limited influence on international and defense matters but is able to veto laws, apart from the budget. The presidential veto can be overturned by a two-thirds parliamentary majority, which the current coalition doesn’t have. However, the outgoing Law and Justice president, Andrzej Duda, has used his veto only six times over the past two years, and Nawrocki is likely to use it equally sparingly.

Surprisingly, Polish international relations and defense matters are not a subject of major conflict (apart from nominating ambassadors, which the president can block). Both Civic Platform and Law and Justice support Poland’s membership in the European Union and alliance with the United States, as well as raising military and defense spending. Recently, the two parties voted to leave the Ottawa convention on ceasing the use of landmines. The two parties also support stricter control over migration, including halting immigration from the Global South through Poland’s border with Belarus; Tusk introduced legislation supported by Law and Justice to suspend the right to apply for asylum on the Poland-Belarus border, with some humanitarian exceptions. The law violates not only the Polish Constitution but also the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, the major liberal promises of legalizing abortion, establishing same-sex partnerships, and restoring the full functioning of constitutional and supreme courts—which were a major part of the promises made during the liberal government’s 2023 victory—will not be fulfilled. Without a president from their camp, the coalition will be able to govern but unable to achieve any major changes.

The rise of the Polish right and the reemergence of its themes in public discourse will force Tusk to decide whether he wants to push his party to the center left, as attempted during the parliamentary election, or try to sustain Civic Coalition’s image as a more pro-European, center-right party. For now, the latter effort is more likely, as Tusk tries to consolidate the liberal forces and dominate the pro-democratic part of the political scene in the hope that he can convince some third-party voters to support the large center-right block.

The only hope for creating an alternative to the duopoly on the pro-democratic side lies on the center left, which is in the ruling coalition, and the far left, which opposes the current government. The two parties have basically the same agenda but are in conflict over their relationship to Tusk’s government. The center left, which is in the governing coalition, seeks to achieve a leftist agenda while also remaining critical of some of the government’s decisions, such as suspending the right to asylum. The far left, which is in the opposition, votes against the government and accuses the center left of selling out. The difference is one of political strategy, not ideology, and might be overcome before the next election.

Indeed, reconciliation might be necessary in order to avoid a repeat of 2015, when a divided left didn’t manage to enter the parliament, giving Law and Justice a much stronger mandate than its election result would have provided under normal circumstances. In two years, if Tusk’s strategy fails and Civic Coalition doesn’t manage to expand its electorate, the left might be the only hope of preventing right-wing parties from obtaining a significant majority.

Since leftist parties express firm support for legal abortion on demand and civil partnerships for same-sex couples—which, as demonstrated by the first round of votes in the presidential election, a majority of the population supports—they might be a force that could convincingly vow to make good on liberal promises and rebuild support from 2023. The question is whether voters believe that these unfulfilled promises will finally be realized.