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Here's the math problem: We've known for some time that the group of detainees who fall into the government's "too dangerous" category includes 33 men (a number that goes down with each clearance of a detainee by a Periodic Review Board). And we learned recently that the government envisions military commission proceedings for at most seven of the remaining detainees--on top of the 10 detainees whose military commission proceedings are ongoing or have run their course.
Of course, many of the pending (and, possibly, future) military commission trials are vulnerable to serious constitutional (and other legal) challenges. But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the courts uphold the authority of the commissions to try all of these cases (I'd bet more money on the Mets winning the World Series), that leaves at least 15 detainees who have historically been "referred for prosecution," whose military commission trial has apparently been foreclosed by the U.S. government, and who therefore must either fall into the group of detainees who are cleared for transfer (complicating the diplomatic intrigue to which Bobby alluded), or who are not (which would increase by nearly 50% the size of the group that would be left even if the government is able to transfer everyone else--and perhaps more, if some of these commission cases are ultimately thrown out).
Thus, as we continue to discuss the practical, political, and legal obstacles to closing Guantánamo, it sure would be helpful to know into which of the two non-military commission categories these 15-plus detainees fall...