The U.S. Security Commitment to Qatar and a Path to Peace in Ukraine

During a meeting at the White House on Friday, Oct. 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that to end the Russia-Ukraine War, “a bilateral security guarantee between [him] and President Trump is very important.” He added that “it is the most important document because the United States is very strong.”

The sentiment is not new. Ukraine has been looking for a robust U.S. security commitment since discussions in the 1990s about giving up its nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. It remains relevant today. The prospect of a U.S. security commitment to Ukraine came up during the Istanbul talks with Russia right after the 2022 full-scale invasion. A U.S. promise to take serious economic and military measures, including a potential use of armed force, in defense of Ukraine if it is attacked again can facilitate a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia. It can provide Ukraine with a security substitute for NATO membership and simultaneously satisfy the long-standing Russian demand of keeping Ukraine out of NATO.

Recent events have now provided this long sought after commitment with a new model. Just a few weeks ago, President Trump facilitated the Israel-Hamas ceasefire by, among other things, providing a strongly-worded security guarantee to Qatar via an executive order. The order bears some resemblance to other U.S. security obligations with regard to treaty allies in NATO and Asia. Indeed, under the order, any armed attack against Qatar would be considered “a threat to peace and security of the United States,” stipulating that the U.S. “shall” take all appropriate measures, including “diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military,” to defend Qatar. The guarantee reportedly motivated Qatar to continue its mediating role in the conflict despite previous Israeli air strikes on Hamas leadership in Doha. Part of the Hamas leadership is located in Qatar, and other members of Hamas may have an option to flee there if they lay down their arms. Consequently, the loss of Qatari involvement in the negotiations threatened to derail the entire peace process.

A similarly worded security guarantee of Ukraine’s armed neutrality or non-alignment is a tool that President Trump can use to increase the chances of ending the Russia-Ukraine War through a settlement acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia. Right after the Alaska summit concluded, U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff stated that the Trump administration was “able to win the following concession [from Russia], that the United States could offer Article 5-like protection, which is one of the real reasons why Ukraine wants to be in NATO” (emphasis added). President Trump reportedly also previously told Ukraine and the European partners that Ukraine can have “Article 5-like NATO protections.” Considering Russia’s aversion to NATO membership and other alliances for Ukraine, Witkoff may have contemplated an Article 5-like security arrangement in exchange for Ukraine’s armed neutrality, discussed by Ukraine and Russia during the 2022 Istanbul talks. It remains to be seen whether such a framework can satisfy all the parties.

Congressional buy-in for U.S. security commitments to Ukraine would certainly bolster their credibility in the eyes of both Ukraine and Russia. However, a presidential promise akin to the Qatar executive order may be the second-best option by putting the U.S. and its president’s credibility on the line and forming a bedrock for the settlement. Although some scholars have argued that absent congressional involvement, an Article 5-like executive promise raises significant constitutional questions, the move can be justified with the help of prior executive assertions of broad powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution—including to make security commitments and unilaterally use force in defense of partners.

Understanding the Security Guarantee to Qatar

Comparing and Contrasting With NATO’s Article 5

The executive order’s wording on the necessary “military measures” may imply the use of U.S. armed forces in defense of Qatar under certain circumstances. Consequently, journalists and analysts have suggested that the order “mirrors” the U.S. obligations under NATO and mutual defense treaties with its Asian allies. However, there are notable differences in the wording.

The executive order declared a U.S. policy “to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of the State of Qatar against external attack” (emphasis added). Other U.S. mutual defense obligations, including in NATO, do not explicitly include the term “guarantee.” However, the invocation of this term is not unprecedented; former President Biden, for example, sometimes used this term in his statements in the context of NATO’s Article 5. Section 2 of the order contains a list of U.S. security commitments to pursue  the policy of guaranteeing Qatar’s security. Unlike Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the executive order does not state that an attack on Qatar would be considered an attack on the U.S. Instead, such an attack would constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the United States,” creating a softer commitment than NATO’s Article 5 in this section.  This wording more closely resembles U.S. mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.

Also, according to the order, if Qatar is attacked, “the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures — including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military” (emphasis added). In comparison, NATO’s Article 5 obliges the U.S. to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force” (emphasis added). Although NATO’s Article 5 explicitly mentions a potential use of armed force, the executive order’s wording on the appropriate and necessary “military measures” to guarantee Qatar’s security similarly seems to implicate the potential use of armed force. However, unlike Article 5, the order does not contain the explicit subjective qualifier “as it deems necessary” (for a history of this qualification in NATO’s Article 5, see Michael Schmitt’s article). Instead, the order provides for  “all lawful and appropriate measures” (including “if necessary, military”). Hence, the order can be interpreted as including an objective standard of using force—a standard that appears somewhat stronger than the more discretionary wording of Article 5. The order’s wording is also stronger than the relevant wording in the U.S. mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, which contain an obligation to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”

Additionally, the order obliges the secretary of defense, in coordination with the secretary of state and the director of national intelligence, to “maintain joint contingency planning with the State of Qatar to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to any foreign aggression” against Qatar. Although the U.S. does engage in extensive contingency planning with its NATO and other allies, the mutual defense treaties themselves do not contain explicit wording to this effect.

As others have observed, the order omits a standard qualification present in U.S. mutual defense treaties about acting “according to constitutional processes,” which implies the need for congressional involvement under certain circumstances. However, the order does contain wording present in other executive orders, stating that it “shall be implemented consistent with applicable law [which includes the U.S. Constitution] and subject to availability of appropriations,”—which could act similarly as the “constitutional processes” wording in the mutual defense treaties.

The partial advantages of the order’s wording do not automatically make the U.S. commitment to Qatar  more credible than the U.S. security obligations to its allies. Beyond the language itself, a commitment’s credibility depends on its history, contingency plans, military presence (although around 10,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Qatar), and various other policy and strategic considerations. However, such robust wording puts the credibility of the U.S. and President Trump on the line. Importantly, a breach of the U.S. commitment to Qatar may have potential negative implications for credibility of U.S. commitments to its NATO and Asian allies, given the resemblance between them. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger succinctly summarized this credibility variable:

For what is involved now is confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms ‘credibility’ or ‘prestige,’ they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness.

(For a more thorough analysis of the credibility variable, see Karen Yarhi-Milo’s piece.) Also, as others have suggested, attempts to revoke the order by subsequent administrations may have diplomatic and strategic costs, including in security relations with Qatar. As I explain below, it is precisely the importance of  U.S. credibility that may facilitate a settlement in the Russia-Ukraine War. And if a security guarantee becomes the foundation of a peace settlement, revoking it in the future may upset the peace. This, in turn, may contribute to the order’s durability.

Status Under International Law

Considering that the security commitments to Qatar are outlined unilaterally via executive order, it may constitute a unilateral undertaking by the United States, not an agreement with Qatar. However, depending on the exact nature of the bilateral discussions and arrangements between the U.S. and Qatar, the commitments could still arguably constitute an international agreement.

For an instrument to qualify as a legally binding or nonbinding international agreement, it must express the convergence of the parties’ wills. An international agreement can be embodied in “two or more related instruments,” given the parties’ mutual will as conveyed by the text and surrounding circumstances. However, an agreement can also be oral. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the executive order, calling it “an important step in strengthening the two countries’ close defense partnership” that “will contribute to strengthening bilateral cooperation in the security and diplomatic field.” Depending on other communications between Qatar and the U.S, it is possible to argue that Qatar has expressed its agreement with the U.S. about these commitments. The answer to this question depends significantly on the exact understanding that the U.S. and Qatar achieved—and whether it is part of a broader Gaza peace arrangement—as reported in the media. Currently, however, the specifics of these bilateral discussions have not been made public.

Another important issue is whether the U.S. commitments enumerated in the order are legally binding under international law. If so, that would bring them closer to NATO and other mutual defense obligations of the U.S.—both in terms of wording and legal status—potentially amplifying the credibility consideration mentioned earlier.

Whether the parties intended an international agreement to be binding depends on its text, the context of its conclusion, and sometimes the subsequent conduct of the parties. A unilateral undertaking can be also legally binding if it is specific and clear enough, and expresses the state’s intention to this effect (for example, see the ICJ Nuclear Test Cases). The relevant security commitments to Qatar are expressed using the operating word “shall,” which usually conveys binding obligations under international law. However, the order also mentions that the secretary of state “shall reaffirm this assurance” to Qatar (emphasis added). This could allow the U.S. to argue that, despite the binding wording of the executive order for the purpose of directing relevant officials within the administration, the administration sought to provide a nonbinding assurance to Qatar. Whether this logic is correct would depend, among other things, on other bilateral communications and understandings between Qatar and the U.S. However, absent an explicit understanding to the contrary, a binding wording could still allow Qatar to make a plausible argument that the U.S. made a legally binding commitment as a matter of international law.

Separately, the order contains a boilerplate disclaimer present in many other executive orders that it does not create “any right or benefit… enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States.” However, considering that such wording is usually aimed at precluding suits in domestic courts, it is not immediately clear whether it has a meaningful influence on the commitments’ legal nature under international law, where no court has jurisdiction to enforce these commitments.

Implications for Ukraine

During the 2022 Istanbul talks, Ukraine and Russia discussed a legally binding, Article 5-like security guarantee to Ukraine from P5 members of the UN Security Council in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality. A draft treaty prepared at that time included wording somewhat stronger than Article 5 of NATO, providing for assistance to Ukraine as a permanently neutral state in case of armed attack against it and using armed force to restore its security “as may be necessary.” However, Russia wanted unreasonable caps on the Ukrainian armed forces and veto power regarding the security guarantee. That said, there was some chance of Russia dropping the veto demand under certain circumstances, considering that, earlier in the negotiations, it provisionally accepted a security framework without it. Still, a big question in the current talks is whether Russia will acquiesce to Ukraine’s robust defense and deterrence capabilities. As I argued earlier,

[G]iven continuing robust military and economic pressure, Russia might realize that it is better to pocket some strategic benefits of Ukraine’s armed neutrality, including strategic denial of the Ukrainian territory to NATO, than fight many more years and risk getting much less down the road.

Critics of “NATO’s Article 5-like” security commitment for Ukraine have suggested that—given that the U.S. and other partners have refused to directly support Ukraine with their armed forces in the current war—any promise to use force in defense of Ukraine in the future would not be credible, including in the Russian eyes (for example, see Charap and Shapiro). However, this line of argumentation misses the important reputational factor. If the U.S. makes a strong commitment involving a potential use of armed force, it puts its credibility on the line—including the credibility of its NATO commitments if the wording bears a strong resemblance to them. Put differently, when a promise is made, maintaining the credibility of similar promises becomes a part of national interest.

To illustrate this logic: From a pure national interest perspective, the U.S. arguably does not have significantly greater reasons to fight a war with Russia (with a potential nuclear escalation) in defense of the Baltic countries than for Ukraine, but the importance of NATO’s credibility makes the pledge credible. Thus, a security guarantee can be an important factor in both the guarantor’s and Russia’s calculus if the latter considers attacking again. As RAND Corporation analyst Samuel Charap observed in 2022,

The risk that the U.S military would come to Ukraine’s defense would be existential for Russia. It seems highly unlikely that Moscow would want to open up the prospect of war with the United States merely to prove a point.

Moreover, the NATO-like commitment would be just one of the important pillars of the deterrence scheme. The second pillar would be Ukraine’s strong defense and deterrence capabilities (supported with Western security assistance during peacetime), ensuring that in the event of a future attack, Ukraine can effectively defend itself. This may force Russia to question the prudence of waging another war, given the low prospects of success (see my earlier Lawfare piece about legal and policy considerations of Ukraine’s armed neutrality).

Following this logic, some analysts have suggested that promising Ukraine “a massive intensification of external support” in the event of another attack would have a sufficient deterrent effect, demonstrating credible commitment. But such a promise on its own is a less reliable deterrent of future aggression; Russia has proven that it is ready to incur tremendous costs to achieve its objectives in Ukraine despite massive support and sanctions from the West. Hence, there is always a risk that it may find it acceptable to incur the expected costs to put into action the lessons it has learned during the war. 

However, the calculus would be significantly different if Russia perceives a risk of some form of direct U.S. involvement in the conflict. Moreover, the risk of using force to defend Ukraine may create additional incentives for the guarantors to prevent Russia’s attack, including by ensuring Ukraine’s army is well-prepared to act as a first line of defense to reduce the need for the guarantors’ significant direct involvement.

The third pillar would be Russia’s incentives to maintain the status quo if it agrees to the arrangement. The U.S. guarantee of Ukraine’s armed neutrality would essentially satisfy one of Russia’s main demands to the West in the run-up to the 2022 full-scale invasion—to foreclose Ukraine’s membership in NATO—and would ensure Ukrainian neutrality. If the parties agree on the acceptable parameters of Ukraine’s armed neutrality, by launching a new attack Russia would not only incur significant costs from Ukraine’s resistance and Western sanctions and risk a war with the U.S.—it would also lead to Ukraine potentially irreversibly abandoning its neutral status as Belgium and Luxembourg after Germany violated their neutrality. This framework of intertwined incentives can significantly reduce the risks of future war.

In the Ukrainian case, it would be best if the U.S. made such a security guarantee with congressional involvement to increase its credibility and to iron out any constitutional questions. Judging by the 1969 National Commitments Resolution, besides the Article II treaty mechanism with the necessary two-thirds of votes in the Senate, it should also be possible to achieve this through a congressional-executive agreement with the majorities in both houses of Congress.

However, even an executive commitment from the Trump administration may prove to be beneficial. First, it would require that President Trump defend Ukraine’s neutrality. Second, if the armed neutrality guarantee becomes a bedrock of the negotiated settlement in Ukraine, revoking it by the next administration may unravel the settlement and increase the risks of future war. That may be politically challenging to do and involve significant political costs. To further lock in the commitment legally and politically, it may be worth seeking a UN Security Council resolution to endorse such a guarantee. 

Constitutional Questions and Historical Practice

In his recent Just Security piece, Michael Mattler opined that issuing such security guarantees without congressional involvement “raises significant constitutional questions” and is “inconsistent with both historical practice and the Senate’s longstanding position.” Mattler suggested that it also “entails an extraordinary and seemingly unprecedented claim of independent authority by the President” because the performance of the commitments would “almost certainly require Congressional action” due to congressional authority under Article I of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power “to declare war and to decide whether to appropriate funds to support U.S. military actions.” However, prior presidents asserted extensive Article II powers relevant for such a guarantee.

First, U.S. presidents have asserted expansive powers under Article II of the Constitution to use force in self-defense and in the sufficient national interest, including to protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens abroad and in collective self-defense of or assistance to partners. For example, President Biden seemingly used such Article II powers to protect Israel from Iranian and other attacks without congressional authorization. In his Lawfare piece, based on this and other similar assertions of Article II powers by the executive, Jack Goldsmith concluded that

Just about any conceivable circumstances in which the president (or his relevant subordinates) would think it prudent to use force in the Middle East can be justified under an Article II self-defense theory.

Additionally, the executive has also justified a unilateral use of force to “further sufficiently important national interests,” including “assisting an ally or strategic partner at its request” (for example, see an Office of Legal Counsel opinion on targeting ISIL during the Obama administration). Under these prior precedents, the Trump administration can justify the use of force in performance of the Qatar security guarantee, among other things, to protect the U.S. forces located in Qatar and defend Qatar as a partner without congressional authorization. Admittedly, the executive branch has indicated an important limitation in this respect in the past, admitting that congressional approval would be required when “[t]he anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the military operations [would] rise to the level of a ‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of War Clause.” But the executive took the position that military operations would amount to war only if they constituted a “prolonged and substantial military engagement, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risks over a substantial period.” Also, based on this position “military operations that do not include the introduction of ground troops are less likely to constitute ‘war.’” However, this limitation may lose its relevance in practice, among other things, when there is no opportunity to deliberate (which is often the case with self-defense against a surprise attack) and when U.S. forces are already engaged in battle.

Second, the president has expansive authority to make nonbinding agreements or declarations on any topic without congressional review or approval. For example, given the absence of support from Congress, former President Obama concluded the so-called Iran nuclear deal without congressional approval by presenting it as a nonbinding agreement. If the Qatar security guarantee is nonbinding (and there is a possibility that this is the case), that would mean that President Trump pledged to use his Article II powers in defense of Qatar without making legally binding commitments.

The U.S. executive branch made similar political promises without congressional involvement in the past. For example, in the context of the 1973 Paris talks, former President Nixon made a nonbinding promise to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that “if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement, it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action.” Such retaliatory actions implied a U.S. reply “with full force.” To support the enforcement of the 1975 Israel-Egypt Sinai Disengagement Agreement, the Ford administration promised both Israel and Egypt to consult as to “possible remedial action by the [U.S],” which could conceivably involve at least some form of force. Also, in the 1970 Symington Report, a Senate subcommittee found that, in a 1954 note to Philippine foreign secretary, Secretary of State Dulles effectively promised an “instantaneous response” to any attack on the Philippines instead of pursuing a “constitutional process” (including potential congressional authorization), as provided in the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, considering that any such attack would be considered “an attack upon the military forces of the United States.” Similarly, one can make an argument that any time U.S. presidents guarantee defense of every inch of NATO territory under Article 5, they make a political promise to use their Article II powers on top of the North Atlantic Treaty that contains discretionary language and provides for its implementation in accordance with “respective constitutional processes.”

That said, when it comes to legally binding mutual defense agreements, the U.S. traditionally concluded them in the treaty form with the advice and consent of the Senate under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Congress has also historically protected its role in making similar national commitments—for example, requiring “a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment” (see the 1969 National Commitments Resolution) and pushing against substantial executive agreements, including nonbinding ones, in this respect (see the 1970 Symington Report).

However, in 2008, despite some resistance in Congress, President Bush entered into a legally binding agreement with Iraq, providing that “as may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter” (emphasis added) aggression against Iraq. This wording bears only partial resemblance to the Qatar security guarantee, requiring a mutual agreement to trigger the measures. However, it still implies a potential use of force by the U.S, given the mutual agreement. Indeed, in practice, the operation of such a provision may not be significantly different from U.S. mutual defense treaties that also provide considerable discretion to the United States, especially in its treaties with the allies in Asia. In the case of Iraq, the executive’s assertion of the power to conclude a binding agreement may have been made based on inherent Article II powers, together with the 2022 Iraq AUMF. Indeed, some members of Congress supported the 2008 Iraq agreement with this logic. If the Trump administration used a similar theory for the Qatar security guarantee (which is unclear based on public sources), the congressional reaction would be relevant for potential similar assertions of such powers in the future—including in a potential guarantee to Ukraine. So far, only several senators have reportedly raised their concerns.

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The Trump administration is set to make another push for ending the Russia-Ukraine War in the coming weeks. A security guarantee of Ukraine’s armed neutrality or non-alignment is a tool that the administration can use to facilitate an acceptable negotiated settlement. However, to make progress in negotiations feasible—among other things—Russia would need to cease its demands for  the removal of Ukrainian forces from Donbas and accept Ukraine's robust defense and deterrence capabilities. At the same time, Ukraine should consider introducing its potential armed neutrality or non-alignment into the negotiations on the condition of acceptable security guarantees and Russia’s withdrawal of its unreasonable territorial demands. After all, NATO membership was envisioned as a means of ensuring an independent and secure Ukraine—not as an end in and of itself.