In a highly polarized country, it is hard to change voter preferences—and this is even more likely to be the case when the tools for doing so represent a tiny, tiny fraction of the information to which w...

Authoritarians’ use of influence operations must be understood as part of a larger strategy to reshape the information space into one that is less democratic and more friendly to despots.

The continued focus on Russia, at the expense of domestic threats, is significant and dangerous.

A more transactional policy has brought advantages, but will have limits in the longer term.

What did the candidates have to say about national security issues?

The evidence that there are Russian information operations aimed at the United States is overwhelming. But there is no publicly available evidence that establishes that these operations have made any dif...

Introducing a series from the Stanford Internet Observatory on assessing the threat of foreign influence operations targeting the United States.

Information operations are sometimes sensationalized and overhyped by politicians and others to distract and confuse the public for their own political ends—but the threat persists and must be taken seri...

In the most desperate scenarios, the voters may not be the ones who decide who becomes president after all.